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Using the road system is a par t of everyday life for people all over the world. Most 
people drive their whole life with minimal (if any) formal training, perhaps speeding at times, 
or fatigued and distracted at others, and will never be involved in a serious accident. This is 
quite an achievement if you consider that our perceptual and cognitive ability evolved under 
conditions where the average running speed of a human was under 30km/h and has not had 
time to adapt since the invention of the car.
However, while the individual risk of an accident may be small, it does add up across the 
population. In fact, using the road system it is one of the most common everyday ways for 
someone to be injured or killed. As such, road accidents are the number one cause of death 
worldwide for people aged 15-29, and the 9th leading cause of death internationally if all age 
groups are considered (World Health Organization, 2009). Even soldiers are more likely to 
be killed in a non-combat motor vehicle accident than by enemy action (Fear et al., 2008). 
These tragic statistics are stated again and again in the introductions of repor ts, books, web 
sites, theses and journal ar ticles on road safety and traff ic psychology. As such, it almost seems 
redundant to repeat them. However, these statistics must still be repeated as the majority of 
these road accidents are preventable; a fact that is represented by the gains that have been 
made in road safety in the last 50 or so years. There is still room for fur ther improvement 
however, and traff ic psychology as a f ield is generally dedicated towards this, with traff ic 
psychologists striving to understand the behaviour of drivers and other road users. The hope 
is that this knowledge can be passed on and used by policy makers and system designers to 
save lives, increase mobility, reduce the environmental impact of transpor t, and to generally 
improve transpor t networks. 
Despite this goal, traff ic psychology does not have a widely-used guiding theory or model 
of driver behaviour. In fact, one analysis of over 1400 traff ic psychology papers that were 
published between 1998 and 2008 found that only 15% of these papers used any type of 
recognisable theoretical framework or model at all. Fur thermore, if a paper did use a model 
or framework, it was likely the only time that par ticular model would appear in the literature 
(Glendon, 2011). This creates a fragmented and atheoretical approach, which not only has 
the potential to hamper fur ther research, but also means that mixed messages are being 
communicated to those with the power to guide and shape the road system.  
For instance, how should a governmental Minister react when one traff ic psychologist 
tells her that, according to the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)(Ajzen, 1991) it is all about 
making sure people have the right attitude and social marketing is the way to go. But then 
the next exper t promotes zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 1988; 
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Summala, 1996; Summala, 1997), or Threat avoidance theory (Fuller, 1984; Fuller, 1988; Fuller, 
1990a; Fuller, 1992), that are primarily behavioural learning models and advocate structural 
and regulatory measures. Then the following week the Minister is tapped on the shoulder by 
another exper t promoting the neo-liberal and anti-regulation rhetoric of Peltzman’s (1975) 
driving intensity model, stating that the government should leave well alone and let the 
market handle it. This is an extreme example, but it does highlight the potential risks to the 
creation of effective interventions on the road of this fragmented and atheoretical approach 
in traff ic psychology.
An often stated reason for the lack of consensus in models of driver behaviour is the lack 
of experimental testing that has been carried out to examine the models (Michon, 1985; 
Michon, 1989; Ranney, 1994; Rothengatter, 2002). Therefore the following thesis attempts to 
address this issue. To do so the stage must be set and the predictions of the various models 
made clear. Therefore Chapter 2 features a summary of previous notable reviews of models 
of driver behaviour, followed by a review of many of the more recent, post year 2000, driver 
behaviour models. In par ticular Task Diff iculty Homeostasis theory (TDH) (Fuller & Santos, 
2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh, & Pender, 2008), its successor 
Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT) (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011), the Risk Monitor Model (RMM) (Vaa, 
Glad, & Sagberg, 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) and the multiple comfor t zone model 
(Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007), will be discussed. These models also represent the primary 
models that will be tested in later chapters.
Chapter 3 contains an experiment designed to test the results of one of the primary 
suppor ting studies for TDH and RAT (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). In par ticular the experiment 
examines whether variables such as feelings of risk and task diff iculty are constantly monitored 
and experienced by drivers, or if they operate in more of a threshold fashion, only occurring 
once cer tain conditions are met. This was done through the use of a driving simulator, with 
the primary independent variable being set changes in speed.
Chapter 4 is similar to Chapter 3, and again addresses the issue of the continuous versus 
threshold perception of subjective variables and their inf luence on driver behaviour. This chapter 
also examines whether this perception differed between inexperienced and experienced 
drivers, and whether task familiarity had an impact on these variables. In this case however, 
due to concerns about models of driver behaviour being overly focused on speed (Carsten, 
2009), following distance was the primary independent variable in the simulator study. 
Chapter 5 returns to the use of speed as a primary independent variable and also 
examines the issue of threshold versus constant perception. However, this chapter also seeks 
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to more closely examine the relationship between drivers’ preferred driving speed and these 
subjective variables. This was done by basing the experimental manipulations around each 
individual par ticipant’s own preferred speed, rather than the set speed categories used in the 
experiment described in Chapter 3. Fur thermore the experiment described in Chapter 5 also 
seeks to examine the impact of a secondary task on the variables examined, and whether it 
has any impact on how they are perceived.
Chapter 6 differs somewhat from the empirical chapters preceding it. It describes an 
experiment to test the idea that unconscious or implicit body states or emotions can inf luence 
behaviour without having to become feelings and therefore be made conscious. This idea 
has been referenced by several modern theories of driver behaviour (Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 
McHugh et al., 2008; Fuller, 2011; Kinnear, 2009; Ljung Aust & Engström, 2011; Summala, 2005; 
Summala, 2007; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2011) and was tested through the use of emotive masked 
images being presented to drivers in a simulator. 
Chapter 7 contains a general discussion of the four empirical chapters. In par ticular the 
signif icance of the f indings will be discussed in reference to the models which are outlined in 
chapter 2.
It should be noted that due to the fact that Chapters 3-6 are based on previously 
published journal ar ticles there is some overlap between them. In addition, the content of 
these chapters may also somewhat overlap with the review in Chapter 2 and the discussion 
in Chapter 7. However, attempts have been made to keep this to a minimum while also 
providing comprehensive coverage of the impor tant issues.
 
CHAPTER 2 MODELS OF DRIVER BEHAVIOUR
A version of some par ts of this chapter will be published as Lewis-Evans, B., de Waard, D., and 
Brookhuis, K.A. Contemporary theories of behavioural adaptation. In Jamson, S. and Rudin-
Brown, C. (Eds) Behavioural adaptation: Theory, Evidence and Action. To be released in 2012.
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Concern about the atheoretical and fragmented nature of traff ic psychology is not new 
but major published reviews of driving behaviour models and theories aimed at trying to 
guide and unify the area are relatively scarce. Some do exist however, and in par ticular the 
reviews by Michon (1985; 1989), Ranney (Ranney, 1994), Huguenin and Rumar (2001), and 
Rothengatter (2002) are worthy of mention. 
Michon’s 1989 review is a somewhat more focused restatement of an earlier review 
(Michon, 1985), and approaches models of driver behaviour by characterising them in terms 
of what made them ‘move’. In doing so Michon divided theories of driver behaviour into those 
which move ‘magically’ based on curve f itting, and those rational or functional models which 
are driven by explicitly stated concepts and rules. It was in this latter category of rational 
models, which were also described as models which can adapt and learn, where Michon 
(1985; 1989) saw the most promise. 
The category of functional models was fur ther split into those which Michon described 
as motivational and those which are rule based. The motivational models include Taylor’s 
risk-speed compensation model (Taylor, 1964), RHT (Wilde, 1976), Threat avoidance theory 
(Fuller, 1984) and zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974), although the latter model is 
only mentioned by Michon in his earlier 1985 review. Michon admires these models for moving 
away from the magical curve f itting that accompanied earlier models, but critiques RHT 
for containing circular explanations and Threat Avoidance Theory for not handling nested 
behaviour. In his earlier review Michon (1985) also critiqued the motivational models for being 
over concentrated on risk and road safety, rather than explaining the normal everyday basis 
of driving. Fur thermore, Michon (1985; 1989) views the explanations and mechanisms of the 
motivational models as not suff iciently identifying the underlying cognitive mechanisms that 
they rely on.
Instead, Michon promotes rule based theories, which drew most of his attention in the 
latter par ts of the 1985 and 1989 reviews. Rule based theories are based on the inf luence of 
cognitive science and the idea of schema or scenarios. This means that rule based theories 
state that behaviour operates along the lines of f inding a correct rule, and then applying it 
in a “IF THEN” fashion. For example, IF I feel that my wheels are slipping on the road THEN 
I begin to drive cautiously. As an example of the rule based type of theoretical approach 
Michon (1989) referred to the SOAR cognitive architecture (Laird, Newell, & Rosenbloom, 
1987), and indeed f inishes his review by promoting SOAR as a way forward for understanding 
driver behaviour.
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Ranney’s review in 1994 presents model development in terms of a historical evolution, 
an approach also taken in Michon’s earlier 1985 review. As such he begins by examining 
models based around individual differences such as the previously popular theory of accident 
proneness, which is the idea that some individuals are simply statistically more likely to be in 
accidents than others (see Haight (2001) for an excellent review of this idea). According to 
Ranney, model development then moved on to the examination of various individual factors 
or traits and their inf luence on accident probability. These included visual ability, perceptual 
style, reaction time, gender, age, marital status, traff ic conviction record, and socio-economic 
status, amongst others. These variables had varying levels of success in predicting accidents 
and behaviour, but as Ranney points out, do not offer actual a priori explanations as to 
why accidents occur, but rather are based on aggregate post-hoc explanations. Therefore 
such models are more descriptive than predictive. Ranney also points out that these earlier 
models were aimed primarily at trying to explain only why people are involved in accidents 
rather than explaining the entirety of normal everyday driving. In his earlier review, Michon 
(1985) also spends a considerable amount of time describing these earlier trait based models, 
and spends some time on more mechanical task analysis based models. However, in Michon’s 
later review trait based models hardly get a mention with Michon largely dismissing them as 
being too rigid and unable to move by themselves (Michon, 1989). 
Ranney then moves on to discuss the models which Michon had identif ied as functional, 
again splitting them between motivational models and the more cognitive rule based models 
which Ranney refers to as information-processing theories. Like Michon, Ranney praises the 
motivational models for incorporating motivational aspects into their accounts of driver 
behaviour, mainly referencing RHT (Wilde, 1976), Threat Avoidance Theory (Fuller, 1984) and 
zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974). However he raises concerns that motivational 
models have been somewhat unclear as to how they operate, leading to a lack of testable 
hypotheses, and therefore, a lack of productive research into the operation of these theories. 
Ranney also comments, as Michon did (1985), that there has been an over emphasis on 
the idea of risk as a controlling variable in behaviour. He also adds that a quite protracted 
debate over the total risk compensation mechanism proposed by RHT had stalled progress 
in the area of model development.
Ranney also sees more potential in the use of information processing theories to explain 
driver behaviour but notes that cognitive information processing theories had not made 
much of an impact on driver behaviour models at the time. Ranney therefore introduces the 
idea of hierarchical control models, par ticularly through the use of the Skill-Rule-Knowledge 
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framework put forward by Ramussen (1987a), the Generic Error-Modelling System (GEMS) 
proposed by Reason (1990) and Michon’s Three Level Control hierarchy (Michon, 1985). 
In association with the idea of automaticity Ranney praises information processing models 
as moving away from a concentration on risk, and through the use of hierarchies, a move 
towards modelling driver behaviour in the frame of a more complex systems view.
The review by Huguenin and Rumar (2001) is generally critical of the idea of a single 
unifying model of driver behaviour. They state that the models which have been put forward 
have tended to be either so broad as to be unusable for generating useful predictions or so 
specif ic as to only explain cer tain small par ts of the driving task. They do however present a 
classif ication of models of driver behaviour as either driver task related, functional control, 
or motivational (Rothengatter, 1997) but then reject it as being overly simplistic and not 
capturing the full complexity of driver behaviour.
Having rejected this classif ication, and made their objections clear to the existing models 
of driver behaviour, Huguenin and Rumar then proceed to never-the-less discuss the models 
in a somewhat historical fashion. They begin with Gibson & Crooks (1938), who claimed that 
driving was just an extension of the walking task, making it primarily a perceptual matter of 
identifying the appropriate visual stimuli in order to navigate safely through the environment. 
Then they brief ly discuss personality or trait based approaches to traff ic psychology, mostly 
dismissing this area, before moving to discuss the variable of risk. A variable they consider to 
be a “key factor in the explanation of driver behaviour” (Huguenin & Rumar, 2001), p 32).
Huguenin and Rumar (2001) discuss risk in terms of objective versus subjective risk 
comparisons by drivers and the occurrence of behavioural adaptation. Behavioural adaptation 
is the idea that drivers tend to adapt their behaviour to changes in the environment and 
may therefore end up reducing or negating any potential safety gains which these changes 
may have brought about (see OECD (1990) for a review of behavioural adaptation). 
When discussing the role of risk in behavioural adaptation the authors reference RHT (Wilde, 
1976), zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974) and the hierarchical risk model for traff ic 
par ticipants (Van Der Molen & Bötticher, 1988). However they do not seem to favour any of 
these models, pointing out that RHT is largely unfalsif iable and the hierarchical risk model is 
mainly descriptive. In terms of zero-risk theory the authors describe the model, but do not 
seem to offer any concrete objections against it, only suggesting that it contradicts RHT 
which the authors state is suppor ted by “a considerable number of studies” (Huguenin and 
Rumar, 2001, pg 39).
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Huguenin and Rumar then brief ly mention that systematic approaches towards road safety 
have been attempted, where driver behaviour is seen as arising out of an interaction of many 
factors. After stating this, they proceed to discuss what they class as motivational models. 
The models differ from those described as motivational by Michon (1985; 1989) and Ranney (1994) 
in that they seem to take a more low level approach. This is manifested by an explanation of 
motivational models as those that state that there are expectancies for action, and then certain 
valences (or benef its) which are applied to different acts. Therefore, under this classif ication, 
behaviour is determined in a kind of utility fashion where the expected results of behaviour are 
weighted with the expected benef its and then the most benef icial option is taken. The upshot of 
this is that due to the relatively low accident likelihood associated with most on-road behaviours, 
and the high valence of unsafe behaviour, that unsafe behaviours (for example speeding) may 
be chosen more often than objectively safer alternatives.
Finally, Huguenin and Rumar attempt to collate the existing models into a model of driver 
behaviour that states that driver’s actions are a function of their situation, their predispositions 
towards the action and their level of assimilation of the relevant perceptual information in the 
environment. They end their review by stating that while many models of driver behaviour are, 
traditionally speaking, impossible to falsify, that never-the-less they are useful as guidelines or 
heuristics. They also state that they would like to see more inclusion of emotional and social 
psychology aspects in driver behaviour modelling. 
By 2002 it would seem that Rothengatter agrees with the idea of more inclusion of social 
psychology into models of driver behaviour. However he also appears to be considerably less 
in favour of information processing models and discussion of them hardly features in his review 
at all. With the exception of a reference to Wicken’s Multiple Resource Model (1992) near the 
end of the paper, and some comment on the importance of automaticity in driving. He also 
dismisses hierarchical models, such as zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 
1988) or the hierarchical risk model for traff ic participants (Van Der Molen & Bötticher, 1988), 
as not ref lecting the reality of the complex control environment that in which driving occurs. 
Rothengatter does, however, spend time covering motivational models, particularly what he 
refers to as Risk Theories. He criticizes them on their lack of testable hypotheses, their over 
reliance on risk as a controlling factor, and on their often circular nature. 
Rothengatter’s review is also the only one to discuss attitude theories in any depth, such 
as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)(Ajzen, 1985), which were not mentioned at all by 
Michon (1985; 1989) and Ranney (1994), and only in passing as part of drivers predispositions by 
Huguenin and Rumar (2001). This is perhaps because of Rothengatter’s previous work in the area 
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of attitude-behaviour research (Rothengatter, De Bruin, & Rooijers, 1989; Rothengatter, 1996; 
Rothengatter, 1982; Rothengatter, 1988; Rothengatter, 1991; Rothengatter, 1992; Rothengatter, 
1997). Rothengatter is generally positive towards the attitudinal theories, although he does point 
out that, methodologically speaking, their use within driver research has been problematic in 
terms of an over reliance on self-report. Furthermore, he states that when attitude theories 
have been used to predict actual observed behaviour that their predictive power is greatly 
reduced. This is a well known issue with attitude theories, and in particular the TPB (Armitage & 
Conner, 2001), but it is worth nothing that the TPB is still probably the most referenced model in 
traff ic psychology today (Glendon, 2011). However, this is likely due to its continued popularity in 
social psychology, rather than its validity in terms of explaining the breadth of driver behaviour. 
Rothengatter also singles out the idea of Calibration (Kuiken & Twisk, 2001) and Task Diff iculty 
Homeostasis Theory (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, 
McHugh et al., 2008)(TDH) as showing promise, due to their move towards more of a task 
performance approach to driving. However he does point out that TDH falls into the same 
circular reasoning trap that RHT does through the use of a comparator. He concludes, much 
like Huguenin and Rumar (2001), that the focal point for traff ic psychology, and therefore for the 
development of theories of driver behaviour, should be where performance theories and social-
psychology theories meet. 
These four reviews do a good job of describing the major models and theories in traff ic 
psychology in their time, as well as highlighting the lack of consensus in the f ield. They all seem 
to agree that older trait and skill based models of driver behaviour will not get the f ield any 
further in terms of understanding normal everyday driving behaviour. They also all put forward, 
in one way or another, the most common argument against the models of driver behaviour 
that existed at the time, the argument of unfalsif iability. This argument states that many of the 
existing models are too vague in their underlying mechanisms and, therefore, it is diff icult to form 
useful predictions from them and to then test these predictions. 
The development of models aimed at describing driving behaviour has not ceased since 
Rothengatter’s 2002 review was published. In fact, it could be argued that there has been an 
increase in new models, especially in models aimed at explaining the behavioural adaptation 
of drivers to driver assistance features. Examples of these include the Driver-in-Control model 
(Hollnagel, Nåbo, & Lau, 2003), the qualitative model of behaviour adaptation (Brown & Noy, 
2004; Rudin-Brown & Parker, 2004), the situational control framework (Ljung Aust & Engström, 
2011), and the Unif ied Model of Driver behaviour (Oppenheim, Shinar, Carsten et al., 2010; 
Oppenheim, Shinar, Enjalbert et al., 2010). 
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However, there are four more general models which have dominated theoretical 
discussions in the last decade or so. These are Task Diff iculty Homeostasis theory (TDH) 
(Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008), 
its successor, Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT) (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011), the Risk Monitor Model 
(RMM) (Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) and the multiple comfor t zone 
model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007). All four of which claim to be movements away from 
the older, unfalsif iable theories, a claim that will put to the test in chapters 3-6. 
The rest of this chapter will be primarily dedicated to covering these four models. 
However, some time will also be devoted to reviewing, to a lesser extent, other models that 
have appeared in the literature during this time. The aim is to highlight the trends in model 
development in recent times and set the scene for the following chapters. One such trend 
was an initial movement away from theories that relied on concepts of ‘Risk’. This was initially 
hailed as a long overdue step forward (Rothengatter, 2002), however, this trend did not 
necessarily continue.
2.1 How Task Diff iculty became a RAT.
As mentioned above, the most common criticism of models of driver behaviour is that they 
do not produce testable hypotheses and that they are descriptive rather than predictive 
(Carsten, 2009; Michon, 1985; Michon, 1989; Ranney, 1994; Rothengatter, 2002). In an attempt 
to correct this situation, Fuller (Fuller, 2000) proposed the model of Task-Capability Interface 
(TCI) as a representation of the driving task, and Task Diff iculty Homeostasis (TDH) as an 
explanation of driver behaviour (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 
2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008).
2.1.1 Task-Capability Interface (TCI)
TCI has remained relatively similar over time but the version discussed in this chapter is based 
on the most comprehensive version available (Fuller et al., 2008). As shown in Figure 2.1 the 
model contains two vital components: Capability and Task Demands.
2.1.1.1 Capability
Under TCI drivers are said to possess a cer tain level of capability which is constructed in a 
hierarchical fashion. The initial level of capability is labelled as the constitutional features. This 
level consists of base physiological characteristics and includes factors such as reaction time 
and speed of mental processing. 
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Added onto the base constitutional factors are the effects of training, education and 
experience. Experience is different from training and education in that experience is intended 
to mean experience gained through driving, rather than through formal training. Therefore 
this level ref lects the learnt components of the driving task. The combination of the learnt and 
physiological components is then referred to as the driver’s competence. Both competence 
and the proceeding constitutional factors are seen as theoretical maximums and relatively 
stable (Fuller, 2000; Fuller & Santos, 2002).
However, given the resource limited nature of human performance it is unrealistic to 
expect people to operate at their full level of competence all of the time, so the f inal step 
in the creation of capability is to subtract human factors from competence. Human factors 
is somewhat of a catch-all term and refers to situation-dependent attributes such as 
motivations, attitudes, and state-conditions such as intoxication, fatigue and emotional state. 
Therefore in contrast to the components of capability that come before it, human factors are 
relatively unstable.
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The result of this hierarchical process is capability, which ref lects the current situational 
ability of the driver to respond to task demands. This is not simply the amount of effor t a 
driver has available at any par ticular moment. Rather, it is the amount of effor t available plus 
the knowledge and experience of how to best use and apply this effor t, minus any relevant 
situational-dependent factors.
2.1.1.2 Task demands
Task demands sit on the other side of the TCI and ref lect the environment in which the 
driver is currently operating. Task demand, as laid out by TCI, is not created in a hierarchical 
fashion but is rather a combination of environmental factors, including: the road environment, 
behaviour of other road users, weather conditions, vehicle characteristics, road position, and 
the trajectory of the driver’s car and its travelling speed.
The environmental factors that make up Task demands are both in and outside of the 
driver’s control. For instance, there is very little outside of high level strategic route decisions 
a driver can do to affect the current road environment or weather conditions. However, 
road position, trajectory and travel speed are mostly under the control of the driver. It is this 
control of speed and road position by the driver that leads to driving often being referred to 
as a self-paced task (Michon, 1985; Michon, 1989; Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Ranney, 1994; 
Taylor, 1964). This means that the speed and trajectory of the driver are also linked to their 
capability. Fuller (2005) appears to have attempted to represent this in an earlier version of 
TCI where human factors were added to the task demand side of the diagram, impacting on 
speed, road position and trajectory. However, this addition disappeared from TCI after this 
date. 
2.1.1.3 Task diff iculty and the loss of control
Within TCI, task diff iculty is produced by the interaction of task demands and capability. Task 
demands can be seen as representing the minimum amount of capability required to retain 
control of the vehicle. Therefore if task demands exceed capability then loss of control occurs. 
Fur thermore, as task demand approaches capability then performance loss begins to occur 
(Fuller, 2000; Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008). 
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However, in the end, TCI is just a description of the driving task and does not really 
generate many testable hypotheses. It also does not detail how drivers determine that their 
choices will not place them in a situation where their capability cannot match the demands of 
the task, and does not par ticularly help to explain behavioural adaptation. To address these 
issues Fuller proposed Task Diff iculty Homeostasis theory (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; 
Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008).
2.1.2 Task Diff iculty Homeostasis theory (TDH)
TDH was f irst proposed by Fuller and Santos (Fuller & Santos, 2002), and states that people 
have a set range of experienced task diff iculty at which they prefer to operate at. This range 
of task diff iculty is not static, but rather determined by a driver’s perceived capability, effor t 
motivation, and trip goals, and can therefore vary between, and even within, trips. Perceived 
task diff iculty, a product of the interaction between perceived capability and task demand, 
is then compared with preferred task diff iculty and action is taken if the currently perceived 
task diff iculty falls outside of the target range. This leads to task diff iculty being constantly 
maintained in a homeostatic way. This means that behavioural adaptation should occur 
whenever drivers detect that they are operating at a level of task diff iculty outside of their 
preferred range. 
As stated above, this formulation of TDH, with perceived task diff iculty as the central 
factor, led to TDH being praised by Rothengatter (2002) as moving away from an over 
concentration on risk as a controlling factor in driving. However, the model did not stand still 
and continued to evolve eventually incorporating nearly the entire TCI model within TDH 
itself.
2.1.2.1 Proximal and Distal determinants of Task Diff iculty
The incorporation of TCI into TDH was mainly carried out through the addition of distal and 
proximal determinants. These determinants act on different par ts of the core comparison 
between perceived task diff iculty and preferred task diff iculty, and are intended to make the 
model more comprehensive. The most comprehensive version of the model to date (Fuller et 
al., 2008), is therefore shown in Figure 2.2.
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As shown in Figure 2.2, the hierarchical formation of perceived capability from TCI is now 
spelled out within TDH. However, unlike in TCI, perceived task demand now also appears 
to be constructed in a hierarchical fashion. This appears somewhat illogical. If we treat this 
formulation in the same way as the construction of perceived capability, it seems that the 
only way that the ‘distal’ element of vehicle characteristics can interact with perceived task 
demand is to interact f irst with the route and time-of-day, and then come in contact with 
the proximal road environment and behaviour of other road users. However, in reality 
these environmental factors form a complex system and are not necessarily dependent and 
moderated by each other in such a linear hierarchical fashion. 
Another addition is the distal element of a disposition to comply with the speed limit 
and a proximal element of immediate inf luences on compliance. These enforcement related 
elements are not explicitly stated in TCI, and are shown as inf luencing driver’s decisions and 
26
2  MODELS OF DRIVER BEHAVIOUR
responses outside of the normally described comparison process. However, it seems that 
these enforcement elements could easily be covered within the initial comparison between 
perceived capability and perceived task diff iculty. Surely the level of enforcement in the 
environment is par t of task demand, making it harder or easier to avoid detection. Then 
the intention to comply could arise out of an individual’s capability to react to this external 
demand, given that capability already includes motivational factors and predispositions from 
driver’s biology and experience. It therefore seems inconsistent to consider that a demand/
capability comparison is said to occur as a reaction to other road user’s behaviour, but not to 
the presence of enforcement, which is essentially just a special type of other road user. 
2.1.2.2 Risk Threshold
Another par t of TDH is the idea of a risk threshold. This risk threshold was conceptualized as 
being similar to that already proposed by earlier theories, such as zero-risk theory (Näätänen 
& Summala, 1974), and triggers when drivers are near the limit of their preferred range of 
task diff iculty. In this way it can act as a warning, in addition to the constant comparison of 
perceived and preferred task diff iculty, that the preferred range of task diff iculty is about 
to be exceeded (Fuller, 2005; Fuller et al., 2008). Impor tantly, the risk threshold within TDH 
does not refer to crash risk as detailed in earlier theories of driver behaviour, such as Risk 
Homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1976), but rather to a ‘feeling of risk’. 
2.1.3 Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT)
Risk as a variable of impor t within TDH did not stop with the risk threshold however. Rather 
in 2008 Fuller reconceptualized TDH into Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT)(Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 
2011). This new form of the model is summarized in Figure 2.3.
While not shown in Figure 2.3, in RAT the acceptable range of task diff iculty is accompanied 
by, and essentially interchangeable with, a range of preferred feeling of risk. Similarly, 
drivers now constantly monitor feeling of risk as an indicator of perceived task diff iculty. 
This development can be summed up like this:
“…the effects of risk feelings on decision making are not binary (one moment they are 
irrelevant, the next they become salient): task diff iculty and feelings of risk are continuously 
present variables which inform driver decisions (whether consciously or not). However, only 
when some threshold point is reached may risk feelings become par ticularly salient in driver 
consciousness” Fuller et al, 2008, page 31
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 This shift towards the constant monitoring of feelings of risk seems to have occurred for 
two main reasons; the inf luence of the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 
2003; Fuller, 2007), and on the basis of one experimental study by Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008. 
It is also worth noting that Fuller also indicates that RAT is simply a catchier name for the 
model (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011). 
2.1.3.1 Allostasis
Before getting into this evidence, what is meant by allostasis should be brief ly mentioned. 
Allostasis refers to a process of achieving stability in a system through making changes. This is 
in contrast to homeostasis which refers to achieving stability in a system by staying the same 
(Fuller, 2011). 
2.1.3.2 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis was put forward by Damasio (1994; 2003) as a way of 
viewing the inf luence of emotions and feelings on the decision making process. It is based in 
neurological theory and is still somewhat speculative and largely experimentally untested 
(Damasio, 2003). It suggests that unconscious body states, labelled as emotions, can control 
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or bias behaviour towards rational1 decisions even without entering into consciousness, 
i.e. becoming feelings. The def inition of emotions as unconscious body states, and feelings 
as the conscious awareness of emotions, has been labelled by Damasio (1994; 2003) and 
others (Fuller, 2007; Fuller, 2011; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) as somewhat unconventional. However, 
both the APA Dictionary of Psychology (VandenBos, 2006) and the Penguin Dictionary of 
Psychology (Reber, 2009) also def ine emotions and feelings in this fashion. Fur thermore, 
while feeling and emotion are sometimes used interchangeably in everyday language, the 
word ‘feeling’ at least does carry with it the connotation of being ‘felt’, and therefore implies 
conscious awareness. 
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis also ties in with a relatively recent view of risk assessment 
where it is suggested that there are two forms of risk based decision making (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). The f irst is referred to as ‘affect heuristics’ and is similar to the 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis in that it refers to learnt, fast and automatic ‘gut’ emotional 
reactions which can be used to guide decision making. The second form of decision making 
is referred to as analytic and is seen as the more traditional slow, deliberate, subjective 
utility maximization process where the benef its and costs of a par ticular behaviour are 
weighed up. 
2.1.3.3 The Fuller, McHugh and Pender Study
Fuller et al (2008) cites several studies as experimentally suppor ting various aspects of TDH 
(e.g. Couyoumdjian, Di Nocera, & Ferlazzo; Gregersen & Bjurulf, 1996; Hogema, Veltman, & 
van’t Hof, 2005; Larsen, 1995; Lewis-Evans & Charlton, 2006; Uzzell & Muckle, 2005). But by 
2008 only one study had been published specif ically examining TDH; an experiment carried 
out by Fuller, McHugh and Pender (2008) themselves.
 In this study the par ticipants were shown several videos of different road environments 
being driven at speeds which differed in increasing 5 mph increments. The different speeds 
were created through digital manipulation of the video clip to either speed up or slow down 
the perceived speed of travel. After watching each clip, par ticipants were asked to provide 
ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and crash probability. In line with the state of TDH at 
the time (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008), it was hypothesized 
that ratings of task diff iculty would systematically increase with speed, and that ratings of felt 
risk and crash risk would show a threshold relationship. This expected threshold relationship 
meant that risk ratings should have only increased once a cer tain speed was exceeded. 
1 Rational in terms utility – i.e. the best choice for the least loss.
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What actually occurred appears to have surprised the researchers (Fuller, McHugh et al., 
2008). Ratings of task diff iculty did indeed systematically increase with speed and indications 
of crash risk showed a threshold relationship as predicted. However, ratings of feeling of 
risk were found to also systematically increase with speed (r2 = .98), and in fact were highly 
correlated (r = 0.81) with ratings of task diff iculty. This indicated to the researchers that 
feelings of risk could be being used by par ticipants as an indication of task diff iculty. The Fuller, 
McHugh and Pender (2008) study was later replicated by Kinnear, Stradling, McVey (2008) 
who found similar results. 
2.1.3.4 Feelings of Risk Homeostasis
Kinnear (2009) also proposed a risk based modif ication to TDH with the Feelings of Risk 
Homeostasis model (FRH). This model also attempted to incorporate the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis and a ‘risk as feelings’ form of decision making in terms of making risk (feeling 
of, but also objective estimate of) the primary variable and is shown in Figure 2.4. Another 
change is the separation of sensory perception and working memory out from capability and 
placing them as their own separate factors within the model. 
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FRH also attempted to make some of the psychological processes behind driver decision 
making more prominent by including separate response types; automated and deliberative. 
This change also has the effect of removing the somewhat vague ‘comparator’ box featured 
by TDH and RAT.
2.1.4 Commentary on TDH and RAT
The fact that TDH and RAT both seem to rely on the monitoring of a subjective variable 
such as perceived task dif f icult or feeling of risk is in conf lict with other models of driver 
behaviour such as zero-risk theory, or the more recent multiple comfor t zone model 
(Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) – see section 2.3). These other models state that 
uncomfor table feelings, such as feelings of risk, only occur once a cer tain per formance 
threshold has been crossed. In this sense they act as warnings, and are indeed binary, 
only impacting on driver decision making when cer tain set situations or stimuli are 
encountered. As mentioned above, the initial formulations of TDH also took this threshold 
view for feelings of risk (Fuller, 2005; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). Indeed the earlier work 
discussing TDH appears to reject the idea of risk perception having a constant role in 
driver decision making (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005). 
Fur thermore, despite its connection to RAT (Fuller, 2007; Fuller, 2011) a threshold 
account for feelings is actually more in line with the predictions of the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis, in that in the Somatic Marker Hypothesis changes in emotions only occur 
when cer tain learnt (or in some rare cases innate) stimuli are present and then only 
become feelings once attention is directed to them (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). 
Similar to RAT, FRH claims that automatic risk appraisal occurs through unconscious 
unfelt feelings (Kinnear, 2009). However, this appears to be because, despite its use of 
the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, the FRH model does not make a distinction between 
feelings and emotions; a problem that Kinnear suggests should be addressed.
It is not just the constant monitoring of a feeling of risk that is an issue, as task dif f iculty 
is also thought to be constantly monitored (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). However, 
according to the mental workload literature, this may not be the case. While people do 
have a tendency to operate at an optimal level of workload, this level of workload is 
def ined, not by people typically being aware of a specif ic feeling of optimal workload, 
but rather is indirectly inferred by the absence of under or over load. This principle is 
well demonstrated in Figure 2.5 below, which shows various subjective and objective 
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measures of workload and their inability to detect optimal workload directly. Since task 
dif f iculty has been suggested to be analogous to mental workload (Fuller, 2005) this is a 
challenge to the assumption that task dif f iculty is continuously able to be monitored and 
a set range targeted.
Figure 2.5. The sensitivity of various measures to detect which region of workload and performance an indi-
vidual is operating at (from de Waard, 1996). The shading indicates the measure is sensitive to workload in this 
region. RSME and Activation are self-repor t measures and SDLP and SDSTW are primary task performance 
measures. ‘Delay in carfollow’ and ‘Mirror Checking’ are both secondary task performance measures. Finally 
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Summala (2007) has also challenged the f inding from Fuller, McHugh and Pender (2008) 
that ratings of task diff iculty and feelings of risk are highly correlated. He instead suggests that 
this correlation may be due to semantic confusion of the two terms during rational evaluation 
by par ticipants. Although it should be noted that since risk is def ined as the probability of 
an occurrence (which is effectively the diff iculty of a task) which is then multiplied by the 
consequence of that occurrence (Nordgren, Van Der Pligt, & Van Harreveld, 2007), it is easy 
to see how feelings of risk and task diff iculty could come to correlate. 
TDH and RAT have also been criticized as concentrating overly on speed and vehicle 
trajectory as the only way that drivers are able to change task demand (Carsten, 2009). 
This does seem to be the case with a focus on ‘effects on speed choice’ in the models (see 
Figures 2.2 & 2.3). This is a challenge to the validity of TDH/RAT, which as a comprehensive 
model of driver behaviour should be able to explain the whole driving task. FRH deals with 
this issue by being somewhat vaguer about its specif ic operational pathways, suggesting that 
the process of risk comparison leads to ‘action’ (Kinnear, 2009). This unfor tunately opens 
FRH up to the criticism that has been applied to earlier theories of behavioural adaptation, 
in terms of being vague about the pathways through which they operate (e.g. Carsten, 2009; 
Michon, 1985; Michon, 1989; Ranney, 1994; Rothengatter, 2002).TDH and RAT themselves can 
also be criticized on these grounds due to their somewhat vague ‘comparator’ box (Fuller 
et al., 2008; Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011). Another diff icult aspect of TDH and RAT is that they 
refer to a target range of feeling of risk or task diff iculty, rather than one set level. While 
this seems reasonable, it does somewhat add to the diff iculty of falsifying the theory, as 
exactly how wide or narrow this range is, or how the range is set, has not yet been clearly 
established. It has been suggested however that there are different driver types which have 
different ranges (Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, 2011). However, at the moment, any lack of reaction 
to a change in feeling of risk or task diff iculty on behalf of a driver could be put down to the 
change not being large enough to move outside of their preferred range.
Some of the above factors even led Carsten (2009) to criticize RAT as being no more 
useful than, and even extremely similar to, the earlier Risk Homeostasis Theory (RHT) of 
Wilde (1976). This is a charge that Fuller has defended by pointing out that RHT relies on a 
target level of objective accident risk arising from a utility decision making process. Whereas 
objective accident risk plays no role in RAT and utility decisions do not affect the setting of 
the preferred level of feeling of risk (Fuller, 2011).
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Finally a study by Broughton et al (2009) should be considered. This study claims 
to demonstrate that TDH can be used to generate specif ic predictions and provide the 
behavioural pathways through which these predictions will occur. To do so, motorcycle riders 
and car drivers’ self-repor ted behaviour was compared. The authors predicted that due to 
motorcyclists’ aversion to braking and their problems with being seen by other road users, 
motorcyclists would have a higher perceived task diff iculty in urban areas. Therefore, according 
to TDH they would speed less in urban areas than car drivers. The results of Broughton et al 
(2009) initially do seem to suppor t TDH, with motorcyclists repor ting less speeding in urban 
areas. However, if real world speed data is examined for the UK (Fuller et al., 2008) it is found 
that motorcyclists’ speed at about the same rate as car drivers’ in urban areas. Fur thermore, 
motorcyclists are more often found to be excessively speeding in urban areas. Broughton et 
al. (2009) explained this by questioning the methodology of how speed data was collected 
by the Depar tment of Transpor t in the UK and speculating about the inf luence of different 
personality types of motorcycle driver. However, other studies looking at on-road speed 
measurement in the UK, Italy, and Cambodia have all found that motorcyclists drive faster 
than car drivers in urban areas (Horswill & Helman, 2003; Kov & Yai, 2010; Perco, 2008). This 
presents a diff icult situation for TDH, in that seemingly valid predictions generated by the 
model have been suppor ted by self-repor ts but are not well suppor ted by actual real world 
speed data. 
2.2 Monitoring the RMM
Another model of interest is the Risk Monitor Model (RMM) (Vaa, 2011). The RMM was 
originally referred to as simply the Monitor Model (Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007) and 
was proposed in Norwegian repor ts aimed at developing a model of driver behaviour (Vaa 
et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003). It was not until 2007 that a comprehensive account of the Monitor 
Model was published in English (Vaa, 2007), and it is only recently that it was renamed to 
become the Risk Monitor Model (Vaa, 2011). However, with exception of the initial repor t, 
which outlined a very early draft version of the model (Vaa et al., 2000), the model’s structure 
has remained relatively unchanged2. Therefore the version discussed here will be that of the 
RMM, which can be seen in Figure 2.6.
2 With RMM adding only a distinction between ‘primary’ or innate emotions, and ‘secondary’ or learnt emotions into the 
text of the model itself (Vaa, 2003; 2007; 2011).
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The RMM is described by Vaa (2011) as a combination of several components from 
other older models; such as the subjective risk monitor from zero-risk theory (Näätänen & 
Summala, 1974), Taylor’s (1964) asser tion that galvanic skin response (GSR) governs drivers’ 
decision-making, Wilde’s (1976) idea of a target variable, Reason’s (1990) model of information 
processing, and the principles of operant conditioning. However, as can be seen from Figure 
2.6, the Somatic Marker Hypothesis is at the RMM’s hear t (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003 – 
see section 2.1.3.2). According to the RMM, driver’s personality traits, interactions with other 
road users and a catch all ‘other factors’, are all f iltered via the somatic marking system 
before impacting on driver decisions. A driver’s motives also are shown as both inf luencing 
behaviour via somatic markers, but also directly inf luencing functional balance. This occurs 
because in Vaa’s (2011) view, a constant motive of all individuals is to maintain their bodies’ 
functional balance, or in other words, physiological homeostasis. The end result of the somatic 
marker facilitated process described by RMM is a drive to maintain/obtain a target ‘best 
feeling’. The target ‘best feeling’ is variable, in both its value and the type of feeling, but Vaa 
(2007) does specify several candidates for target feelings including; tension or anxiety, arousal, 
sensation, pleasure, relaxation, threat/diff iculty avoidance, compliance, and non-compliance. 
Exactly how some of these rather broad concepts are ‘feelings’ is not really clear however. 
Also, while RMM does propose that there is a variety of target ‘best feelings’, ‘feelings of risk’, 
35
2  MODELS OF DRIVER BEHAVIOUR
or at the least the monitoring of risky stimuli appear to be seen as a key factor in creating this 
‘best feeling’ (Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011). Ultimately, it is through the motivation, unconscious or 
otherwise, to maintain or reach this target ‘best feeling’ that behavioural adaptation occurs.
2.2.1 An Evolutionary Model
RMM’s focus on the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, functional balance, and risk is par tly due 
to an attempt to ground it in evolutionary theory. Vaa states that, based on the Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis, the primary (deep) motivation of humans is to survive and, therefore, the 
body must have evolved as a monitor of risk in order to facilitate this survival (Damasio, 1994; 
Damasio, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011). In fact in depictions of the RMM, the black bounding 
box is said to represent the body as the risk ‘monitor’. The body, therefore, aims to maintain 
functional balance, consciously and unconsciously, and by doing so a ‘best feeling’ is targeted. 
This conclusion is also based on the research carried out by Taylor who examined drivers’ 
GSR, and suggested that GSR peaks at sites of high accident involvement, allowing drivers to 
pace the driving task based on this information (Taylor, 1964).
Vaa (2011) even goes so far as to suggest that par t of the reason why non-raised 
pedestrian crossings don’t always improve safety is that a pedestrian represents a small, and 
rarely encountered, survival threat to a car driver. Whereas a raised pedestrian crossing, 
by threatening to directly damage vehicles every time it is encountered is more of a direct 
threat. 
2.2.2 Commentary on RMM
That life, in evolutionary terms, is ultimately about survival seems hard to question. But to 
be more specif ic it is survival in order to pass on your genes to your offspring that is most 
impor tant in evolution. Otherwise evolution cannot act in a selective fashion and, therefore, 
does not operate at all. As such, it is not enough to simply survive; rather an individual 
organism must also breed. Once breeding has been achieved and the reproductive age 
has been passed then for many organisms survival often does not continue for much longer 
either.
One can, therefore, question the RMM’s assumption that the body is primarily a risk 
detector. As mentioned earlier, risk is def ined as the chance of something occurring and the 
consequence of that occurrence (Nordgren et al., 2007). The second par t of this def inition, 
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the consequences, relies largely on memory and learning. In other words an organism must 
either be able to remember the consequences of its actions and/or the actions of others, and 
then recall them, or have built up a learnt conditioned response to cer tain stimuli, in order to 
take them into account in future decisions. This makes a feeling or even an underlying learnt 
emotional response about ‘risk’ useful in some situations but less so in the day to day survival 
of life where the immediate consequences of actions are often not apparent.
If there is one constant however, it is that every action costs energy and energy is in 
limited supply. Therefore it is energy conservation that is a more credible basic guiding 
motivation for life. For example, when animals confront other members of their own species 
they usually do so through dominance displays and ritualised behaviour. These may in some 
cases resemble f ights, however they are not. Fighting is an extremely costly expenditure of 
energy that can leave even the victor vulnerable and weak. Rather these rituals are a more 
energy eff icient manner of determining f itness and dominance, and thus avoiding the costly 
energy expenditure of f ighting. Even predatory species, which by their nature must come into 
conf lict with other species, tend to only target the weakest prey, those that will take the least 
effor t to bring down. The mating rituals of animals serve a similar purpose, usually allowing 
the female of the species to assess the evolutionary f itness of potential mates, and therefore 
her potential offspring, before investing the large amount of energy required to reproduce. 
Fur thermore, the learning of consequences of behaviour in itself is a costly exercise, and 
in some cases some consequences are so dire there is no chance to learn at all. However, 
information about the chance of failure at an action, in other words the diff iculty of an action 
or how much energy/effor t it will cost, is usually much more accessible and more apparent 
at a basic level. 
That is not to say that risk does not play a role. That the diff iculty of behaviour can also 
be associated with threats, and lead to a feeling of risk, is understandable in that diff icult 
tasks are often risky tasks. As mentioned earlier, ratings of feelings of risk have indeed been 
found to be highly correlated with ratings of task diff iculty and effor t (Fuller et al., 2008; 
Kinnear et al., 2008). But with the exception of a few innate reactions to stimuli, a feeling of 
risk must be f irst learnt to be associated with the much more readily available information 
on the diff iculty of the action, information that does not necessarily have to rely on memory 
and learning, and can become apparent simply through the limitations of our bodies. 
Fur thermore, from a biological perspective, homeostasis is not maintained through constant 
monitoring of the current state directly, but rather by reactive responses to thresholds being 
crossed indicating that homeostasis has been breached. For example, neurons themselves, 
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which are impor tant components of our bodies system for maintaining homeostasis, only f ire 
when there are suff icient stimuli (chemicals) to cause them to do so, and even then it takes 
a threshold of nerve impulses to trigger a physiological response. This is a much more energy 
eff icient way of handling the situation; to only react in the comparatively rare situation of 
being ‘out of bounds’, rather than to expend constant energy checking on normality. As stated 
earlier, this threshold, reactive nature of somatic markers is already an acknowledged part of 
the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003).
Part of the argument for the constant monitoring of risk within RMM is also made through the 
use of Taylor’s GSR data (Taylor, 1964). This interpretation of Taylor’s work also partly motivated 
earlier theories such as Risk Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1976) and even RAT (Fuller, 2011), and 
has been questioned. Most importantly it has been pointed out that GSR is an extremely 
reactive measure, and responds to too many variables, not only risk (Fuller, 2005; Heino, 1996; 
McKenna, 1988; Summala, 2007). For example, one critique of Taylor (1964) made by Summala 
(2007) is that many of the road sections at which Taylor’s participants showed increased GSR 
activity were also areas requiring signif icant motor control. Therefore it is possible that the GSR 
increases were simply caused by the physical activity of driving the vehicle. Fuller (2005) critiqued 
Taylor’s (1964) f indings in a similar way, saying that the changes in GSR Taylor observed could 
instead be taken as evidence for the constant monitoring of task diff iculty, not risk. 
Moving on, while RMM openly acknowledges the role of automatic actions and unconscious 
processes in creating a ‘best feeling’, it ultimately relies on the targeting and monitoring of 
a conscious feeling. Therefore, much like with the predictions of TDH and RAT, it should be 
expected that an individual’s feelings can be seen to visibly change over a range of different 
driving situations. However, as already discussed in section 2.1.4 this constant monitoring of 
feelings has been challenged by some other models (Ljung Aust & Engström, 2011; Näätänen & 
Summala, 1974; Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007).
Another issue with RMM is that there is a lack of feedback loops in the model. This is because 
the only feedback shown in the model is onto the somatic markers, via sensory storage, from 
the outside inf luence of other road users, vehicles, and the road environment. It also seems to 
suggest that a driver’s personality, motives, interaction patterns, and other factors affecting 
driving are totally set and stable and only arise from deep motivations.
Finally, Fuller (2011) states that RAT supersedes RMM by already handling the idea of target 
‘best feeling’ through the more parsimonious use of a target range of feeling of risk. Fuller 
also states that the other ‘best feelings’ put forward by Vaa simply make up the dispositional 
motivations and proximal inf luences in setting a target risk range. For example, if a driver is 
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seeking to gain the ‘best feeling’ of arousal, then this motivation will modify the target range of 
feeling of risk they are seeking. 
2.3 The comfortable thresholds of the multiple comfort zone model
The multiple comfor t zone model or safety margin model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) 
is a hierarchical model of driver behaviour which could be described as a modern evolution 
of Näätänen & Summala’s (1974) zero-risk theory and Summala’s (1997) hierarchical and 
motivational model of behavioural adaptation. Much like TDH/RAT and the RMM, it also 
mentions the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003), but only to point 
out that emotion and feelings have long played a role in zero-risk theory (Näätänen & 
Summala, 1974) via the subjective risk monitor (Summala, 2007). The Safety Margin Model also 
incorporates some par ts of TDH and the RMM, while at the same time taking a somewhat 
different approach in terms of how driver decision making and behavioural adaptation is 
viewed. Also like TDH, it has been proposed as an attempt to create a model which produces 
testable hypotheses (Summala, 2005).
2.3.1 A hierarchical and motivational model
As an evolution of the earlier zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974), the multiple 
comfor t zone model is a motivational model. It views driver’s excitatory motives, personality, 
and driving goals as prevailing factors. These motives interact with the road system and 
push drivers towards changing their behaviour to satisfactorily meet their driving goals, for 
example, by increasing speed to arrive at a destination on time. One of these motives can 
also be a desire to take pleasure in driving, which is viewed as pushing drivers towards 
greater risk taking. These motives can also act as limiters on behaviour in terms of an 
individual’s disposition towards compliance with the law (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007). 
In terms of its hierarchical nature, it views driving as broken down between activities at the 
strategic, tactical, and operational levels (Michon, 1985; Summala, 1997). Within this hierarchy, 
the strategic level is the highest and refers to decisions about aspects of the driving task 
such as: the route to take, the vehicle to drive, or what time of day to leave. The tactical, or 
maneuvering, level is the next level down and refers to the general day to day handling of 
driving situations such as gap acceptance and the navigation of intersections and corners. 
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The lowest level is the operational level where the generally automatic processes of driving 
such as lane control, and gear and pedal operation occur. 
2.3.2 Safety Margins 
Given this motivational and hierarchical framework, the multiple comfor t zone model concerns 
itself mainly with what keeps these motivations in check; a process which is essentially the 
same at each of the three levels. To do so, the multiple comfor t zone model uses the control 
mechanism of safety margins. These are based on the idea of proxemics (Hall, 1966), in that 
individuals have cer tain areas of personal space around them which trigger emotive reactions 
if breached. The model states that drivers maintain a similar space around their vehicle. An 
proxemics approach to driving is an idea that dates back to work by Gibson & Crooks 
(1938) who proposed that drivers have a ‘safety zone’ which they use to detect threats and 
navigate the road environment. In essence, rather than one emotive control function for 
driving, such as the feeling of risk, driving is mainly controlled by the monitoring of various 
safety margins (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007). The most prominent safety margins being 
those which are based on time, specif ically time to collision and time to lane crossing. This 
makes the time available for decision making one of the key controllers of driver behaviour 
and it is somewhat comparable to the idea of the current task diff iculty in TDH (Fuller, 2005) 
or the workload demand of a task (de Waard, 1996). So, if a driver is on a wide road, there 
is now more time available and, therefore their safety margins increase and their motives 
are free to perhaps push them towards higher speeds. On the other hand, if the situation 
changes to breach (or comes close to breaching) these safety margins then drivers begin to 
feel uncomfor table. This is the idea of a subjective risk monitor which triggers when these 
safety margins or thresholds are crossed and creates the experience of risk, a feeling which 
is usually absent from day to day driving. In this case, a feeling of risk acts as a warning and 
something to be avoided, rather than a variable to be targeted and maintained (Summala, 
2005; Summala, 2007).
2.3.3 Comfort Zones
Much of the thinking around safety margins and the subjective risk monitor was already 
present in zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974). What the multiple comfor t zone 
model adds is the idea that the act of staying within these safety margins constitutes being 
in a ‘comfor t zone’. Being within your safety margins does not produce one specif ic emotion 
or feeling but rather results in a general overall mood of comfor t (Summala, 2005; Summala, 
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2007). The ‘multiple’ par t of the comfor t zone model comes from the idea that there are 
multiple candidates for margins, ranging from time to lane crossing to the comfor t of the 
driver’s seat, all of which constitute a comfor t zone. This may seem similar to the idea of 
targeting and maintaining a ‘best feeling’ or ‘feeling of risk’ as suggested by RMM or RAT 
(Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011), but Summala (2007) insists that 
this is not the case. Operating in a comfor t zone does not arise by drivers targeting and 
monitoring ‘comfor t’, but rather is an indirect side effect of the action of not crossing the 
thresholds of their safety margins (Summala, 2007). In other words, driving is seen as a 
mainly automatic control task bounded by well learnt safety margins. The automatic and 
mostly unconscious maintenance of these safety margins keeps individuals within a ‘comfor t 
zone’ that is seen as not par ticularly arousing but is perhaps mildly pleasant (Summala, 
2005; Summala, 2007). The breaching of these safety margins or a lack of goal progress, on 
the other hand, creates uncomfor table emotions and feelings which can act as warnings. 
This view of the comfor t zone is very similar to the idea of mental workload discussed in 
section 2.3.2.4 and shown in Figure 2.5. This threshold account of the role of emotions and 
feelings in driving cer tainly matches well with the idea of somatic markers (Damasio, 1994; 
Damasio, 2003). 
2.3.4 Satisf icing not optimizing
A f inal impor tant distinction in the multiple comfor t zone model is that it clearly describes 
driver decision making as mainly operating via satisf icing (Summala, 2007). That is to say 
that driver decision making, consciously or unconsciously, typically aims to have drivers do 
just enough to meet their goals rather than maximizing their gains and minimizing their losses. 
This f its well with established lines of thought in evolutionary and behavioural science (Simon, 
1955), and is related to the concept of energy preservation mentioned in section 2.3.3.2.
2.3.5 Commentary on the multiple comfort zone model
The threshold account of feelings of risk and task diff iculty promoted by the multiple comfor t 
model is not suppor ted by studies by Fuller, McHugh et al (2008) or by Kinnear, Stradling et 
al. (2008) who both found that ratings of feeling of risk were constantly present and increased 
systematically with speed. In addition, Fuller (2011) has commented that with the multiple 
comfor t zone model, Summala’s theorizing has become more inclusive, and that comfor t 
zones are similar to the idea of targeting a feeling of risk or task diff iculty. As mentioned 
above, Summala (2007) would disagree with this. However, Fuller (2011) also suggests that 
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the multiple comfor t zone model can already be accounted for within the framework of RAT; 
in that the motivational side of the model f its within setting a target range of task diff iculty/
feeling of risk. Fuller (2011) also suggests that the safety margins or comfor t zones in terms 
of time to lane crossing, time to collision, and glare, are accounted for in the perceived task 
diff iculty. Fur thermore, Fuller (2011) states that the motive of compliance with enforcement is, 
as mentioned in section 2.1.2.1, already handled by TDH/RAT as an additional factor outside 
of the normal task diff iculty/risk monitoring loop. Finally, Fuller (2011) suggests that the other 
‘comfor t zones’ or motives, such as the temperature inside the car, could also be modelled 
within RAT in a similar secondary fashion, although he specif ies that they would be outside of 
normal safety motivations.
Common objections to zero-risk theory could also be applied to the multiple comfor t 
zone model. One such objection is that if risk is not constantly monitored, then how does the 
subjective risk monitor know when risk is too high? (Fuller, 1984; McKenna, 1988; Rothengatter, 
2002; Vaa, 2001). However, this objection could be explained as a misinterpretation of the 
model. It is the breaching of safety margins that activates the subjective risk monitor, doing 
away with a need to be constantly monitoring a feeling of risk and replacing it with monitoring 
the control task of driving (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007). 
Another common objection to zero-risk theory, and therefore the multiple comfor t zone 
model, is that as a behavioural learning model it relies on too many contingencies being 
learnt in order to create all the safety margins needed (Fuller, 2005; Michon, 1985; Michon, 
1989; Ranney, 1994). These objections however seem to ignore the highly predictable and 
forgiving nature of the driving environment and the years of experience that drivers have 
built up successfully navigating their environment before they even sit behind a wheel of a 
car. Finally, since the model is hierarchical, then Rothengatter’s (2002) asser tion that such 
hierarchical distinctions are ar tif icial and do not ref lect the reality of the complex control 
environment that makes up driving is also relevant. 
2.4 Other contemporary models 
The models discussed above are not the only post 2000 models aimed at describing driver 
behaviour. While the empirical chapters that follow will focus primarily on the models already 
described, the rest of this chapter provides summaries of some of the other models that have 
been proposed since 2000. The purpose of these summaries is not to provide a completely 
comprehensive review but rather to give some fur ther indication of the ways that model 
development is trending. As such, only models that aimed to explain or describe the whole 
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driving task or models which have par ticular impact on one or more of the main models 
discussed in this thesis are presented. These models were collected as par t of an independent 
literature review and with the assistance of a table listing the models found during the 
Glendon (2011) analysis, mentioned in the introduction (Glendon, 2010).
2.4.1 Four facet model of driver behaviour
Groeger’s (2000) four facet model of driver behaviour is a socio-cognitive, goal focused 
framework in which driver behaviour can be examined. It consists of four facets which are 
called: implied goal interruption, appraisal of future interruption, action planning, and (action) 
implementation. 
The f irst of these facets, implied goal interruption, refers to the key assumption within 
the model, which is that driving is a complex multiple goal driven process and that progress 
towards these goals are constantly monitored, implicitly and explicitly, by drivers. This is done 
through the monitoring of the expectancies that arise from drivers goals and, therefore, this 
facet is said to come into play when a driver ‘notices’, either consciously or unconsciously, that 
their expectations for goal progress are not being met or may not be met in the near future. 
According to a factor analysis carried out by Groeger and his colleagues this facet is made 
up of an individual’s readiness to respond, behavioural standards, scene evaluation ability, 
their tendency to provide cursory analysis of situations, and their ability for making spatial 
judgements.
The next facet, appraisal of future interruption, or simply appraisal, is conceptualised as 
when drivers determine what the outcome of the aforementioned goal interruption will be. 
According to a factor analysis, this facet includes the expectations of the drivers’ own ability 
and their expectations of the abilities of other car users, as well as a range of personality 
factors such as behavioural responsibility, conf idence, extraversion, stress proneness, and 
the value drivers place in being active or passive. Although Groeger doesn’t mention it, it is 
wor th noting that these f irst two facets could perhaps be seen as quite similar to the idea of 
situation awareness, which also is made up of steps, such as becoming aware of a problem 
and working out what will happen in the future (Endsley, 1995).
Action planning is the third facet and is relatively straight forward in representing the 
creation of a plan to deal with goal interruption. It should be noted that while this is referred 
to as ‘planning’ it does not necessarily imply that this is done in a conscious or deliberative 
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manner, and indeed Groeger is careful to stress that all of the facets are capable of operating 
at both an implicit and explicit level. As such the action planning level can also simply represent 
the activation of automatic responses or heuristics. This facet represents a driver’s general 
cognitive and physiological ability in terms of executive function. Factor analysis of this facet 
revealed three factors; general intelligence, reaction speed, and selection. 
The f inal facet, implementation, refers to the physical and mental ability of the driver 
to implement their action plan. This also includes the plan to change nothing about their 
behaviour and maintain current performance if this is deemed the appropriate response. 
This level is constructed by four factors: motor control, eye-foot and eye-hand co-ordination, 
and the cognitive task of storing and retrieving digit spans. 
The validity of the four facet model has been experimentally examined by Groeger who 
repor ts that it can account for 30–40% of the variance in driver behaviour, depending on 
whether self-assessments, exper t assessments, or speed comparisons of a driver’s behaviour 
are made. The model also includes hypothetical feedbacks between the four th facet and the 
second and third, as well as feedbacks between the second and third facets with each other 
and the f irst level. Interestingly however, the model, when presented in diagram form seems 
to suggest that drivers can move straight from the f irst facet of identifying goal interruption 
right to the third facet of planning an action without f irst going through the second facet of 
working out the consequences of the detected goal interruption (Groeger, 2000). How this 
occurs is not made clear and indeed the text that accompanies the diagram of the model 
seems to imply that it operates in more of a linear stepwise manner, and indeed, it has been 
interpreted by some others in just such a fashion (e.g. Mesken, 2006).
Finally it should be noted that while Groeger does often refer to threat detection and 
hazard perception when discussing this model, he does also make clear that he believes that 
risk, in terms of accident risk, does not generally play a large role in driver behaviour. Rather, 
he suggests that most of the time ‘threats’ refer to challenges towards the immediate goals 
of drivers such as having a smooth comfor table ride or getting to a location on time. 
2.4.2 The lateral acceleration model
The lateral acceleration model (Reymond, Kemeny, Droulez, & Ber thoz, 2001) is an addition 
to the existing time to lane crossing model (TLC) which suggested that drivers maintain 
cer tain learnt, time based safety margins when navigating the road environment (Godthelp, 
Milgram, & Blaauw, 1984). The lateral acceleration model states that in addition to the visual 
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information used to judge TLC safety margins, drivers are said to also have a learnt threshold 
based on the lateral acceleration they experience when navigating curves. 
This was tested by Reymond et al (2001) through the use of a driving simulator that could 
be turned from static to dynamic in terms of its movement, thereby providing conditions 
in which feelings of lateral acceleration were absent or present. The result was somewhat 
mixed, with the upper limits of lateral acceleration in par ticipants decreasing less steeply in 
the static condition but drivers generally maintained the same driving style when cornering 
across the two conditions. 
Reymond et al (2001) suggested that this is because driver’s motor control of cornering is so 
over learnt and automatic from on road situations where lateral acceleration is present, that 
they are able to maintain their usual cornering style even in conditions where this information 
is absent. This explanation does however somewhat undermine their argument for the added 
benef its provided by dynamic simulators in terms of providing accurate lateral acceleration 
information. While this model is obviously limited, the idea of a lateral acceleration threshold 
would easily f it within the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) 
which already uses TLC as a core performance threshold. 
2.4.3 Conceptual model of seatbelt use
The conceptual model of seatbelt use is a regression model which takes a trait based 
approach to try to examine the determinants behind self-repor ted seatbelt use amongst 
young drivers in the US (Calisir & Lehto, 2002). The resulting model showed that while the 
par ticipants in the study were able to sit down and make relatively accurate risk judgements 
about accident probabilities and consequences in the case of not wearing a seatbelt, that 
risk perception did not signif icantly predict self-repor ted seatbelt use. Rather, demographic 
factors such as age, gender, and GPA were the most signif icant predictors (combined 
r2 of .16) with the perceived usefulness of the seatbelt also playing a small predictive role 
(r2 .02–.03). The authors conclude that this f inding means that drivers do not use conscious 
risk perceptions when making their decision to wear a seatbelt or not, but rather that seatbelt 
use is habitual. This model itself is obviously limited and descriptive but could be taken as 
suppor t for broader models such as zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 
1988) or the comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) which also state that risk 
perception plays very little role in daily driver behaviour. Although care should obviously be 
taken with regression studies which rely only on self-repor ted behaviour. 
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2.4.4 Motivational Model of Driving Anger and Aggression
The Motivational Model of Driving Anger and Aggression (Neighbors, Vietor, & Knee, 
2002) is a personality model aimed at explaining, as the name suggests, driver anger and 
aggression. The model itself is an application of self determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 
1987) to a driving situation. Self determination theory states that people are motivated to 
regulate their behaviour both in reaction to ‘pressures’ (external or internal) to produce 
cer tain behaviours and a tendency to react to events in a way that is ‘ego-defensive’. To 
this existing framework the authors add the idea of preexisting tendencies for anger and 
aggression (traits), and then tested the model through the use of a questionnaire. The result 
was that ego defensiveness did predict self-repor ted driving anger, which then predicted self-
repor ted driver aggression. Feeling pressured on the other hand had no signif icant impact. 
The authors take this as meaning that much driver aggression occurs due to the interpreting 
of the action of others as insulting or damaging to the ego of drivers. Ultimately however, this 
model suffers from the same problems as other self-repor t based models, and is, by design, 
not par ticularly useful for understanding driver behaviour as a whole.
2.4.5 The Driver-in-Control model (DiC)
The DiC model is a hierarchical model based on a cognitive systems perspective and criticizes 
earlier theories in terms of treating the driver as a separate component from the vehicle 
(Hollnagel et al., 2003). Instead it proposes that the driver and vehicle should be seen as a 
Joint Driver-Vehicle System. The model proposes a regulating loop where driver’s intentions, 
objectives, actions, and behavioural outcomes are monitored. This is described as occurring 
at four distinct levels: the targeting level, where high level goals are set, the monitoring 
level, where current environmental traff ic conditions are assessed, the regulating level, where 
goals for the immediate control of the vehicles are set, and the tracking loop where low level 
control of the vehicle goes on. The model also has feedbacks between the levels in terms of 
compensatory control actions between the last two levels and anticipatory control between 
the f irst three levels. 
Ultimately, while the DiC is a useful systematic and cognitive description of goal driven 
processes in driving, it is openly described by its creators as a descriptive model and, therefore, 
could be criticized as not directly resulting in solid predictions that could be tested. However, 
it could be useful in modelling traff ic behaviour and as a guideline for designers of driver 
assistance technology.
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2.4.6 Causal Chain for the effect of road safety measures
This is a subjective utility maximisation, risk based model proposed by Elvik (2004) aimed 
at explaining the factors that lead to behavioural adaptation by drivers in the face of road 
safety measures. The model is a relatively straight forward causal chain with road safety 
measures f irst working to modify basic risk factors on the road. According to Elvik, drivers 
are continuously monitoring accident risk and, therefore, once a change in accident risk has 
occurred thanks to a new road safety measure, one of two things will happen. The f irst is 
‘antecedent behavioural adaptation’, which is a pre-existing reaction or behavioural response 
to the change in the risk factors, which then goes on to change the safety margins the 
driver maintains through their behaviour. The second option is that there are changes to the 
‘structural safety margin’s’ of the road system. These changes in the structure of the road 
system, which change its objective safety margin, will then be behaviourally adapted to: if they 
are noticed by the driver, if the safety margin increase is large, if they primarily effect accident 
probability rather than injury probability, if the amount of utility gained by adapting is high, 
and if the damage that an accident may cause is low. 
This model’s use of accident risk as a central factor means that it can be criticized in the 
same way that earlier models, like RHT (1976), were. The primary criticism being that people 
are not very aware of accident risk, which is generally low, and that safety measures tend to 
only slightly alter this already low chance. This makes it very unlikely that people are able to 
monitor and react to these small changes. Fur thermore, the subjective utility maximization 
view of risk perception taken by this model is generally considered to be quite rare in human 
decision making (Slovic et al., 2004; Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007).
2.4.7 Model of Accident Prevention
The Model of Accident Prevention (Lund & Aarø, 2004) was formulated in an attempt 
to move away from a perceived dominance of social psychology models, such as the theory 
of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985), in accident and health research. The Model of Accident 
Prevention states that there are three main types of measures that can prevent accidents: 
attitude modif ications, behavioural modif ications, or structural modif ications. These three 
types of measure are therefore positioned at the core of the model. The model is, therefore, 
presented as an interaction between the person (made up of behaviour, attitudes, and 
beliefs) and the context/situation (made up of social norms, the culture and the physical 
environment). These sub aspects are shown as all interacting with each other, leading to the 
prevention of accidents and being inf luenced by the appropriate modif ications (behavioural, 
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attitudinal or structural). This means that the model itself is quite broad and descriptive 
in nature and, therefore, does not give much of an insight into the underlying mechanisms 
behind driver behaviour.
However, in order to validate the model, and provide weightings for the impor tance of the 
three modif ications in preventing accidents, Lund & Aarø (2004) conducted a literature review 
on accident prevention measures. In this review they found that pure attitude modif ication 
interventions have little to no effect in preventing accidents and that behavioural and 
structural modif ication is much more effective. However, they also repor t that if attitude 
modif ications are combined with behavioural or structural modif ications then they seem to 
be able to enhance the accident prevention effect. This f inding of the ineffectiveness of pure 
attitudinal accident prevention measures is not new, and in fact is par tly what promoted the 
creation of the Model of Accident Prevention. However, such interventions are still common 
within the accident prevention f ield, so perhaps it is still a point that is wor th making.
2.4.8 Psychosocial function of driving in young people
The Psychosocial function of driving is a social and motivational model aimed at describing 
the various lifestyle aspects that can inf luence young people’s driving behaviour (Møller, 
2004). The model was constructed through a focus group study with a group of 29 young 
drivers and resulted in Møller identifying four ‘psychosocial functions’ for driving. These are: 
visibility (a way to get attention), status (the expression of their self-identity), control (as in 
the ability to control and handle a vehicle), and f inally mobility (the ability to get around and 
fulf ill goals). 
The psychosocial functions are then broken down into eleven categories such as what car 
brand the driver has or their risk perception. These psychosocial functions, which could also 
perhaps be called motivations, are then said to interact with three main lifestyle functions of 
driving: leisure use, driving with or for friends, and driving patterns in terms of self-expression. 
This model is obviously limited in scope and mostly descriptive in nature. However, in a 
large scale questionnaire study Møller & Gregersen (2008) did f ind that the psychosocial 
function of driving was an indicator of self-repor ted risky driving activities. Interestingly, in 
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this study the questions used to assess psychosocial function of driving were based on nine 
variables, not the four functions or eleven main variables repor ted in the earlier Møller (2004) 
paper. 
2.4.9 The qualitative model of behaviour adaptation 
The qualitative model of behaviour adaptation (Rudin-Brown & Parker, 2004) was originally 
called the quantitative model of behavioural adaptation (Brown & Noy, 2004) and presented 
at an ICTTP conference in 2000. This model is aimed exclusively at explaining behavioural 
adaptation to driver assistance systems and suggests that driving experience is mediated 
via the trust the driver has in the driver assistance system. This trust is affected by a 
driver’s personality, par ticularly their locus of control and sensation seeking characteristics. 
The driver’s personality and their trust in the system then create their mental representation 
of the driving task, which is executed at the strategic, tactical, and operational level, and then 
interacts with the road system. It could be argued that the aspects that make up this model 
are already covered within the major models discussed above: in terms of the motives and 
‘human factors’ component of TDH/RAT (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller 
et al., 2008; Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011), the motives and personality components of the RMM 
(Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011), and the ‘extra motives’ component of the multiple comfor t 
zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007). However, the qualitative model of behaviour 
adaption is more specif ic, and this led Carsten (2009) to praise the model for generating 
testable predictions, some of which have already been relatively successfully tested (Rudin-
Brown & Parker, 2004; Rudin-Brown & Parker, 2004). 
2.4.10 Behavioural framework for aggression at intersections
This mathematical gap acceptance model exists purely to simulate drive behaviour at 
unsignalised intersections; specif ically whether drivers will perform an ‘aggressive manoeuvre’ 
at an intersection or not (Kaysi & Abbany, 2007). The model uses driver characteristics 
such as gender and age, characteristics of their vehicles in terms of year and performance 
attributes, and attributes of the traff ic f low, such as time spent waiting at the intersection, 
to predict the performance of aggressive manoeuvres. The base characteristics of the driver, 
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their experience, and the current traff ic conditions, are f iltered through their skills, attitudes, 
perceptions, and preferences and then modif ied by any relevant situational constraints, such 
as the time of day or current sight distance at the intersection, before producing the choice 
to accept (or reject) a gap in the traff ic. 
The model itself was calculated through the use of quite simple binary probit models, with 
attitudes for example, simply being a binary disposition towards being aggressive or not. 
The model resulted in a prediction that being younger than 26, driving a spor ts car, and the 
average speed of the road being driven were the best predictors of aggressive manoeuvres 
at intersections. These predictions were somewhat validated by comparison with real world 
data. 
2.4.11  The Safe driving behaviour framework
While not actually intended to replace any other models of driver behaviour, the Safe driving 
behaviour framework (Strecher et al., 2006) is still interesting as it combines several theories to 
create a reference point to review other literature on the psychological factors in driving. The 
models incorporated into the framework are TCI (Fuller, 2000; Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 
2005; Fuller et al., 2008), RHT (Wilde, 1976), Deery’s (1999) model of crash risk perception, the 
concept of reciprocal determinism from Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1978), the theory 
of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), and the health belief model (Rosenstock, 1974). 
The combination of all these models unsurprisingly results in what appears to be a quite a 
complex, multifaceted model of driver behaviour. But when examined more closely, the safe 
driving behaviour framework essentially turns around an idea of perceived accident risk being 
compared against a target level of risk acceptance, which then creates a behavioural intent. 
This intent is then moderated through the task diff iculty of the current situation to produce 
behaviour. Other social or psychological factors such as sensation seeking or attitudes are 
shown as inf luences on these variables but it is this accident risk comparison that appears 
most impor tant in the model. Therefore, the criticisms aimed at other such accident risk 
based models can easily be applied here (e.g. Fuller, 1984; Fuller, 2005; Michon, 1985; Michon, 
1989; Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Ranney, 1994; Rothengatter, 2002). However, it is still 
interesting to see an attempt to combine several social and cognitive models together in this 
fashion. 
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2.4.12 Hierarchical model of operational anticipation windows in driving
Tanida & Pöppel (2006) provide a goal-directed model which attempts to provide a 
neuronal account of the driving task broken down into f ive hierarchical levels: the strategic, 
segmented tactical, manoeuvring, anticipative control, and sensorimotor and perceptual 
levels, with the last two levels being seen as outside of explicit control. These f ive levels are 
essentially an extension or f iner detailed expansion of Michon’s three level hierarchy which 
split driving into the strategic, tactical and operational levels (Michon, 1985; Michon, 1989). 
The model states that anticipation of events and, therefore, goal processing is impor tant 
for driving, yet this involves the processing of a lot of complex behaviour, a task which is limited 
by the ability of the brain to create windows in which the anticipation of events and outcomes 
can occur. These windows get progressively smaller in time frame as a driver moves down the 
proposed hierarchy from strategic control to the sensorimotor levels where the anticipatory 
windows are as small as 30 milliseconds. Apar t from this attempt to introduce the concept 
of neuronal anticipatory time windows, and the f ive step hierarchy, this model is similar to 
other goal directed models in its basic operation. This suggests that drivers have goals at 
different levels, which then create anticipations, or in other words, expectations, which can be 
monitored, and then action can be taken if these expectancies are not met. Then, assuming 
that the driver has the resources, represented in the model by anticipatory time windows, to 
detect the loss in goal progress they will then change their behaviour in order to correct the 
situation. This time limited, goal directed, hierarchical conceptualization of driving is similar 
to the performance monitoring suggested by Summala in his multiple comfor t zone model 
(Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007).
2.4.13 Situational analysis of behavioural requirements of driving tasks (SAFE)
SAFE (Fastenmeier & Gstalter, 2007) is built on Rasmussen’s (Rasmussen, 1987) idea of 
information processing. The model states that drivers compare their perception of the current 
task environment with their expectations for performance and then make decisions based on 
stored heuristics. This results in a normative model of driving behaviour which can be used 
to carry out a task analysis. The model is therefore a descriptive or taxonomic model and 
cannot deal with, or predict, driver behaviour that deviates from normative rule following 
processes. 
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2.4.14 Driver celeration theory 
Driver celeration theory (Af Wåhlberg, 2008) is a mathematical model aimed not at explaining 
driver behaviour as a whole but rather at predicting accident involvement. The core of the 
model is an assumption that all changes in speed indicate changes in risk, therefore driver 
celerations, which are the sum or average of all of a driver’s accelerations and decelerations 
across a cer tain time, can be used to predict accident involvement. In other words, the 
model states that risky or dangerous behaviours tend to involve a lot of speed changes and, 
therefore, if you can look at an individual’s celeration behaviour over time it should predict 
their accident involvement, specif ically the accidents that they themselves cause. Ultimately, 
however, the whole model is just an exercise in curve-f itting and does not add anything to 
the psychological understanding of driver behaviour.
2.4.15 Calibration
Calibration (Kuiken & Twisk, 2001) is a motivational model based around the assumption that 
drivers are motivated to adapt to keep the mental load of the driving task to a minimum. 
This is done through the process of calibration, where drivers compare the perception of 
their own skills and capability with the demands and requirements they perceive arise from 
the driving task. This is very similar to the Task-Capability Interface model (Fuller, 2000) 
and task diff icultly homeostasis (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 
2008) discussed in section 2.1.1. The Calibration model is in the end descriptive but does 
suggest that par t of the reason why young drivers are over represented in accidents is 
that their calibration is worse than more experienced drivers. This leads younger drivers to 
overestimate their own skills and underestimate the demands of the task. This in itself was 
praised by Rothengatter (2002) as an impor tant idea that requires fur ther research.
2.4.16 Åberg and Warners combined model and the Safety related driver 
  behaviour model
Both Åberg & Warner’s (2008) combined model and the Safety related driver behaviour 
model (Verschuur & Hur ts, 2008) come from an attempt to combine two relatively popular 
models in traff ic psychology. The f irst is the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) and 
the second is Reason’s (Reason, 1990) error taxonomy as assessed by the Driver Behaviour 
Questionnaire (DBQ). 
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In the case of Åberg & Warner’s (2008) combined model, the power of these models 
to account for self-repor ted, and actual logged speeding was examined. The model was 
created through the use of a survey and states that the TPB variables of attitude, subjective 
norm, and perceived behavioural control, predict par ticipants’ perceived moral norm, which 
then predicts the DBQ variable of repor ted violations. Self-repor ted violations then predict 
self-repor ted speeding and to a lesser extent actual logged speeding. Attitude and perceived 
behavioural control also had small predictive impact on self-repor ted speeding, with moral 
norm also having a small predictive impact on actual logged speed. The only other DBQ 
variable that was signif icant was self-repor ted inattention, which was found to have a small 
predictive impact on self-repor ted speeding. 
The Safety related driver behaviour model (Verschuur & Hur ts, 2008) on, the other 
hand, used a much larger survey and was aimed mainly at predicting accident involvement. 
Much like the combined model, the only two DBQ factors that were found to be signif icant 
in the Safety behaviour model were self-repor ted violations and inattention. However, the 
predictive power of these variables was very weak. 
To combine two such well used frameworks as the TPB and the DBQ is cer tainly an 
interesting approach. However the resulting models suffer from the same problems as both 
of its component measures in that they rely quite heavily on self-repor t and generally have 
small to very small predictive power. 
2.4.17 Risk-adaption theory
Risk-adaption theory (Koornstra, 2009) is an application of what is called the ‘psychophysical 
response and valence theory of choice behaviour’ (Koornstra, 2007) to traff ic behaviour. 
It also appears to be an expansion of an earlier model called the ‘reference-frame theory of 
traff ic risks’ (Koornstra, 1990). The model itself is mathematical in nature as well as being 
quite dense and hard to tease apar t. However, on close examination the model seems 
to suggest that risk behaviour in traff ic is controlled by ‘single-peaked’ valences for fear 
conf licting with ‘single-peaked’ valences for arousal. So, in other words, the fear of an accident 
would conf lict with the arousal of driving fast. The assumption seems to be that drivers have 
a preferred, ideal arousal level as well having a preferred ideal accident fear level. However, 
moving towards either of these levels effects the other, in that increasing arousal increases 
the fear of an accident away from the ideal range, and decreasing accident fear reduces 
arousal away from this point. The result is that when these two valences are combined, an 
‘indifference area’ is created where there is not too much or two little of either variable. 
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The paper describing risk-adaption theory then goes on to state (Koornstra, 2009) that 
the model can account for three older models of driver behaviour: RHT (Wilde, 1976), zero-
risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 1988), and Threat avoidance theory 
(Fuller, 1984; Fuller, 1988; Fuller, 1990a; Fuller, 1990b; Fuller, 1992). It does so by setting one 
of its variables to zero. However the model itself does not necessarily suppor t any of these 
interpretations, rather it just demonstrated that it could. Indeed the model seems to exist as 
a mathematical formulation in need of a driver and does not suggest how any of its variables 
should be set, or even really how they become set at an individual level. The closest it appears 
to come is suggesting that individuals are somehow sensitive to aggregate accident risk in the 
population. How this occurs is not made clear however. Ultimately, the idea that actions or 
situations have different valences which attract or repel individual decision making towards 
or away from them, is not new and is better expressed by other models, such as the Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003).
2.4.18 The situational control framework
A relatively recent model, the situation control framework (Ljung Aust & Engström, 2011) 
is aimed primarily at assisting designers of driver assistance and active safety systems with 
the design and evaluation of their products. The model takes a systematic and goal driven 
approach to driving, much like the DiC (Hollnagel et al., 2003), and combines it with a 
motivational account of driving similar to the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; 
Summala, 2007). By doing so, the model states that drivers seek goal states at various 
hierarchical levels of driving, including the goal of maintaining safety margins. The satisfactory 
movement towards these goals leads drivers to operate in a comfor t zone and the 
failure to obtain or lack of progress towards these goals causes uncomfor table feelings. 
These uncomfor table feelings are then generally avoided, which restores the control based 
goals of the driver. 
These safety or comfor t zones are also proposed as guiding goal setting, with drivers 
tending to set goals which will place them within these zones. In par ticular, Ljung Aust & 
Engström (2011) def ine being in the comfor t zone as feeling zero discomfor t. The situational 
control framework, then goes on to suggest that when discomfor t is felt, this will lead to learnt 
associations and to somatic markers (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003) being created which 
can help with avoidance of similar situations in the future. The situational control framework, 
like the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007), also makes the point 
of referring to driving behaviour as satisf icing, rather than optimizing. All of this creates a 
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conceptualization of a goal driven joint driver-vehicle system taking on sets of driver, vehicle, 
and environmental based ‘trajectories’ bounded by mostly automatically and unconsciously 
monitored safety margins, the crossing of which f irst produces feelings of discomfor t and 
then eventually leads to a loss of control. The ability of drivers to maintain performance, 
unconsciously and consciously, within these safety margins is referred to as situational control. 
Overall, the framework seems quite well thought out, and Ljung Aust and Engström 
(2011) provide a useful description to how it can be applied to evaluate active safety features. 
However, since this control framework is based heavily on the ideas of the multiple comfor t 
zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) most of the criticisms that apply to that model 
could also be made in reference to the situational control framework. 
2.4.19 ITERATE and the Unif ied Model of Driver behaviour (UMD)
The IT for Error Remediation And Trapping Emergencies (ITERATE) project is an EU project 
aimed at creating and testing a Unif ied Model of Driver behaviour (UMD) (Barnard et al., 
2010; Oppenheim, Shinar, Carsten et al., 2010; Oppenheim, Shinar, Enjalber t et al., 2010). In 
par ticular the UMD is designed to describe driver behaviour when interacting with active 
safety systems in emergency situations. The model aims to describe all forms of surface 
transpor t and appears to be designed in terms of being able to be used in the modelling of 
driver behaviour by computer software and for integration into intelligent agent systems. 
The model itself is made up of f ive driver variables, mostly derived from a driver model put 
forward by Cacciabue & Carsten (2010). The f ive variables are: culture, attitude/personality 
(primarily sensation seeking), experience, driver state (with a special focus on fatigue) and 
task demand. These f ive factors then interact with each other to produce driver behaviour 
and performance, represented as error propensity and reaction time. Driver behaviour then 
interacts with the road environment, made up of the traff ic, the road conditions and the 
visibility, via the mediating inf luence of the vehicle they happen to be operating, plus the result 
of their own, and their vehicles, interaction with any technological driver assistance systems 
available. 
The UMD is relatively broad and simple, yet it has been used to create several general 
hypotheses (see Barnard et al, 2010 for details). These hypotheses are currently being evaluated 
by the labs that make up the ITERATE project, and the UMD is still under development.
CHAPTER 3 THAT IS FAST ENOUGH
A version of this chapter has been previously published as Lewis-Evans, B. & Rothengatter, 
T. (2009) Task diff iculty, risk, effor t and comfor t in a simulated driving task – Implications for 
Risk Allostasis Theory. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 41, 1053-1063 and can be accessed 
online here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2009.06.011
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Abstract
Risk Allostasis Theory states that drivers seek to maintain a feeling of risk within a preferred 
range (Fuller, 2008). Risk Allostasis Theory is the latest version of Task Diff iculty Homeostasis 
theory, and is in par t based on the f indings of experiments where par ticipants were asked to 
rate the task diff iculty, feeling of risk and chance of collision of scenes shown in digitally altered 
video clips (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008).
The focus of the current research was to expand upon the previous video based experiments 
using a driving simulator. This allowed par ticipants to be in control of the vehicle rather than 
acting as passive observers, as well as providing additional speed cues. The results suppor t 
previous f indings that ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk are related, and that they 
are also highly related to ratings of effor t and moderately related to ratings of comfor t and 
habit. However, the linearly increasing trend for task diff iculty and feeling of risk described 
by the previous research was not observed: instead the f indings of this experiment suppor t 
a threshold effect where ratings of risk (feeling of and chance of loss of control/collision), 
diff iculty, effor t, and comfor t, go through a period of stability and only star t to increase 
once a cer tain threshold has been crossed. It is within the period of stability where subjective 
experience of risk and diff iculty is low, or absent, that drivers generally prefer to operate.
3.1 Introduction
The underlying controlling factors of everyday driving behaviour have been debated 
extensively for many years (e.g. Michon, 1989; Ranney, 1994; Rothengatter, 2002). Models put 
forward have included attitude theories such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 
1991), learning theories such as the threat avoidance model (Fuller, 1984), economic models 
such as Peltzman’s (1975) driving intensity model and motivational models such as Risk 
Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1976; Wilde, 1982; Wilde, 1988), zero-risk theory (Näätänen 
& Summala, 1974; Summala, 1997) and the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; 
Summala, 2007). However, none of the proposed models have yet managed to achieve 
wide-spread acceptance amongst a majority of traff ic researchers. The lack of a well-agreed 
understanding of the underlying controlling factors of everyday driving creates problems 
for road safety professionals. If effective interventions are to be put into place, then a good 
understanding of exactly what guides driver behaviour is impor tant. It is also vital, given that 
these models could be used when designing interventions, that they are tested in order to 
determine their validity. 
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In 2000, Fuller proposed a new model; The Task-Capability Interface (TCI) model, and its 
accompanying Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT), states that a feeling of risk, as an indication of 
task diff iculty, is the primary controller of driver behaviour (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; 
Fuller, 2007; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Fuller, 2008). The basic premise behind TCI is that 
driving is an interaction between the demands of the environment in which the behaviour is 
being produced, and the capability of the individual producing the behaviour. This interaction 
produces the diff iculty of the task being performed which is then perceived by drivers, and 
if task diff iculty becomes too great then loss of control occurs (Fuller, 2000; Fuller & Santos, 
2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). In this way TCI is more a 
description of the driving task rather than a model which predicts everyday driver behaviour. 
It is instead RAT that takes on the aspect of a predictive model. RAT states that individuals 
have a preferred range of perceived feeling of risk in which they operate and that they will 
alter their behaviour to maintain the feeling of risk within this preferred range (Fuller, 2008). 
An individual’s preferred level of feeling of risk is determined by their current and long term 
motivations, along with how capable they currently perceive they are. This means that this 
range of preferred feeling of risk is not set and may alter as an individual’s motivations and 
perceptions of their capability change (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller 
et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). That preferred feeling of risk is a range, and that it 
is f lexible differentiates RAT from Risk Homeostasis Theory, where target level of risk was 
seen as less f lexible and more of a discrete target (Wilde, 1976). 
However RAT, like Risk Homeostasis Theory, does still rely on the constant monitoring 
of a variable, in this case feeling of risk, which in turn is an indication of task diff iculty, and 
comparing it to a preferred level. RAT in itself is a replacement for Task-Diff iculty Homeostasis 
(TDH) theory in which a preferred range of task diff iculty was monitored (Fuller & Santos, 
2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Fuller, 2008). When the model 
was still called Task-Diff iculty Homeostasis the monitoring of diff iculty was at one point 
related to the monitoring of mental workload (Fuller, 2005). Fur thermore, it was originally 
predicted that feelings of risk would act in a threshold manner, acting as a warning to drivers 
that they were near the edge of their preferred range of task diff iculty (Fuller, McHugh et 
al., 2008). However, since that time TDH has developed into RAT and feelings of risk have 
become a constantly monitored variable. In par ticular feeling of risk is not seen as a variable 
that is only salient after a cer tain threshold has been crossed, as suggested by zero-risk 
theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 1997), but rather is continuously salient in its 
inf luence on driver decision making. However, while feelings of risk are continuously salient, 
drivers may not be aware of their inf luence on their decision making. This is seen in the 
following statement: 
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“... the effects of risk feelings on decision making are not binary (one moment they are 
irrelevant, the next they become salient): task diff iculty and feelings of risk are continuously 
present variables which inform driver decisions (whether consciously or not). However, only 
when some threshold point is reached may risk feelings become par ticularly salient in driver 
consciousness” Fuller et al. (2008, p. 31). 
In combination with this constant monitoring of feeling of risk is a threshold type relationship 
thought to warn individuals when they are operating outside of their preferred range of 
feeling of risk. It is also perhaps the point which feelings of risk may begin to consciously 
effect decision making of drivers. This risk threshold also seems to be around the same time 
at which individuals repor t feeling at risk of being involved in a crash (Fuller, McHugh et al., 
2008). 
That feelings of risk are being constantly monitored and compared to a preferred range 
opens RAT to many of the same criticisms that had previously been aimed at Risk Homeostasis 
Theory (Evans, 1986; McKenna, 1990; Summala, 1988; Summala, 1997). In psychology, a feeling 
is a subjective and conscious experience of an emotion, with emotions being seen as objective 
physiological and mental states (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003; VandenBos, 2006). That is to 
say, feeling implies conscious awareness at some level. If this is the case, the most impor tant 
objection to RAT is that most of the time drivers repor t feeling no risk during day-to-day 
driving and it is only when a performance related safety margin is crossed that drivers 
become aware of any feelings they could label as risk (Summala, 1988; Summala, 1997). In 
the past these objections have tended to relate to the monitoring of crash or statistical risk. 
But objections that it would be stressful and demanding mentally to be constantly directing 
attention towards a subjective variable in order to continuously compare it to a preferred 
level or range of experience of that variable, are still relevant, even when the variable is 
“feeling of” rather than “statistical” risk. 
Similarly, if mental workload is examined it is true that people do tend to adjust their 
behaviour in order to operate at an optimum level of workload (Fuller, 2005). However, 
it seems that it is the absence of under or over load that indicates that an individual is 
operating at optimal mental workload. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.1 where a range of 
measurement tools and their ability to detect mental workload is shown. As can be seen in 
the f igure both objective physiological and subjective assessments of workload are unable to 
detect operation in the optimal A2 area. Rather operation in this area has to be inferred by 
the f inding that an individual is not operating in any of the under or over load areas which 
can be detected (de Waard, 1996). 
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Figure 3.1. The relation of workload to performance in 6 regions and the sensitivity of different measures to 
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In this way mental workload is similar to a threshold type relationship with under and over 
load thresholds and optimally functioning individuals feeling no load at all, or a stable low 
load, creating a U-shaped curve (de Waard, 1996). 
Fuller (2007; 2008) attempts to address these concerns around the constant monitoring 
of a feeling of risk, with reference to Damasio’s Somatic-Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; 
Damasio, 2003). The Somatic-Marker Hypothesis claims that through past experience, 
specif ic stimuli become marked by associated emotions, which are underlying body states. 
Damasio refers to this as a somatic marker and suggests that when the marked stimulus 
is encountered then this marker is also triggered. These markers can also be in some cases 
present from bir th (Damasio, 1994). Activation of the somatic marker could produce greater 
attentional capture for these stimuli, resulting in feeling. In addition, as these emotions are 
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seen as changes in the body state of the individual, they are also speculated to be able to 
bias an individual into behaving in a specif ic way due to the resulting changes in the internal 
physiology and associated psychology of the individual. In this last way the body states 
associated with emotions are said to be able to shape behaviour without conscious awareness 
(Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). Fuller, therefore, has suggested that it is through this process 
that feeling of risk is monitored (Fuller, 2007). However, Damasio’s theory makes a clear 
distinction between emotions, which are body states and do not need consciousness, and 
feelings, which are the experiences of emotions (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). It is the 
emotions, which are underlying body states, constantly present within the Somatic-Marker 
Hypothesis. Fuller, however, only uses the term ‘feeling’, which seems inappropriate, as he 
seems to be paradoxically suggesting that feeling of risk is constantly monitored, constantly 
salient and yet not felt. 
Placing issues of terminology aside, it is not clear exactly how the Somatic-Marker Hypothesis 
f its with the contention made by RAT that individuals select a range of feeling of risk at 
which to operate and maintain operation in this area (Fuller, 2008). Rather than a range, the 
Somatic-Marker Hypothesis seems to lead to the suggestion that there are set learnt stimuli 
which, when encountered, trigger an emotion and can then lead to a feeling of experienced 
risk (or bias behaviours through resulting body changes), assuming that this feeling has been 
learnt to be associated with the relevant emotion (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). It is at this 
point action will be taken to avoid this feeling. Either that or motivational aspects will cause 
this feeling to be tolerated. This is a learnt threshold avoidance relationship more along the 
lines of that suggested by zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 1997) or 
threat avoidance theory (Fuller, 1984), rather than a constant monitoring and maintaining of 
a preferred level of feeling of risk in an allostatic fashion as suggested by RAT (Fuller & Santos, 
2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Fuller, 2008). 
Finally, and perhaps of most relevance to this paper, Fuller (2007) acknowledges that the 
application of Damasio’s Somatic-Marker Hypothesis within RAT is speculative and does not 
currently have direct experimental support. 
Rather, the primary experimental support for RAT is a study carried out by Fuller, McHugh 
et al. (2008), which has been subsequently replicated by Kinnear et al. (2008). This experiment 
examined the relationship between individuals’ subjective ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of 
risk, their assessment of when loss of control would occur and speed. In order to examine the 
relationships between, par ticipants were presented with digital video footage of three roads; a 
residential road, a dual carriageway and a rural road, being driven at several different speeds. 
The differences in speed were achieved by digitally altering the video and, therefore, the footage 
included no other moving vehicles and no information from in-car speed instrumentation. 
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Participants were presented with the speeds star ting with the slowest and then increasing 
in 5 mph increments. After each increment they were then asked to indicate how much risk 
they thought they would feel driving this road at the speed shown, as well as how diff icult 
they thought it would be, and how many times they thought they would lose control of the 
vehicle or be in a collision. 
It was initially hypothesized by Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008) that task diff iculty would have 
a systematically increasing relationship with speed and that feeling of risk and ratings of 
loss of control would operate more on a threshold fashion, as predicted by zero-risk theory 
(Näätänen & Summala, 1974). However, the results of the experiment showed that both task 
diff iculty and feelings of risk were highly linearly related to speed (r2 = .98), and that only 
ratings of potential loss of control showed a threshold relationship. It was also found that 
ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk were highly correlated with each other (r = .81, 
p < .001). This led to the conclusion that a feeling of risk provides continuous feedback to 
drivers allowing them to maintain the diff iculty of the driving within preferred levels. However, 
the presentation of speeds in steadily increasing 5 mph increments raises the possibility that 
an order effect is responsible for the strong linear relationships found between task diff iculty, 
feeling of risk, and speed. This means that the systematically increasing relationship of task 
diff iculty and feeling of risk with speed repor ted could be, at least in par t, an ar tifact produced 
by the methodology used. 
A replication by Kinnear et al. (2008) produced similar results but no threshold effect was 
found for ratings of loss of control. It is possible that this is because the question used by 
Kinnear et al. asked about the loss of control of a hypothetically identical other driver rather 
than of the par ticipants’ own driving ability. Previous research has suggested that people 
assess their own ability as higher, and crash risk as lower, than that of others, even their peers 
(Harré & Sibley, 2007; McKenna, Stanier, & Lewis, 1991; McKenna, 1993). Therefore it is possible 
that even though the wording Kinnear et al. (2008) used specif ied a driver that was just like 
the par ticipant, the par ticipants may have rated these hypothetical identical others in a more 
negative fashion than when asked to rate their own crash risk. Kinnear et al. (2008) also 
presented the speeds in an ascending fashion, again raising the possibility of an order effect. 
Fuller (personal communication, September 2, 2008) however, has claimed that different 
speed orders were tested in his original study and produced similarly linear increasing results. 
This experiment will seek to address both methodological issues by presenting speeds in 
random order within each trial, and by including two questions on crash risk which follow 
wordings similar to those used by both Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008) and Kinnear et al. (2008). 
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This experiment seeks to expand on Fuller, McHugh et al.’s (2008) f indings, by using a 
driving simulator to examine three vital components. The f irst is the predicted systematically 
increasing relationship between speed, ratings of task diff iculty, and feeling of risk (Fuller, 
McHugh et al., 2008). That individuals are sensitive to changes in the diff iculty of the task 
they are performing (in this case increases in speed) is impor tant in order for them to be able 
to constantly monitor the related comparator variable of feeling of risk. This is necessary in 
order for them to be able to select a cer tain level/range of this variable at which to function. 
That is to say, if a cer tain target range of feeling of risk is preferred (higher than zero) there 
must be, assuming no other distractions, a detectable difference in feeling of risk between 
differing levels of speed in order for drivers to be able to choose/maintain the speed they 
prefer to operate at. In line with the previously raised objections to constant monitoring of risk 
(McKenna, 1988; Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Wagenaar, 1992) and the original predictions of 
Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008) it is hypothesized that instead a threshold effect will be apparent. 
The second component is the strong relationship between the subjective ratings repor ted. 
In this experiment, additional ratings of effor t and comfor t will be added and their relationship 
to subjective risk and task diff iculty examined. Effor t was selected as a measure of mental 
workload, a comparator initially suggested by Fuller and Santos (2002) when RAT was still 
known as Task-Diff iculty Homeostasis. Ratings of comfor t have been indicated by Summala 
(2005) as an impor tant par t of his multiple comfor t zone model where they are suggested 
to indicate operation outside of or near the edge of threshold-like safety margins. It is 
hypothesized that ratings of effor t and comfor t will also be related to ratings of risk and 
task diff iculty. A rating of how typical the speed experienced is to the par ticipant will also be 
gained in order to see the effect of previous experience. It is expected that through this scale 
that drivers will indicate a clear preference for travelling at speeds which they rate as typically 
experienced. 
The relationship between par ticipants’ subjective ratings and a chosen preferred or target 
speed will also be examined. The use of the driving simulator allows for the introduction of 
a free speed condition where par ticipants can choose their own speed rather than being 
always restricted to preset speeds. The subjective ratings given at this speed will be compared 
to ratings for the f ixed speeds. 
It is predicted that in line with a threshold model of feeling of risk, task diff iculty and effor t, 
that ratings at this chosen speed will be lower or the same as the ratings given to speeds 
before this point and that only speeds higher than this preferred speed show a systematic 
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increase with speed. In other words, par ticipants will not prefer a cer tain level of feeling of risk 
along an increasing continuum but instead rate their preferred speed as having no, or a low 
and stable, feeling of risk, task diff iculty, and effor t.
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
There were 47 par ticipants recruited from the undergraduate population at the 
University of Groningen; 25 male and 22 female. Recruitment was carried out through the 
psychology depar tment’s computerised recruitment pool and two course credits were given 
for par ticipation in the research. The males had a mean age of 21.2 (SD = 2.0), and had 
held their drivers’ licence for an average of 2.8 years (SD = 1.4). Females had a mean age of 
20.3 years (SD = 1.2), and had held their drivers’ licence for 2.1 years (SD = 1.1) on average. 
3.2.2 Materials 
Two sections of road were created in the driving simulator. One road simulated a residential 
street and the other, a section of dual carriageway. The roads contained no other traff ic 
or adverse weather conditions. In addition, speed limit signs were absent from the roads. 
The use of a residential road and a dual carriageway were chosen as these were two of 
the road types used in the previous studies (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008). 
The f inal road type used in the previous studies, a rural road, was not used in this case due 
to time restrictions. This was deemed acceptable since the previous studies found very similar 
results across all three road types (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008). 
The experiment was carried out using the University of Groningen’s STSoftware driving 
simulator, which consists of a f ixed-base car mock-up with controls linked to a dedicated 
graphics controller, and allows par ticipants a 210° view of the road environment. A cardboard 
cutout was placed over the speed instrumentation in order to obscure it. 
Nine set speeds, plus a free speed condition, were assigned to each road. The set speed 
conditions functioned in a manner similar to cruise control and restricted speed to a set 
value. However, unlike conventional cruise control, par ticipants were unable to set the speed 
or disable it. In the free speed condition, the par ticipants were able to drive the simulated 
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vehicle normally and select their own travelling speed. The set speeds for each road were set 
in 10 kmph increments and presented to par ticipants in randomized order. The speed for the 
residential road ranged between 20 and 100 kmph, and for the dual carriageway the range 
was 80 to 160 kmph. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Par ticipants were asked to f ill out a demographic questionnaire that collected information 
about their age and driving experience. Par ticipants were then tested individually on each 
road section under various speed conditions. Twenty-three of the par ticipants encountered 
the residential road f irst and the other 24 were presented with the dual carriageway f irst. 
The par ticipants then had to complete both an observation and driving task. This was again 
counter balanced between par ticipants. Both the road and task orders were counterbalanced 
between males and females. 
Before star ting with the driving or observation tasks, a practice track was presented to 
the par ticipants to allow them to become familiar with the simulator. If par ticipants felt sick 
or uneasy with the simulator at this point they were removed from the experiment. 
3.2.3.1 Observation task 
Par ticipants experience all nine different speed conditions for each road. All the nine speed 
conditions were presented for one road before moving on to the next. The order in which 
the speed increments were presented was determined by random number generation. After 
each speed condition the par ticipants f illed in a questionnaire (in Dutch) on which ratings 
of predicted task diff iculty, feeling of risk, effor t, and comfor t were gained using 7-point 
Liker t scales. The rating scales used were similar to those used previously by Fuller, McHugh 
et al. (2008). Below is an example of the bipolar scale used for task diff iculty during the 
observation task: 
How diff icult would you f ind it to drive this section of road at this speed?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  Extremely Easy    Extremely Diff icult
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In terms of the ratings for risk and effor t, a unipolar scale was used where a rating of 1 
indicated the absence of the variable being assessed. For example a rating of 1 for feeling of 
risk corresponded to “no risk”. In addition par ticipants were asked to indicate if they would 
never, seldom, sometimes, nearly always or always typically drive at the speed experienced 
on the road type shown. In terms of ratings of comfor t, a rating of 7 corresponded to 
extremely comfor table, and a rating of 1 with extremely uncomfor table. For later analysis 
and presentation this scale was reversed to match the other scales, so in the following results 
section of this paper comfor t decreases as the subjective rating given increases, much as 
subjective impressions of task diff iculty increase as the rating given increases. 
In addition, par ticipants were also asked to give an indication of how many times they 
thought they would lose control of the vehicle or have an accident if they drove the road 
shown, at the speed shown, every day for 2 months (i.e. 60 times). This was a question 
worded in a similar fashion as that used by Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008). A similar question 
asked for a rating of how many times 60 drivers like the par ticipants, would crash if they 
drove the road shown, at the speed shown. This was worded in the similar fashion as that 
used by Kinnear et al. (2008). With both questions, the par ticipants were able to freely 
indicate an appropriate number, including an indication that they or an identical other would 
not crash at all. Once all the relevant speed conditions for a road section were presented, 
par ticipants were also asked to give a preferred speed for the road shown and a maximum 
speed at which they thought they could drive and maintain control of the vehicle. In order to 
control for order effects, 23 of the par ticipants were given the questionnaire presented in the 
normal order and 24 in reverse order. 
3.2.3.2 Driving task 
This task was similar to the observation task except that the par ticipants had the ability to 
control the steering of the vehicle. Also, a free speed choice condition was presented to the 
par ticipants during this task, once for each road type, and the speed at which par ticipants 
drove during this condition was recorded. After each drive, par ticipants were again asked 
to f ill in a similar questionnaire to the one used for the observation task. The only difference 
between the questionnaire used here and that of the observation task, was that the 
questions were worded to ask what was experienced rather than asking par ticipants to 
give an indication of what they thought they would experience. For example, the question 
assessing task diff iculty was worded as follows: “How diff icult did you f ind it to drive this 
section of road at this speed?” Other than this change in wording the same rating scales were 
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used and the same variables assessed. In addition, speed information was collected at a rate 
of 10 Hz during the free speed condition. Average speed and standard deviation of speed 
were then calculated for each par ticipant individually and then averaged across all subjects. 
3.2.4 Analysis 
The collected subjective ratings were examined by creating two datasets. The f irst contained 
the averaged subjective ratings given at each speed category for all par ticipants, for each 
road, and for both the observation and driving task. Ratings given by the par ticipants for the 
free speed condition during the driving task were not included in this dataset. 
A second dataset was created using the data gathered in the driving task in order to 
examine the ratings given by par ticipants during the f ixed speed conditions relative to the 
ratings they gave during the free speed condition. The dataset was created by f irst calculating 
the average speed each par ticipant drove during the free speed condition. Once this speed 
was known, then the ratings from the three set speed conditions above and below this speed 
were collected and arranged around the ratings given for the free speed condition so that 
it sat in the center. For example if one par ticipant drove at 58 kmph on average on the 
residential road, then the ratings they gave on that task were set as the zero or center point, 
and then the ratings for the 30,40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 kmph f ixed speed conditions arrayed 
on either side. So their order of ratings would read: 30, 40, 50, free speed (58 kmph), 60, 70, 
80. Another par ticipant may have driven at 63 kmph on average, and therefore their order 
of ratings would read 40, 50, 60, free speed (63 kmph), 70, 80, 100. This was done for both 
road types. Once this was done for each par ticipant, the ratings where averaged and the 
relative dataset created. 
3.3 Results 
MANOVA, correlation and regression analysis was carried out on both the averaged and 
relative datasets using SPSS 14.0 for windows. MANOVA analysis with a difference contrast 
for speed for the averaged dataset, showed main effects of road type (F = 8.41, p < .01), task 
type (F = 32.59, p < .001), and speed (F = 71.39, p < .001). Interaction effects were also found 
between road and speed (F = 13.81, p < .001), task type and speed (F = 7.58, p < .001), and 
road, task type and speed (F = 2.84, p < .05). Fur ther analysis for each subjective variable by 
road type and task revealed signif icant main effects of road type only on ratings of comfor t 
(F = 9.88, p < .01), ratings of loss of control for the drivers themselves (F = 7.21, p <.01) and 
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ratings of typical speed (F =47.35, p < .001). In all these cases the residential road produced 
higher ratings than the dual carriageway. Main effects of task type were found for ratings 
of task diff iculty (F = 44.29, p < .001), feelings of risk (F = 42.79, p < .001), effor t (F = 65.51, 
p < .001), comfor t (F = 55.85, p < .001), loss of control for self (F = 16.37, p < .001) and 
for others (F = 14.11, p < .001), but not for ratings of how typical the speed was (F = 1.32, 
p = .256). Where these signif icant differences were found the observation task produced 
higher ratings than the driving task. Despite the differences observed between the tasks and 
roads, the shape of the trends shown between the observation task and the driving task are 
quite similar. MANOVA analysis of the relative dataset with a difference contrast for speed, 
failed to f ind a main effect of road type (F < 1, NS) but a main effect of speed was observed 
(F = 45.85, p < .001). 
3.3.1 Relationship of ratings of task diff iculty, and risk to speed 
Ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and risk of collision/loss of control do not linearly increase 
with increases in speed. Rather, as shown in Figure 3.2 it appears that participant indications of 
Figure 3.2. Average ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk and loss of control in relation to increasing speed 
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task diff iculty and risk start low or absent and only signif icantly increase once a certain speed 
has been reached. The only exception to this is the trend for crash risk on the observation task 
on the dual carriageway, which appears more clearly exponential in nature. In terms of the 
rating of loss of control of the vehicle/collision, it is also clear that participants began rating this 
as higher than zero earlier when assessing an identical other rather than themselves. 
Table 3.1. Regression analysis for task diff iculty, feeling of risk and loss of control with speed across both road 
and task types
Residential Road – Observation Task
20 to 40 km/h 50 to 90 km/h
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Task Diff iculty .00 -.05 -.57 .39*** .62 13.22
Feeling of Risk .03 .16 1.91 .41*** .64 14.02
Loss of Control – Self .00 -.06 -.66 .15*** .38 6.84
Loss of Control – Other .00 -.00 -.03 .19*** .43 7.87
Residential Road – Driving Task
Task Diff iculty .00 -.05 -.33 .48*** .69 15.95
Feeling of Risk .00 .06 .70 .51*** .71 17.00
Loss of Control – Self .00 -.06 -.73 .10*** .32 5.61
Loss of Control – Other .00 -.02 -.21 .16*** .40 7.29
Dual Carriageway – Observation Task
80 to 100 km/h 110 to 160 km/h
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Task Diff iculty .02 .15 1.73 .21*** .45 8.51
Feeling of Risk .01 .10 1.13 .22*** .47 8.80
Loss of Control – Self .05** .23 2.78 .08*** .27 4.73
Loss of Control – Other .04** .22 2.66 .08*** .29 4.95
Dual Carriageway – Driving Task
Task Diff iculty .00 .00 .00 .32*** .56 11.37
Feeling of Risk .00 -.01 -.14 .34*** .58 12.05
Loss of Control – Self .01 -.11 -1.27 .10*** .31 5.44
Loss of Control – Other .01 -.10 -1.16 .17*** .42 7.57
** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Regression analysis of the rating of task diff iculty, and risk show no signif icant relationship 
between the repor ted values and speed in the f irst three speed conditions on the residential 
road, under both the observation and driving tasks. Similarly, for the dual carriageway, the 
ratings for the driving task and the ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk for the f irst 
three speed conditions during the observation task, fail to show any signif icant increasing or 
decreasing trend and are f lat in nature. Ratings of both self and other assessed risk of loss 
of control do show signif icant (p <.001) r2 values (t = 2.78, r2 = .05 and t = 2.65, r2 = .05 
respectively) during these f irst three speed conditions during the observation task for the 
dual carriageway. After the f irst three speed conditions the trend in ratings of risk and task 
diff iculty for both roads and across both conditions, begins to show statistically signif icant 
increases (p < .001), with r2 values ranging from .08 to .51 as shown in Table 3.1.
3.3.2 Relationship of ratings of effort, comfort and typical speed to speed 
Figure 3.3. Average ratings of effor t, comfor t and “I typically drive at this speed” in relation to increasing speed 
across both road and task types.
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Ratings of effor t, comfort, and indications of typical speed for the residential road showed a 
U-shaped relationship with speed star ting off initially high and then trending downwards until 
beginning to again trend upwards as shown in Figure 3.3. This is true for both the observation 
and driving task. Although, for the driving task the U-shape is less marked, especially for ratings 
of effor t where the downward trends for effor t were not statistically signif icant (p > .05). 
The relationship is not as clear for the dual carriageway in terms of ratings of effor t and 
comfor t which during the observation task appeared to have a somewhat linear increasing 
relationship with speed. However, indications of typical speed still show a somewhat U-shaped 
curve for both the observation task and the driving task on the dual carriageway. Ratings of 
Table 3.2. Regression analysis for effor t, comfor t and “I typically drive at this speed” with speed across both 
road and task types
Residential Road – Observation Task
20 to 40 km/h 50 to 90 km/h
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Effor t .05** -.23 -2.76 .38*** .61 12.92
Comfor t .08*** -.29 -3.54 .34*** .58 11.88
Typically Drive .32*** -.57 -8.07 .44*** .66 14.76
Residential Road – Driving Task
Effor t .01 -.12 -1.45 .43*** .66 14.65
Comfor t .07*** -.26 -3.14 .36*** .60 12.50
Typically Drive .21*** -.46 -6.15 .40*** .63 13.55
Dual Carriageway – Observation Task
80 to 100 km/h 110 to 160 km/h
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Effor t .00 .07 .78 .20*** .45 8.48
Comfor t .00 -.03 -.32 .18*** .42 7.78
Typically Drive .04* -.21 -2.53 .19*** .45 8.30
Dual Carriageway – Driving Task
Effor t .00 -.06 -.68 .30*** .54 10.86
Comfor t .00 -.07 -.79 .26*** .51 9.81
Typically Drive .09*** -.30 -3.64 .15*** .39 7.08
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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comfor t on the driving task for the dual carriageway also seem to show a slight decrease to 
star t with, although it is not as clear as the trend on the residential road. In terms of ratings 
of effor t for the driving task, it appears to star t stable and then only increase once a cer tain 
speed has passed. The shapes of the trends are consistent with the results of the regression 
analysis shown in Table 3.2.
3.3.3 Relationship between chosen free speed and subjective ratings
Figure 3.4 shows the subjective ratings given by par ticipants relative to the rating they gave 
when they were able to pick their own speed during the driving task. The zero point on the 
x-axis represents the free speed condition and each increment above or below is a speed 
increment faster or slower. These points differed across par ticipants, so in order for them to 
be assessed the procedure described in Section 3.2.3 was used to create the relative data 
seen here. The subjective rating scales for task diff iculty, risk, effor t, and comfor t stayed low 
until the chosen speed was reached and then began to markedly increase after this point. 
Although in the case of ratings of loss of control for an identical other, this value began to 
increase before ratings of loss of control for the par ticipants themselves. The exceptions to this 
were ratings of feeling of risk for the residential road, where there was a slight signif icant linear 
increase initially (r2 = .07, p < .01), then a dip at the free speed point and then the ratings star t 
increasing again, although considerably more sharply (r2 = .25, p < .001). Ratings of comfor t 
for the residential road also do not follow the general pattern, with more of a U-shaped curve 
being apparent. Meaning that as the preferred speed was approached par ticipants rated the 
speed as being more comfor table, and after it was exceeded as increasingly uncomfor table. 
Indications of how typical the experienced speed was showed a clear V-shaped curve with 
ratings decreasing as the free speed choice condition is approached and increasing afterward. 
The results of regression analysis on the f irst three speed points and the last three speed 
points are consistent with the trends shown in Fig. 3.4 and are given in Table 3.3.
3.3.4 Relationship between chosen free speed, maximum speed and preferred speed
When asked to indicate a speed at which they preferred to drive for each of the roads, the 
majority of individuals (N = 43 for the dual carriageway and N = 44 for the residential road) 
chose a speed lower than the speed they said was the maximum they would be able to 
drive before losing control of the vehicle. On average the ratings of preferred speeds were 
112 kmph (SD = 17.82) on the dual carriageway. The average maximum speed before losing 
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Figure 3.4. Relative ratings of task Diff iculty, risk, loss of control, effor t, comfor t, and “I typically drive at this 
speed” across both road types. A relative speed of 0 corresponds to the average rating par ticipants gave for 
the free speed condition. Each increment above or below this point (-3, – 2, – 1, 1, 2, 3) corresponds to a f ixed 
speed condition above or below the average preferred speed of the par ticipants.
control was rated for the same road at 141 kmph (SD = 27.43). In terms of the residential 
road, the preferred speed averaged 49 kmph (SD = 11.21). The maximum speed on this road 
averaged 73 kmph (SD = 16.86).
In comparison to the actual speed par ticipants drove at during the driving task, on 
the residential road; 43% of par ticipants drove at a speed lower than both their preferred 
and maximum speeds, 38% drove at a speed higher than their preferred speed but lower 
than their maximum speed, and 13% drove at a speed faster than both previously rated 
speeds. The remaining par ticipants had missing data for their self-repor ted maximum and/
or preferred speeds. The average speed driven by par ticipants on the residential road was 
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Residential Road
-3 to – 1 1 to 3
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Task Diff iculty .00 .05 .60 .22*** .46 6.09
Feeling of Risk .07** .26 3.09 .25*** .50 6.66
Loss of Control – Self .00 -.01 -.09 .15*** .39 4.96
Loss of Control – Other .03 -.16 -1.90 .13*** .35 4.40
Effor t .00 .06 .64 .07** .26 3.06
Comfor t .00 .10 1.15 .09*** .29 3.50
Typically Drive .19*** -.43 -5.58 .28*** .53 7.26
Dual Carriageway 
-3 to – 1 1 to 3
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Task Diff iculty .01 .09 1.05 .09*** .30 3.53
Feeling of Risk .00 .05 .61 .10*** .31 3.78
Loss of Control – Self .00 .02 .24 .10*** .31 3.78
Loss of Control – Other .00 -.03 -0.38 .11*** .33 3.95
Effor t .01 .08 .91 .06** .25 2.88
Comfor t .04* .20 2.32 .04* .20 2.32
Typically Drive .07** -.27 -3.16 .10*** .32 3.89
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
Table 3.3. Regression analysis for relative scores of task diff iculty, risk, loss of control, effor t, comfor t and habit 
with speed across both road types.
58 kmph (SD = 11.66). On the dual carriageway 53% of par ticipants drove at a speed higher 
than their indicated preferred speed but lower than their maximum speed, 23% drove at 
a speed lower than both of these values, and 19% drove at a speed faster than both these 
values. The remaining two par ticipants had missing data. On average the speed chosen to 
drive for the dual carriageway was 117 kmph (SD = 19.04).
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3.3.5 Correlations between task diff iculty, risk, effort, comfort and habit
Using a Pearson’s correlation, task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and effor t were found to be 
strongly related (r = .81 – .91, p < .01) with each other across both road types and task 
conditions, and to be moderately to markedly correlated with ratings of comfor t and ratings 
of loss of control (r = .44 – .77, p < .01). Ratings of how typical the drive was, were moderately 
correlated with comfor t (r = .47 – .59, p < .05) across both roads and tasks but only had 
a low correlation to moderate correlation with the other subjective measures (r = .29 – .59, 
p < .01). Similar correlations were found between the variables if the ratings were examined 
relative to the par ticipants free speed choice. Although the correlations tended to be slightly 
lower than those repor ted for the averaged results.
3.4 Discussion
The f indings of this experiment do not suppor t some of the predictions put forward by Fuller, 
McHugh et al. (2008). The f irst is that ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk should 
systematically increase with increases in speed. This relationship was found to occur in a very 
strong linear fashion across all speeds examined by Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008) and Kinnear 
et al. (2008). However, in the case of this study it appears that before any increasingly 
relationship is observed the ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk initially go through a 
period of stability in which there is no clear increasing or decreasing trend. It is only once a 
cer tain speed has been reached, around 50 kmph on average for the residential road and 
around 110 kmph on average for the dual carriageway, that ratings of these variables begin 
to increase. Fur thermore even once ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk variables 
do star t to increase with speed, they do not do so as strongly as previously found (Fuller, 
McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008) and are only moderately, not highly, correlated 
with increasing speed. This relationship is similar to the threshold trend found for ratings of 
crash risk in both this study and the previous observation experiments (Fuller, McHugh et al., 
2008; Kinnear et al., 2008). It should also be noted that the average rating for task diff iculty 
and feeling of risk during this period falls between 1 and 2 on the scale used. Given that a 
rating of 1 on the scale of feeling of risk corresponds to “no risk”, this indicates that many of 
the par ticipants indicated they would not experience, or were not experiencing, any feeling of 
risk across a range of speeds. This is in contrast to the f indings of Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008) 
whose results suggested the constant presence of some experienced level of feeling of risk 
which linearly increased with speed. Due to the nature of the diff iculty scale used, a similar 
conclusion is not possible given that a rating of 1 corresponded to “very easy” rather than 
indicating an absence of diff iculty.
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Similarly when the relationship of ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk relative to 
par ticipants free speed choice are examined, a threshold relationship is again apparent. With 
the exception of ratings of feeling of risk for the residential road, ratings of feeling of risk 
and task diff iculty are stable with no signif icant trend with speed until after the free speed 
condition has past. Again, the average of the ratings given, including those given for the 
condition where par ticipants were able to drive at their own chosen speed, only moves 
above 2 after the free speed condition is past. This indicates that many par ticipants did not 
repor t any feeling of risk when driving at their preferred speed and also did not experience 
any feeling of risk during the three f ixed speed conditions that would fall before the speed 
they selected to drive. If par ticipants are aiming for a range of feeling of risk, why then did 
they drive at the speed chosen when their ratings of this value do not seem to signif icantly 
differ from the ratings they gave at earlier, lower speeds? One exception to the threshold 
relationship found was in the ratings of feeling of risk for the residential road. In this case there 
is a slight signif icant increase of ratings with speed as the free speed condition is approached. 
However, at the point of chosen free speed the ratings dip before star ting to increase at a 
signif icantly increased rate. This again indicates a preference amongst par ticipants during 
free driving for feeling of risk to be low or absent.
A similar threshold relationship for ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk was apparent 
for ratings of effor t, with average ratings of effor t only crossing above 2 once a cer tain speed 
was passed, or in the case of the relative data set, only once the preferred speed had been 
passed. Again this indicates that par ticipants generally preferred to drive at a speed at which 
they indicated ratings of effor t were low and stable, or absent.
The threshold relationship for effor t ties in well with existing research on human 
performance and the optimal range of workload under which individuals generally prefer to 
operate (de Waard, 1996; Recar te & Nunes, 2002). Performance, physiological and subjective 
assessments of workload are not able to detect operation in this optimal area; rather, the 
conf irmation that an individual is operating optimally comes from the fact that they are not 
found to be, or do not repor t that they are, at any of the over, or unload, areas that are able 
to be detected. When operating at this optimal level drivers are experiencing no, or very 
minimal and stable, mental load (de Waard, 1996; Recar te & Nunes, 2002). Similarly, ratings 
of comfor t showed threshold effects, either staying stable and then increasing, or showing 
more of a U-shape where par ticipants rated the driver as more and more comfor table until 
a cer tain point and then as increasingly uncomfor table once this point was passed. This is 
what would be expected according to Summala’s multiple comfor t zone model (2005).
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It should also be noted that par ticipants in this study did not only prefer a speed at which 
subjective ratings of the variables assessed were absent or low and stable but that they 
picked a driving speed just before their ratings of the assessed variables star ted to markedly 
increase. This could suggest that, as is the case in zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 
1974), and as originally suggested by Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008), that the perception of these 
variables acts as a warning to par ticipants, causing them to avoid these feelings when driving 
unless otherwise motivated not to.
The results in this experiment for the relationship between ratings of task diff iculty, 
feeling of risk, and speed are quite different from the strong linear trends repor ted by Fuller, 
McHugh et al. (2008) and Kinnear et al. (2008). This could be because, when compared with 
watching a video on a single screen, the simulated driving task provides more cues for the 
drivers to make decisions. The simulator allows for presentation of sound and peripheral 
visual information that may improve speed judgment. It could also be that the use of a 
simulator during the driving task allowed par ticipants to use more accurate data of their 
own performance, in terms of lane keeping, to make their judgments. However, the fact that 
the trends in subjective ratings were quite similar between the observation task, where lane 
keeping was kept perfectly by the simulation software, and the driving task indicates that this 
may not be the case.
While the simulator may provide a more ecologically valid environment, the driving task 
during the f ixed speed conditions is somewhat unusual. During the f ixed speed conditions, 
par ticipants were unable to choose their own speed, thereby making the task essentially simply 
a tracking task with the speed demand being set externally. Driving however, is generally 
seen to be a self-paced task. Therefore, the validity of the task presented to par ticipants in this 
experiment could be called into question. There are times, however, during everyday driving 
where speed will be more or less set and the task reduced to that of simply lane control, such 
as when driving with cruise control or in a stream of traff ic. In addition, during the free speed 
condition par ticipants were able to have free control over their driving.
Another explanation for the difference in f indings between this and previous studies, in 
terms of the absence of the strong linear increasing trend, could be the order of presentation 
of the speeds to the par ticipants. The two previous studies presented the speeds in an 
ascending order star ting from lowest to highest, whereas, in this experiment par ticipants 
were presented with the speeds in a random order for each road and for each condition. 
It is possible, therefore, that the f indings of the previous studies were inf luenced by an order 
effect. However, Kinnear et al. (2008) repor ted a study by Lynn (2006) that showed that 
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order of presentation had minimal impact on the data, and Fuller (personal communication, 
September 2, 2008) claimed that other orders were attempted in his original study and the 
same increasing linear trends were produced. Still, to eliminate any alternative explanation for 
the effects found, randomisation of speed presentation is to be preferred.
It is also possible that the rating scales used in this experiment were not sensitive enough 
to detect small changes in the variables assessed, especially at the lower speeds. However the 
scales used here were similar to those used by both Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008) and Kinnear 
et al. (2008), which managed to produce strong linear increasing trends with speed. Fur ther 
research could however explore the use of a broader scale.
With the exception of the observation task for the dual carriageway, this study found the 
same threshold relationship for ratings of loss of control that was repor ted by Fuller, McHugh 
et al. (2008). Par ticipants also generally rated the chance of others losing control of their 
vehicle as higher than zero before they begin rating their own chances higher than zero. This is 
likely due to a positive self-assessment bias, with par ticipants viewing their own chances of 
being involved in a crash as lower than that of others (Harré & Sibley, 2007; McKenna et al., 
1991; McKenna, 1993).
As predicted, high correlations between ratings of feeling of risk, task diff iculty, and 
effor t were repor ted. The high correlation between feeling of risk and task diff iculty is in 
line with the previous studies (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008). This strong 
correspondence between subjective ratings of risk, task diff iculty and effor t is not surprising. 
Risk is more than just the severity of a consequence for an action: it is also the chance that 
that consequence will occur (Nordgren et al., 2007). Task diff iculty, as def ined by Fuller (2000) 
is the demands of the environment being compared against the capability of the individual to 
meet those demands. Therefore, task diff iculty could easily be seen as a chance of failure, one 
of the vital components of risk. For example, when using a driving simulator, the consequences 
of failure are very low, however, as shown in this experiment, par ticipants are willing to 
indicate that they experience risk. In fact, when driving in a simulator par ticipants repor t 
they are not concerned with the consequences of accidents but rather are concerned with 
avoiding accidents (Glendon, Hoyes, Haigney, & Taylor, 1996). This means that par ticipants 
are reacting to the chance of failure or the diff iculty of the task, rather than the consequence 
when assessing risk. This indicates a strong intrinsic link between the concepts of risk and task 
diff iculty, both objectively and in the subjective assessments of par ticipants. Similarly effor t, 
in terms of mental and physical workload, can be seen as an indicator of task diff iculty (de 
Waard, 2002; Fuller, 2005). As the demands of the environment increase, more effor t is 
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required to match those demands and vice versa. Also, as an individual uses more effor t 
their capacity decreases, therefore, their ability to match the demands of the environment 
decreases, increasing task diff iculty (Fuller, 2000; Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005). Similarly, 
it is unsurprising that tasks that feel diff icult/risky/effor tful are often uncomfor table, signal a 
chance of failure/loss of control and are typically outside of what is usually experienced by an 
individual.
Finally, when asked to state a speed at which they prefer to drive as well as a maximum 
speed at which they would be able to retain control of the vehicle, the majority of par ticipants 
chose a preferred speed lower than their stated maximum. This suggests that, as found in 
previous studies (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008) people do not believe that 
they drive at the limit of their personal performance in terms of maintaining control of a 
vehicle. This is suppor ted by the fact that given the actual oppor tunity to choose their speed 
of travel within the simulator, the majority of par ticipants chose a speed that was at least 
lower than their stated preferred maximum speed.
There are several potential weaknesses with this study. Firstly, the simulated roads used 
were probably less environmentally complex than the videos used in the previous studies. 
This is due to the photo realistic nature of video when compared to the more limited 
settings available in the simulator. The relative lack of complexity means that perhaps some 
important cues may have been absent from the simulated environment. However, the use 
of a driving simulator does allow for tighter experimental control over the stimuli presented 
to par ticipants. This may help to reduce potential cofounding effects. The absence of other 
traff ic from both this study and the previous studies (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et 
al., 2008) also reduces the ecological validity.
Another problem is related to the very nature of asking for subjective ratings of the 
variables involved. It is possible that in doing so, the variables increased in salience and, 
therefore, par ticipants may be paying more attention to these factors than they would while 
driving their vehicle normally, when they have not been prompted to consider such factors 
has risk, diff iculty, effor t or comfor t. This does, however, add more weight to the suggestion 
that these feelings are not present until a cer tain threshold has been reached, as even with 
attention drawn to these variables there still appears to be a threshold relationship in the 
data.
The par ticipants in this experiment were also younger and less experienced on average 
than those used in previous studies. This may have affected their ratings of the various 
variables involved. It could be argued that inexperienced drivers are not good at perceiving 
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risk and may, therefore, not be able to constantly monitor this factor and rate it in the linear 
increasing fashion found by the previous studies. However, the study by Kinnear et al. (2008) 
included three levels of experience: learner, inexperienced and experienced drivers, and all 
the three groups produced similarly linearly increasing ratings of risk and task diff iculty.
Ultimately the f indings of this current experiment seem to suppor t a threshold model for 
perception of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, crash risk, effor t, and comfor t. These ratings are 
generally indicated by par ticipants to be both low and stable, or absent, until a cer tain speed 
after which they begain to increase. In terms of feeling of risk, these f indings are in line with 
the expectations of zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974), risk avoidance theory 
(Fuller, 1984), the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005) and earlier predictions of the 
Task-Diff iculty Homeostasis theory (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008) where the experience of risk 
acts as a warning to drivers and only becomes salient once cer tain conditions have been met.
The f indings of this study suggest that when designing road safety interventions, 
practitioners should take into account the threshold relationship in the perception of risk, 
task diff iculty, effor t, and comfor t. Causing a driver’s threshold to be crossed may be useful 
in creating safer behaviour amongst drivers. The challenge however will be to cross driver’s 
subjective thresholds without actually increasing the real objective danger to the driver and 
other road users. In addition, since thresholds likely differ between individuals, care should be 
taken when designing interventions which aim to affect a whole population. Fur thermore, 
the strong relationship between subjective ratings of risk, task diff iculty and mental workload 
means that road safety practitioners should be aware that any intervention which alters one 
of these variables is likely to impact on the others.

CHAPTER 4 THAT IS CLOSE ENOUGH
A version of this chapter has been previously published as Lewis-Evans, B., De Waard, D., 
& Brookhuis, K.A. (2010). That’s close enough – A threshold effect of time headway on the 
experience of risk, task diff iculty, effor t, and comfor t. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 42, 
1926–1933 and can be accessed online here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2010.05.014
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Abstract
Subjective impressions of task diff iculty, risk, effor t, and comfor t are key variables of several 
theories of driver behaviour. A point of difference between many of these theories is not 
only the impor tance of these variables, but also whether they are continuously present and 
monitored or only experienced by individuals at cer tain critical points in the driving task. Both 
a threshold relationship and evidence of constant monitoring of risk and task diff iculty have 
been found for speed choice. In light of these conf licting f indings this study seeks to examine 
a different par t of the driving task, the choice of time headway. 
Par ticipants (N = 40, aged 19 to 30) drove in a simulator behind a vehicle travelling at 
50 km/h at set time headways ranging from 0.5 seconds to 4.0 seconds. After each drive, 
ratings of task diff iculty, risk, comfor t, and effor t were collected. In addition, par ticipants were 
asked to drive at the time headway they preferred. In order to assess familiarity, par ticipants 
also drove on both the left and right hand side of the road and the role of driving experience 
was also examined. 
The results show suppor t for a threshold awareness of task diff iculty, risk, effor t, and 
comfor t in relation to time headway. Par ticipants’ ratings of these variables tended to be 
low, or nil at large time headways, but then around the 2.0 second mark, began to noticeably 
increase. Feelings of task diff iculty, risk, and effor t were also found to be highly correlated 
with each other. No effect of driving experience or side of the road was found.
4.1 Introduction
An understanding of driver decision making is an impor tant goal of traff ic psychology, and 
several models have been put forward to do so. But no model has of yet received wide 
spread acceptance and use in the f ield. However, variables such as task diff iculty, risk, effor t, 
and comfor t have all at varying times been suggested as vital components of the decision 
making process in drivers. 
Risk, in par ticular, has been the main focus of many models. One of the most well known is 
Risk Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1976), which proposed that there is a preferred target level 
of risk of being involved in an accident that drivers seek to maintain. Other models, such as 
zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974), the Driving Intensity model (Peltzman, 1975) 
and Threat Avoidance theory (Fuller, 1984) have also suggested that an awareness of the risk 
of being in an accident is a central factor in driver decision making. 
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Other models have focused not on the risk of being in an accident, but on drivers’ general 
feelings of risk – which may or may not be related to their perception of accident risk. 
These include models such as the Risk Allostasis Theory (Fuller, 2008), and the Monitor 
Model (Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007). In the case of the Monitor Model, a feeling of 
risk is only one of a possible number of feelings thought to drive decision making. However, 
within the Monitor Model the ability to monitor a feeling of risk is thought to be of great 
impor tance due to the assumed evolutionary value of being able to do so and, thus, seems 
to stand out amongst the other possible best feelings suggested (Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007). That 
risk is assumed to be impor tant in the Monitor Model, relies on the work of Daimasio and his 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). The Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
suggests that cer tain body states, emotions, result from mostly learnt environmental triggers. 
These body states then can bias action towards par ticular outcomes even if the individual is 
unaware of them. Since the relationship between body states and action is thought to have 
arisen due to the process of evolution, it is thought that body states that signal risk have a 
large impact due to their assumed survival value. 
Risk Allostasis Theory (Fuller, 2008) also refers to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis and states 
that individuals have a feeling of risk they prefer to maintain and that they take appropriate 
actions to do so. Risk Allostasis Theory arose out of Task Diff iculty Homeostasis theory (de 
Waard, 2002) which theorised that individuals seek to maintain a cer tain preferred level of 
Task Diff iculty, perhaps indicated by the current level of mental workload or effor t (Fuller, 
2005). As such, in Risk Allostasis Theory, feeling of risk is also thought to be an indicator of 
task diff iculty, due to the strong correlation between these variables (Fuller, McHugh et al., 
2008; Kinnear et al., 2008). 
Apar t from task diff iculty, risk, and effor t, a feeling of comfor t has been put forward by 
the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005) as a potential primary variable in driver 
decision making. Within this model, uncomfor table feelings are thought to indicate when 
drivers are approaching, or exceeding, cer tain learnt safety margins. 
One important point of difference between the theories discussed above is how they view 
their variables of interest, whether that is risk of an accident or feeling of risk, in terms of driver 
awareness of these variables. For example, is the variable of interest constantly present and 
monitored as suggested by Risk Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1976), Risk Allostasis Theory 
(Fuller, 2008) or the Monitor Model (Vaa, 2007)? Or, are drivers only experiencing and acting 
on these variables once cer tain thresholds have been crossed, as suggested by zero-risk 
theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974), risk avoidance theory (Fuller, 1984), or the multiple 
comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005). 
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The relationship between ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and assessment of crash 
risk in relation to speed, was investigated by Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008). In order to do so, 
par ticipants were required to rate videos of three different roads being driven at a range 
of speeds. The speeds were produced by digitally altering one piece of f ilm footage for 
each road and were presented to par ticipants, star ting with the slowest speed and then in 
increasing 5 mile per hour increments after that. It was expected that ratings of task diff iculty 
would increase systematically with speed, in line with predictions made by Task Diff iculty 
Homeostasis. Ratings of feeling of risk and crash risk, on the other hand, were predicted 
to show a threshold relationship in that they would only star t to increase once a cer tain 
speed was observed (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). As expected, a strong linearly increasing 
relationship between speed and ratings of task diff iculty was found but, surprisingly, this was 
also the case for ratings of feeling of risk. However, ratings of crash risk did show a threshold 
type trend. It was also found that ratings of feeling of risk and task diff iculty were strongly 
correlated with each other (r = 0.81), a f inding that Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008) took to mean 
that feeling of risk could act as an indicator of task diff iculty. 
The f indings of Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008) therefore seem to suppor t a constant perception 
and monitoring view of variables such as task diff iculty and feeling of risk. However, a recent 
investigation of the Fuller, McHugh et al. study using a driving simulator instead of video 
presentation produced a different picture (Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009). Par ticipants 
in this study were required to sit in a f ixed base driving simulator and either simply watch a 
road being driven, or had control over the steering of the vehicle while it was driven at a set 
speed. Like the earlier Fuller, McHugh et al (2008) study, par ticipants were required to give 
ratings of feeling of risk, crash risk, and task diff iculty after each trial. In addition, ratings of 
comfor t, effor t, and how typical the speed travelled was, were collected as well. Unlike the 
Fuller, McHugh et al (2008) study, the speeds the par ticipants experienced in the simulator 
were presented in random order, and also the par ticipants had an oppor tunity to drive each 
of the two roads used at whatever speed they preferred. The results of the driving simulator 
study conf irmed the previous f inding that ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk are 
strongly correlated with each other, and in addition are strongly correlated with ratings of 
effor t. However, the strong, linear, increasing trend of ratings of task diff iculty and feeling 
of risk with speed was not apparent. Rather, a threshold trend was found, with ratings of 
feelings of risk, crash risk, task diff iculty, and effor t staying low, or nil, until a cer tain speed was 
reached, and only after this speed did they begin to increase. Ratings of how typical the speed 
was and of comfor t, on the other hand, tended to have more of a U-shaped relationship 
with speed. 
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The difference between the results gained by the studies discussed above, means that it is 
impor tant that more research in this area is carried out. Also, there has been some criticism 
that studies aimed at testing models of driver behaviour have focused too much on speed as 
an independent variable (Carsten, 2009). While driving is typically seen as a self-paced task, 
and a driver’s choice of speed is one important way in which they can affect the task, there 
are other behaviours which drivers can generally freely perform. Selecting and maintaining 
appropriate time headways to lead vehicles is one such behaviour. 
If models of driver behaviour aim to describe the whole of driver decision making then they 
should be able to explain a driver’s choice of time headway, a variable that in many cases is 
able to be freely varied by drivers. The decision of how close to follow a lead vehicle is made 
quite often in traff ic, especially in built up areas and on motorways, and it is clear that drivers 
do not always select their time headway appropriately. In New Zealand, for example, rear 
end crashes are one of the most common crash types (Ministry of Transpor t, 2008). In 2007, 
ten percent of all injury crashes in New Zealand were coded as “Rear end”, the 3rd most 
common type of injury crash after “Loss of control while cornering” (22.3%) and “Lost control 
on a straight” (10.5%). Thankfully, rear end crashes do not often result in fatalities (only 1.6% 
of all fatal crashes in 2007 in New Zealand), but they are never theless still a problem due to 
their high frequency, if only for their material and economic costs. This situation is likely to be 
similar in other motorised western countries such as in the USA, where rear end collisions 
make up approximately 29% of all crashes (National Highway Traff ic Safety Administration, 
2003). This study therefore seeks to examine the relationship between time headway and 
ratings of risk, task diff iculty, effor t, and comfor t. 
It was predicted, that in line with previous studies, a high correlation between ratings 
of effor t, task diff iculty, and risk would be apparent. It was also predicted that a threshold 
relationship between time headway and ratings of task diff iculty, risk, and effor t will be found, 
along with a U-shaped curve for ratings of comfor t and whether the time headway driven 
was typical or not. This is because the constant monitoring of a subjective variable such as a 
feeling, and comparing it to a set subjective state, seems excessively stressful and demanding. 
Instead, it is more reasonable to suggest that cer tain learnt behaviours or environmental 
situations cause a feeling to be felt and then acted upon (Summala, 1997). Feelings, after all, 
are said to arise from attention directed towards the emotional body state, which is generally 
made up of learnt reactions to cer tain environmental stimuli (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). 
In other words, they are not constantly present but rather occur only once cer tain conditions 
have been met. 
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Given that past experience may therefore be impor tant in setting thresholds, it was also 
decided to examine the effect of familiarity and driving experience. In order to do this all 
par ticipants were required to complete the driving task on both the familiar right hand and 
the unfamiliar left hand side of the road. Simply changing the side of the road driven was 
chosen as a manipulation of familiarity because it is unfamiliar to drive on the other side of 
the road but, as long as no turning maneuvers are involved, it is not par ticularly diff icult or 
risky to do so. In addition, both inexperienced and experienced drivers were recruited. It was 
expected that the threshold point for experienced and inexperienced drivers may differ and 
that driving on the unfamiliar side of the road may also shift or remove the threshold effect.
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Par ticipants were recruited through posters placed around the University of Groningen and 
were paid 15 Euros for taking par t. This resulted in 40 par ticipants in total, 20 male and 
20 female. The par ticipants were recruited and categorised as experienced or inexperienced 
based on the number of kilometers they had driven in their lifetimes. Experienced drivers had 
to have driven at least 10,000 kilometers and inexperienced driven less than 10,000 kilometers. 
The experienced group contained 23 par ticipants (12 male, 11 female) who had driven between 
10,000 and 350,000 kilometers in their lifetimes. They had held their licence for an average 
of 6.5 years (SD = 5.9) and were on average 25.4 (SD = 6.0) years old. The inexperienced 
group contained 17 par ticipants (8 male, 9 female) who had driven between 300 to 9,000 
kilometers in their lifetimes. They had held their licence for an average of 1.9 years (SD = 1.1) 
and were on average 21.5 years old (SD = 2.0). 
4.2.2 Materials 
The University of Groningen f ixed based driving simulator was used in the study. The simulator 
runs STSoftware software and allows par ticipants a 210-degree view of the road environment. 
A cardboard cutout was placed over the instrument panel to prevent speed information being 
available to the par ticipants. Par ticipants drove on a residential street, created according to 
Dutch road design guidelines, which took approximately 3 minutes to drive. The street had 
on-coming traff ic at a rate of one vehicle approximately every 12.5 seconds. Depending on 
the condition, the on-coming traff ic was placed to always be in the opposite lane to that 
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driven by the par ticipants; so in the left lane when the par ticipants were driving in the right 
lane and the right lane when the par ticipants drove on the left. This was done to prevent any 
over taking. Information on the time headway between the par ticipants’ vehicle and the lead 
vehicle was collected at a rate of 10 Hz. 
The simulator was programmed with eight different time head-ways between the 
par ticipants’ car and a lead vehicle. This allowed for the speed and time headway of the 
par ticipant’s car to be set by the simulator, similar to driving a vehicle with adaptive cruise 
control. The time headway ranged from 0.5 to 4.0 seconds, in 0.5 second increments, and the 
speed of travel for both the par ticipant and lead vehicle was locked to 50 km/h. In all trials the 
par ticipants retained lateral control of the vehicle. At the star t of the drive the par ticipants’ 
vehicle began 10 metres behind the lead vehicle. When the relevant program was star ted 
both vehicles would begin to accelerate and the required time headway would be set and 
maintained for the rest of the drive. In addition to the eight set time headways, par ticipants 
were also given the oppor tunity to drive at a time headway of their own choosing behind the 
lead vehicle. In this case the lead vehicles speed was locked to 50 km/h and par ticipants were 
instructed to follow the lead vehicle as closely as they felt comfor table. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Par ticipants f irst f illed out a demographic questionnaire containing questions about their 
age and driving experience. Then they were placed in the simulator and allowed to practice 
driving, for around 5 minutes on a practice track, in order for them to become comfor table. 
Par ticipants were then randomly assigned to one of two groups, counterbalanced across 
genders and experience level. The f irst group of par ticipants had to drive all the different 
time headways, in random order, including the free choice condition, f irst on the right hand 
side of the road, and then on the left. The second group carried out the same tasks but 
drove on the left hand side f irst and the right hand side second. In all the f ixed time headway 
conditions par ticipants were simply instructed to drive as they would normally while staying 
behind the lead vehicle. In the case of the free choice time headway condition par ticipants 
were asked to follow as close to the vehicle in front as possible while still feeling comfor table. 
After each drive, during which one following distance condition was experienced, the 
par ticipants f illed in a one page questionnaire (in Dutch). The questionnaire asked for ratings 
of experienced risk, task diff iculty, effor t, and comfor t on 7-point Liker t scales as shown 
below: 
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How diff icult did you f ind it to follow the lead vehicle at this distance?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  Not Diff icult       Very Diff icult
How much risk did you experience following the lead vehicle at this distance?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
       No Risk       Maximum Risk
How much effor t did it take to follow the lead vehicle at this distance?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
      No Effor t     Maximum Effor t
How comfor table did you feel following the lead vehicle at this distance?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
     Very Comfor table           Very Uncomfor table
Par ticipants were also asked to answer two questions about crash risk. One asked 
par ticipants to give an indication of how many times they thought they would have an 
accident or lose control of the vehicle if they had to follow a car at the distance shown every 
day for two months (i.e. 60 times). The second asked the same question, but was phrased 
as how many times a driver just like the par ticipant would have an accident or lose control. 
These questions were used to examine the difference between assessing crash risk for the 
par ticipants themselves versus their perception of crash risk for a hypothetical identical other. 
The two questions about crash risk were open and par ticipants were free to give any number, 
including indicating that they didn’t think that they or the other driver would have any crash. 
The questionnaire also contained one f inal question asking the par ticipants to indicate 
if they would typically follow a vehicle at the time headway they just experienced. This was 
done using a 1-7 point scale with 1 corresponding with “never” and 7 with “always”. This scale 
was reversed for later data analysis. 
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4.2.4 Analysis 
In order to carry out the analyses two datasets were created. One dataset, referred to as 
the averaged dataset, simply contained all the averaged ratings given by the par ticipants for 
each of the f ixed time headway conditions, on both the left and right hand side of the road. 
The second dataset, referred to as the relative dataset, was created to examine the free 
choice condition. First, the average time headway chosen for each of the individual par ticipants 
was calculated for both the left and right hand side drives. Then, using the average following 
distance for each individual, the ratings from the three set time headways above and below 
the free choice time headway were collected and placed around the ratings given during the 
free choice condition. So, if on average the par ticipant had driven with a time headway of 
2.3 seconds then the ratings they gave would be assigned as the zero point, and then the 
f ixed distance ratings for 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0 and 3.5 seconds would be arranged on either 
side of it. Another par ticipant may have driven at 1.75 seconds and in that case the ratings for 
0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5 and 3.0 would also be collected. This was done for each par ticipant and 
then averaged over all par ticipants to create a dataset where all values were relative to the 
ratings given during the free following condition. Due to how the data was arranged, it was 
possible that fewer than 3 f ixed time headways fell on either side of the time headway driven 
by the par ticipant. For example, if the par ticipant drove at a time headway of 1.2 seconds 
from the lead vehicle, then only the 0.5 and 1.0 second f ixed time headways were available 
below the time headway selected by the driver. In the case of a missing value it was replaced 
by the average of the remaining data points for that individual par ticipant in order to allow 
statistical analysis to be carried out. 
MANOVA analysis were run for both datasets with the within subjects factors of time 
headway and side of the road. A difference contrast was used for time headway and all 
the subjective ratings were included as measures within the MANOVA. Gender and driving 
experience were included in the analyses as between subject factors. In order to examine the 
trends of each subjective variable in relation to time headway, individual regression analysis 
was performed for each subjective variable in both datasets. In the averaged dataset, a 
regression was f irst run for the ratings given for the time headways between 4.0 and 2.5 
seconds, and then another regression was run on each of the subjective variables for head-
ways between 2.0 and 0.5 seconds. A similar split was performed for the relative dataset, in 
that regressions were run for each variable for the time headway intervals leading up to their 
preferred time headway rating, and then again for the time headway intervals leading away 
from their preferred time headway. Due to the MANOVA analysis revealing a signif icant 
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effect of side of the road, the regression analysis for both datasets was also run separately 
for data gathered on the right and left hand sides of the road. Pearson’s correlations, again 
split by side of the road, were run for both datasets to examine the relationship between the 
subjective ratings. 
A MANOVA was also run to examine the difference in average free following distance 
chosen by the par ticipants. The MANOVA included side of the road as the within subjects 
factor, as well as gender and driving experience as between subjects factors. Pearson’s 
correlations were also run to examine the relationship between individuals chosen time 
headway and their subjective ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, effor t, comfor t, crash 
risk and how typical the following distance was. All analyses were under taken using SPSS 16.0 
for Windows. 
4.3 Results 
A MANOVA analysis, with a difference contrast for time headway, was run for both the 
averaged and relative datasets. For the subjective ratings in the averaged dataset, there 
were main effects for time headway (F = 5.47, p < .001), in that the subjective ratings 
increased as time headway decreased. A signif icant main effect of side of the road was also 
found (F = 3.29, p < .05), as well as a signif icant interaction effect between side and time 
headway (F = 1.38, p < .05). There was no effect of driving experience (F = .99, p = .46) 
or gender (F = 1.53, p = .20) on the ratings however. Post-hoc tests using a Bonferroni 
adjustment, revealed that there was a signif icant effect for ratings of feelings of risk, in that 
ratings of feelings of risk when driving on the right hand side of the road were higher than 
those given when driving on the left hand side (Mean difference = .21, p < .01). 
In the case of the relative dataset, MANOVA analysis with a difference contrast for time 
headway, found that there were also signif icant main effects for time headway (F = 5.51, 
p < .001) and side of the road (F = 7.0, p < .05), as well as an interaction between side 
and time headway (F = 1.60, p <.01). As with the averaged dataset there was no effect of 
experience (F = .60, p = .77) or gender (F = 1.37, p = .25). Post-hoc tests using a Bonferroni 
adjustment, revealed once again that ratings of feeling of risk were signif icantly higher when 
driving on the right hand side of the road (Mean difference = .22, p < .05) 
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4.3.1 Relationship between subjective ratings and time headway  
 in the averaged dataset 
In the case of the averaged dataset, none of the subjective variables recorded were found to 
increase in a simple linear fashion as time headway decreased. Rather, as shown in Figure 4.1, 
ratings of risk (feeling of risk and crash risk), task diff iculty, effor t, and comfor t, all tend to be 
f lat and stable until a cer tain time headway was reached. This time headway is around 2.0 
seconds for both the left and right hand sides of the road and it is only after this point that 
the ratings of these variables begin to signif icantly increase. There is one exception to this, 
which is in the ratings of feeling of risk for the right hand side of the road. In this case there is a 
very small signif icant trend (t = 2.24, r2 = .03, p < .05) before the 2.0 second mark, which then 
increases considerably once 2.0 seconds is exceeded (t = 8.73, r2 = .33, p < .001). However, 
it should be noted that if the trend for ratings of risk on the right hand side of the road is 
examined between 4.0 and 2.5 seconds, rather than between 4.0 and 2.0 seconds, then the 
small signif icant trend is no longer apparent. Figure 4.1 also clearly shows that the ratings 
of crash risk par ticipants gave for other drivers increase much more rapidly than ratings of 
crash risk for the par ticipants themselves. 
Figure 4.1. Average ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, effort, comfort, crash risk (self and other), and “I typically 
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Furthermore, it is only once this 2.0 second mark has been crossed that ratings of task 
diff iculty, feeling of risk, and effor t rise above an average rating of 2. As a rating of 1 for task 
diff iculty, feeling of risk and effor t indicates the absence of these variables, this suggests that 
many of the par ticipants were not yet willing to indicate that they were feeling or experiencing 
any diff iculty, risk, or effor t until after the 2.0 second mark. The trend for ratings of whether 
the time headway experienced was typical or not appears to be slightly U-shaped, in that 
par ticipants indicated that the time headway became more and more typical, until around 
2.0–2.5 seconds. Then after 2.5 seconds the par ticipants begin to indicate that the time 
headway became more and more atypical. This trend is apparent on both sides of the road. 
Table 4.1. Regression analysis of the averaged dataset for ratings of task diff iculty, risk, loss of control, effor t, 
comfor t and typical follow with time headway for both sides of the road.
Right hand side of the road
4.0 to 2.5 seconds 2.0 to 0.5 seconds
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Task Diff iculty .02 .15 1.84 .15*** .39 5.28
Feeling of Risk .03* .18 2.24 .33*** .57 8.73
Effor t .02 .14 1.75 .16*** .40 5.50
Comfor t .00 .05 .64 .23*** .48 6.88
Self Crash Probability .02 .14 1.76 .11*** .33 4.37
Other Crash Probability .02 .12 1.54 .09*** .29 3.85
Typically follow .03* -.17 -2.20 .37*** .61 9.56
Left hand side of the road 
4.0 to 2.5 seconds 2.0 to 0.5 seconds
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Task Diff iculty .01 -.09 -1.141 .10*** .31 4.15
Feeling of Risk .02 .12 1.572 .26*** .51 7.4
Effor t .00 -.06 -.71 .10*** .31 4.16
Comfor t .00 .04 .489 .16*** .40 5.55
Self Crash Probability .01 .11 1.44 .13*** .36 4.79
Other Crash Probability .01 .10 1.279 .06*** .24 3.09
Typically follow .01 -12 -1.50 .23*** .48 6.92
* p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001
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As shown in Table 4.1, the results of a regression analysis of the f irst four time headways 
for each subjective variable, and the last four are consistent with the trends discussed above. 
The r2 values for the left hand side during the 2.0 to 0.5 second period appear to be slightly 
lower than those for the right hand side, but other than that the general trend is similar. 
4.3.2 Relationship between subjective ratings and time headway  
 in the relative dataset 
As shown in Figure 4.2 the relative dataset initially appears to show somewhat similar 
threshold trends to that of the averaged dataset in terms of ratings of feeling of risk, crash 
risk, and comfor t. However, the trend for ratings of effor t and task diff iculty are different in 
that they appear to stay f lat and stable across all the time headway increments, apar t from 
a peak in the middle at the free choice condition. 
Figure 4.2. Relative ratings of task diff iculty, feelings of risk, effor t, comfor t, crash risk (self and other), and “I 
typically follow at this distance” in relation to decreasing time headway in seconds and by side of the road driven. 
A value of zero on the x-axis corresponds to the average rating given by par ticipants during the free following 
condition. Each increment above or below the zero point (3, 2, 1, -1, -2, -3) represents a f ixed time headway 
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As with the averaged dataset, the trend of the feeling of risk variable when driving on the 
right side of the road, signif icantly increases slightly before the free time headway condition 
(t = 2.7, r2 = .06, p < .05) and then increases rapidly after this point (t = 6.33, r2 = .20, 
p < .001). Fur thermore, the ratings for self crash risk and other crash risk when driving on 
the right also shows a signif icant increase during the period before the free time headway 
is reached (t = 2.00 & 2.34, r2 = .03 & .04, p < .05). Also, the trend for the typically drive 
variable appears to have lost its U-shape when examined for the right hand side drive. Once 
again the results of a regression analysis, shown in Table 4.2, are consistent with the trends 
discussed above.
Table 4.2. Regression analysis of the relative dataset for ratings of task diff iculty, risk, loss of control, effor t, 
comfor t and typical follow with time headway for both sides of the road.
Right hand side of the road
1 to 3 -1 to -3
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Task Diff iculty .00 .05 .51 .02 .14 1.81
Feeling of Risk .06** .24 2.7 .20*** .45 6.33
Effor t .00 .02 .21 .00 .04 0.51
Comfor t .01 .11 1.20 .15*** .38 5.22
Self Crash Probability .03* .18 2.00 .05** .23 2.98
Other Crash Probability .04* .21 2.34 .10*** .32 4.17
Typically follow .00 .01 .10 .21*** .46 6.54
Left hand side of the road 
1 to 3 -1 to -3
r2 Beta t r2 Beta t
Task Diff iculty .01 .11 1.16 .01 .07 .85
Feeling of Risk .01 .10 1.124 .19*** .44 6.12
Effor t .01 0.12 1.30 .00 .03 .34
Comfor t .00 0.03 .35 .19*** .43 6.01
Self Crash Probability .03 0.16 1.80 .11*** .33 4.38
Other Crash Probability .03 0.16 1.79 .08*** .29 3.78
Typically follow .00 0.03 .32 .25*** .50 7.23
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
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4.3.3 Correlations between ratings of task diff iculty, risk, comfort  
 and typical time headway
Using a Pearson’s correlation, ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and effor t were found to 
be moderately to strongly correlated with each other (r = .59 to .78, p < .001). Ratings of task 
diff iculty, feeling of risk and effor t were moderately correlated with ratings of comfor t (r = .41 
to .65, p < .001). Ratings of feeling of risk were also moderately correlated with par ticipants’ 
ratings of self crash risk (r = .51 to .62, p <. 001) but only had modest correlations with ratings 
of crash risk for another driver (r = .14 to .28, p < .05). Ratings of effor t and task diff iculty, on 
the other hand, were only modestly related to ratings of crash risk, both for the par ticipants 
themselves and for others (r = .14 to .29 p < .05), except in the case of ratings of task 
diff iculty in the relative dataset for indications of others crash risk when driving on the left, 
which showed no signif icant correlation (r = .10). Finally, ratings of how typical the following 
distances were, modestly to moderately correlated with all the other variables (r = .29 to 
.66, p < .01), with the strongest correlations being with ratings of feeling of risk. Apar t from 
the exception mentioned above for task diff iculty, the correlations were relatively consistent 
across both datasets, and no matter which side of the road the par ticipants drove on.
4.3.4 Free following time headway
During the free following condition, par ticipants on average drove at a time headway of 
1.78 seconds (SD = .89) behind the lead vehicle on the right hand side of the road, and 
1.67 seconds (SD = .88) on the left. MANOVA revealed that there was no signif icant difference 
in time headway by side of the road (F = .86, p = .36), driver experience (F = 1.03, p = .32), 
or gender (F = 1.84, p = .18). Pearson’s correlations were also calculated between the chosen 
time headway and the subjective ratings given after driving at that distance. It was found 
that, on both sides of the road, ratings of feeling of risk (r = -.43 to -.49, p < .01) and crash 
risk for other drivers (r = -.37 to -.38, p < .05) were signif icantly negatively correlated with 
the time headway. No other variable was signif icantly correlated with the free choice of time 
headway.
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4.4 Discussion
As predicted, there was a strong relationship between ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, 
and effor t. This is consistent with previous f indings (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 
2008; Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009), and is not surprising, as risk, diff iculty, and effor t 
often occur together naturalistically. Risk is formally def ined as the likelihood of an occurrence 
multiplied by the outcome of that occurrence (Nordgren et al., 2007), and task diff iculty is 
the interaction between the capability of an individual and the demands of the environment. 
It could, therefore, be argued that task diff iculty is simply the f irst par t of the risk equation, 
the likelihood of the occurrence. Also, task diff iculty and effor t are intrinsically linked, as 
capability can be seen as related to the amount of effor t available, and the demands of the 
environment set the amount of effor t required for performance (Fuller, 2005). Given that 
the correlation appears robust across studies, it may be that ratings of feeling of risk, task 
diff iculty, and effor t are labels for the same underlying construct. Fur ther research to see if 
these variables can be separated would be interesting. It does seem, however, that once the 
threshold had been crossed, the ratings of feeling of risk were more sensitive to decreases in 
time headway than the ratings of task diff iculty and effor t.
Also as predicted, the threshold relationship previously described by Lewis-Evans and 
Rothengatter (2009) for task diff iculty, feeling of risk, crash risk, effor t, and comfor t with 
speed, was also apparent here for time headway, at least in the averaged dataset. Ratings 
of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, crash risk, effor t, and comfor t generally stayed low and 
stable until a cer tain following distance was reached, around 2.0 seconds, and after this 
point began to signif icantly increase. In the case of the relative dataset, however, the trend 
is not as clear as previously found for speed, where the speed choice made by par ticipants 
acted as a clear threshold point (Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009). This relationship is 
still apparent for ratings of feeling of risk, comfor t, and crash risk but ratings of effor t and 
task diff iculty in the relative dataset appear to stay f lat over the time headways examined. 
This could be because the instruction given to the par ticipants, to travel as close as possible 
while still feeling comfor table, was inappropriate. Given that the par ticipants’ chosen time 
headway was on average around 1.67 to 1.78 seconds, it may be that par ticipants obeyed the 
“follow as close as possible” par t of the instruction more so than the instruction to remain 
comfor table. The resulting relatively close following distance leads to quite a few missing 
values in the relative dataset as there were not always 3 f ixed time headways available to f ill 
the -1 to -3 positions in the relative dataset. This may have affected the trend lines. Perhaps 
an instruction for the par ticipants to simply follow as they would normally would have been 
more appropriate.
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The fact that a threshold relationship is apparent in this data is par ticularly interesting given 
the unusual nature of the task required of the par ticipants. In essence, all the par ticipants had 
to do was maintain lateral control, on an identical road, several different times. The speed 
of the vehicle, and its time headway to the lead vehicle were all set and maintained by the 
simulator, with the exception of the free following condition. It could therefore be argued 
from an objective position, that in this experiment, following the lead vehicle at a headway 
of 0.5 seconds is no more effor tful, diff icult or risky than following at 4.0 seconds. That the 
par ticipants did indicate that it felt risky, diff icult, effor tful, and uncomfor table to be close to 
the lead vehicle, despite the lack of real objective difference in these variables, is suggestive 
of an effect of previous experience and learnt thresholds being responsible for these feelings. 
It may be that, as suggested by threat Avoidance theory (Fuller, 1984), zero-risk theory 
(Näätänen & Summala, 1974), and the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005), that 
par ticipants have a cer tain, learnt, headway at which they prefer to follow vehicles. Once this 
learnt, preferred headway is crossed, uncomfor table feelings that can be labelled as diff iculty, 
risk, or effor t, begin to be experienced. The multiple comfor t zone model, in par ticular, takes 
an approach which is similar to that laid out by Gibson and Crooks (1938) in their Field of Safe 
Travel model. The multiple comfor t zone model suggests that just like individuals have learnt 
personal spaces around them during everyday life that make them feel uncomfor table if they 
are breached, they also create a zone of safe travel or safety margin around themselves 
when driving. When this safety margin is exceeded it indicates to the driver that something 
is not as usually experienced (Summala, 2005). These safety margins may not actually be 
related to the objective risk or safety of the situation, however, and are instead learnt based 
on previous experience.
The typical following distance ratings for the averaged dataset also suppor t an idea of 
learnt thresholds. Ratings of how typical the time headway experienced was, followed a 
U-shaped trend, with the bottom of the U being around the same point at which ratings of 
task diff iculty, risk, effor t, and discomfor t begin to increase. This is in line with a similar result 
for indications of typical speed of travel found previously (Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009).
With the possibility of learnt thresholds in mind, this study attempted to test the role of 
familiarity in determining the threshold point. As such, drivers were required to complete the 
following distance task on both the familiar (for Dutch drivers) right hand side of the road, 
as well as the unfamiliar left hand side. It was thought that driving on the unfamiliar side of 
the road may have shifted or removed the threshold effect, and perhaps increased ratings of 
diff iculty, risk, effor t, and discomfor t. However, there was very little difference in the results 
produced by driving on the left hand side of the road, with the general trend for both sides 
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being similar. The only signif icant increase in ratings was in fact found for ratings of feeling of 
risk for drivers travelling on the right hand side of the road, and this effect was small. The lack 
of an effect caused by road type could be because drivers were aware of what was causing 
any potential feelings of unfamiliarity, and were able to dismiss them as not relevant to the 
time headway task. Perhaps if a task involving manoeuvres traditionally seen as diff icult when 
driving on an unfamiliar side of the road (such as navigating intersections or roundabouts) 
had been used there would have been a more marked impact. However, this would then 
confound the variable of simple unfamiliarity with the increased diff iculty and risk of such 
manoeuvres.
In addition, there was no signif icant impact of driver experience on the ratings given. 
This may indicate that drivers learn or establish these thresholds early and that once a 
threshold has been crossed the reaction is similar no matter how experienced the individual 
is. In their examination of the relationship between speed, ratings of risk, and task diff iculty, 
Kinnear et al. (2008) also found no effect of driving experience on ratings of these variables.
There are several potential weaknesses with this study. To begin with, it is possible that 
by asking par ticipants to rate the variables assessed that they become more salient to the 
par ticipants. This would bias the results towards repor ting those variables more readily and 
perhaps shift par ticipants’ threshold point of awareness. However, the f inding that even 
with attention directed towards these variables, par ticipants still often rated them as absent 
during the larger time headways, does give additional suppor t to the idea that these variables 
are not usually experienced.
It is also possible that the rating scales used in this experiment were not sensitive enough 
to pick up underlying changes in the variables assessed. This could also be impacted by the 
relatively large changes in following distance experienced by the par ticipants. It is possible 
that steps of 0.5 seconds may have been too large to see the actual threshold point of the 
par ticipants.
Fur thermore, the task that the par ticipants performed could justif iably be labelled as 
unusual. Driving is usually described as a self-paced task where drivers are free to choose their 
own speed and time headway, amongst other things. In this experiment, however, drivers 
were for most of the time locked into the same speed and the control of time headway 
was completely out of their hands. There are times during driving, however, when the task 
is not par ticularly self paced such as when in a stream of traff ic. Also the task used in this 
experiment could be seen as similar to driving with adaptive cruise control, which allows for 
control of both time headway and speed to be handed over to the vehicle.
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4.5 Conclusion
This experiment offers fur ther evidence for driver behaviour models that provide a 
threshold account for the experience of task diff iculty, risk, effor t, and comfor t while driving. 
Fur thermore, that a threshold relationship is apparent for both following distance and speed, 
is in par t validation of threshold models to embrace the entire driving task. It also appears 
from the results of this experiment, that experience and learning may play some role in 
setting the thresholds used by drivers. Ultimately this means that road safety practitioners 
cannot rely on drivers to always be consciously aware of changes in the driving task brought 
about by interventions. Rather, if practitioners want to cause drivers to consciously change 
their behaviour in reaction to the experience of task diff iculty, risk, effor t, or comfor t, then 
whatever road safety intervention is being implemented must cause the drivers threshold for 
the perception of these variables to be crossed. This could be par ticularly challenging given 
that there is likely considerable variation between, and perhaps within, individuals’ thresholds 
for the perception of these variables.

CHAPTER 5 MAINTAIN THAT SPEED
A version of this chapter has been previously published as Lewis-Evans, B., De Waard, D., 
& Brookhuis, K.A. (2011). Speed maintenance under cognitive load – Implications for theories 
of driver behaviour. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 43, 1497-1507 and can be accessed 
online here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2011.02.030
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Abstract
No model of driver behaviour has yet managed to achieve widespread acceptance and use 
in the f ield of traff ic psychology, par tly due to the diff iculty in testing many of the theories. 
However, one class of theories, the motivational theories, can be usefully split into two groups, 
and the differences between them can then be examined. One group posits the constant 
monitoring and targeting of a cer tain subjective variable, often risk, as the controlling factor 
in driving. The other group however states that subjective variables such as risk are only 
relevant once a cer tain threshold has been passed. 
In this study we aimed to examine this difference by manipulating both speed of travel 
and the amount of cognitive load par ticipants were under. Par ticipants were asked to initially 
drive at their preferred speed for 1 minute in a driving simulator. Par ticipants’ speed was 
then automatically increased or decreased by 10, 20, 30 km/h or left unchanged. Par ticipants 
were then required to maintain the new speed for 1 minute. After this 1 minute, the speed 
was again automatically changed and had to be maintained for one more minute, but this 
time par ticipants also carried out a secondary mental arithmetic task. Finally, par ticipants 
were asked to again drive for another 1 minute at their preferred speed. This procedure was 
repeated seven times, once for each speed manipulation; -30, -20, -10, +0, +10, +20 and 
+30 km/h. After each 1 minute interval, verbal ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, 
and the typicality of the speed, were collected
 The results show a threshold effect in ratings of task diff iculty, effor t and feeling of risk, 
with no signif icant difference given between the ratings during the baseline period and the 
experimentally decreased speed periods until after par ticipant’s preferred speed of travel 
had been exceeded. Fur thermore, even when under cognitive load the threshold relationship 
was still apparent, if somewhat diminished. Finally, it appears that when under cognitive load 
drivers have diff iculty maintaining a travelling speed which is lower than the speed at which 
they would prefer to drive. However, driving at a speed in excess of their preferred speed 
appears to be easier to maintain, at least in the shor t term.
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5.1 Introduction 
Motivational theories of driver behaviour can be roughly split into two groups. The f irst group 
is made up of those theories which state that drivers are constantly aware of, monitor, and 
seek to maintain a set level or range of a variable, such as risk. Whereas the second group 
of theories, claims that variables such as a perception or feeling of risk are only relevant, and 
only experienced, at cer tain times during driving, i.e. when a cer tain threshold is exceeded 
(Michon, 1989; Ranney, 1994; Rothengatter, 2002). 
The classic example of the monitoring type of motivational model is Risk Homeostasis 
Theory (RHT) which was f irst put forward by Wilde (1976). RHT states that individuals have 
a target level of risk which they seek to maintain. This target level of risk is created through 
a motivational cost/benef it trade off, where the benef its and costs of risky behaviours are 
weighed against the benef its and costs of safer behaviours. RHT also states that unless these 
costs and benef its are altered, target risk will stay the same, and drivers will act in a fashion 
that means they are constantly monitoring and always attempting to return to this target 
level of risk. This process, called risk compensation by Wilde (1988), led to an extreme claim 
that road safety engineering measures, such as widening roads, would have no effect on 
safety; individuals would just use up the safety gained by widening the road, by speeding for 
example, in order to maintain their preferred level of risk. This extreme risk compensation has 
been discounted to a large extent, however, as it seems clear that many non-motivational 
road safety measures, such as the general improvement in car safety designs over time, have 
managed to have a positive impact on road safety (e.g. McKenna, 1990; OECD, 1990).
While complete risk compensation may not occur, negative behavioural adaptation, where 
drivers act in a fashion that reduces the safety which could otherwise be gained through an 
intervention, is a well accepted phenomenon (OECD, 1990). It should be noted, however, 
that behavioural adaptation is essentially just a way of saying that people change their 
behaviour in reaction to changes in the environment. This is hardly revolutionary. Behavioural 
adaptation can also act in a positive fashion to increase safety, for example, people drive 
slower on narrower roads (Godley, Triggs, & Fildes, 2004; Lewis-Evans & Charlton, 2006). 
Given the acceptance of behavioural adaptation, most modern theories of driver behaviour 
have concentrated not on trying to show if this phenomenon occurs, but why it does. 
Other examples of theories that f it within the f irst monitoring and target maintaining 
group, include Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT)(Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008), and the Monitor 
Model (Vaa et al., 2000). RAT differs from RHT in that it specif ies that individuals maintain 
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a target range of a feeling of risk, rather than a single target level of crash risk put forward 
by RHT. Also RAT states that this target range is a lot more f lexible and open to change 
than the target level of risk within RHT, which was seen as quite f ixed and stable (Fuller & 
Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller et al., 2008; Wilde, 1988). Within the theoretical underpinnings 
of RAT, Fuller is quite clear that “the effects of risk on decision making are not binary” and 
that “task diff iculty and feelings of risk are continuously present variables which inform driver 
decisions” (Fuller et al., 2008, p. 31). 
The Monitor Model differs from the previous two examples of monitoring theories in that it 
suggests that multiple subjective variables are monitored and maintained, leading to an overall 
target best feeling (Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007). Although, within the framework 
of the Monitor Model the monitoring of feelings of risk is given high importance due to the 
assumed evolutionary value of being able to reliably detect risk (Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007). 
Interestingly, both the Monitoring Model and RAT reference the Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
of Damasio as supporting their view of risk, or some other feeling, as being constantly monitored 
(Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003; Fuller, 2007; Fuller, 2008; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007). However, the 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis does not seem to support this interpretation. Rather, it specif ically 
classif ies feelings, such as the feeling of risk central to RAT, as conscious perceptions of an 
internal body state. These feelings are therefore not seen as continuously present, and similarly 
the underlying internal body states, or emotions, are reactions to cer tain learnt or innate 
stimuli and also not continuously present for monitoring (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). 
It would seem therefore, in conf lict with the statements of Fuller et al. (2008; 2008), that the 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis does view the effect of risk on decision making as binary, in that 
it is either there or not. To be clear what is available in most cases, for constant monitoring, 
according to Damasio (1994; 2003) is the body itself. It is changes in the general body state 
caused by cer tain stimuli that can be detected, or that can inf luence behaviour unconsciously. 
These changes therefore only occur when cer tain thresholds have been crossed, i.e. if stimuli 
present or not, or present in a cer tain required quantity (Damasio, 1994, 2003). 
This leads on to the threshold class of theories. The classic example of this is zero-risk 
theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 1988). Zero-risk theory claims that risk is only 
perceived occasionally. Specif ically, zero-risk theory states that drivers only experience risk 
once cer tain safety margins have been exceeded. Only once this threshold is crossed, and 
risk is experienced, do drivers take action to reduce this risk back to zero if possible, unless 
they are otherwise motivated not to do so. It is worth pointing out here that while zero-
risk theory does contain a component called the “Subjective Risk Monitor” this component is 
only triggered during the relatively rare situations when a driver’s safety margins have been 
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exceeded. This means that there is an aspect of the monitoring of risk in zero-risk theory, 
but this only occurs once a threshold has been crossed, and not continuously as claimed by 
monitoring models such as RAT (Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Näätänen & 
Summala, 1974; Summala, 1988). 
Other examples of threshold models are threat avoidance theory (Fuller, 1984) and the 
multiple comfort zone model (Summala, 2005). Threat avoidance theory (Fuller, 1984) is a 
behavioural model which suggests that people learn to associate risk with cer tain situations 
and only respond to risk when those situations arise. It also suggests that since the road 
environment is quite forgiving, associations between objectively risky driving and subjective 
impressions of risk are not often made and, therefore, not often experienced, and in fact this 
disconnect acts to encourage objectively risky behaviour. 
The multiple comfort zone model (Summala, 2005) can be viewed as an evolution of the 
earlier zero-risk theory. It states that the maintenance of performance based safety margins are 
the primary controlling factors behind driver behaviour, but adds that there may be additional 
feelings, along with or instead of risk, which arise when these margins are exceeded. This 
creates an uncomfortable or unpleasant feeling that drivers will seek to remove. Ultimately 
the most important factor that separates the threshold models from the monitoring models is 
that in threshold models the relevant variable, often risk, acts as a warning and as a sensation 
that should be removed. In monitoring models, however, this subjective variable is constantly 
present and constantly guiding driver behaviour. 
Unfortunately experiments aimed at testing specif ic models of driver behaviour have been 
relatively rare due to the diff iculties of coming up with valid, testable hypotheses that would 
effectively falsify the individual theories. However, it may be possible to at least examine the 
difference between the constant monitoring of subjective variables versus threshold perception 
of subjective variables and then perhaps the number of competing theories could be somewhat 
narrowed down. 
Some previous experiments have found support for the constant monitoring of feeling of 
risk and task diff iculty in reaction to speed changes while driving (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; 
Kinnear et al., 2008), but others have challenged this and instead found evidence for threshold 
perception of these variables (Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans, de Waard, & 
Brookhuis, 2010). What these studies do agree on is that there seems to be a strong relationship 
between how people perceive and rate a feeling of risk, and how they perceive and rate task 
diff iculty. 
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In this paper we seek to add to the previous experiments (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; 
Kinnear et al., 2008; Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans et al., 2010) in two 
ways. Firstly, we again examine the relationship between speed and subjective ratings of 
task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and effor t. If accounts of constant monitoring are accurate, then 
ratings of task diff iculty, risk and required effor t should systematically increase with speed, as 
was found in the experiment of Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008). This would mean that ratings 
at speeds lower and higher than individuals preferred speed should be different from ratings 
drivers give when driving at their preferred speed. Conversely if a threshold account holds, 
then ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk and effor t should initially be low, stable, and no 
different from the ratings given during a baseline period where drivers are allowed to drive 
at the speed they prefer. Then once the speed at which drivers prefer to drive has been 
surpassed, ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and effor t, will increase. Idealised predicted 
differences between theoretical accounts, using ratings of task diff iculty as an example, are 
shown in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1. Idealised predictions of the relationship between ratings of task diff iculty and speed based on 
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Secondly, we seek to fur ther explore the relationship between individuals’ repor ted 
perceptions of risk and their ratings of task diff iculty. These two variables have previously 
been found to be strongly related to each other (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 
2008), and also to ratings of effor t (Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans et al., 
2010). This is not surprising given that risk, diff iculty, and effor t are often linked naturalistically. 
In fact it is very diff icult to think of any way of increasing the diff iculty of driving without also 
increasing the risk. In this experiment the diff iculty of the task being performed has been 
increased through the addition of a secondary task. 
The hypotheses related to the addition of the secondary task are twofold. Firstly, it was 
expected that the addition of a secondary task would increase ratings of effor t, task diff iculty, 
and feeling of risk. So in other words, if Figure 5.1 is examined, a rating of 1 would increase to 
a rating of 2 for example. The second hypotheses is that if a threshold type relationship, such 
as the one shown in Figure 5.1 was found, then it is possible that the presence of the threshold 
would be removed, or perhaps shifted to an earlier speed. This is based on the idea that 
simply the extra loading nature of the secondary task would cause the threshold to either be 
crossed right away, resulting in a monitoring type reaction as shown in Figure 5.1, or that it 
would be crossed earlier, for example at 40 km/h rather than 60 km/h in Figure 5.1. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Par ticipants were recruited from students enrolled in the English Bachelors in Psychology 
at the University of Groningen and given course credit for par ticipation. To comply with 
the University’s ethical requirements, they provided informed consent before being admitted 
to the experiment. In order to take par t, par ticipants had to have had at least one year 
driving experience on a valid drivers’ licence. A total of 56 par ticipants were recruited in this 
way, 22 male and 34 female. However, one of the male par ticipants consistently drove at 
speeds in excess of 130 km/h during the experiment and was a clear outlier. As such, he was 
removed from the experiment. In addition, two female par ticipants experienced feelings of 
nausea when using the simulator and did not complete the experiment. This left 21 males and 
32 females in the f inal dataset. The females on average were 20.4 years old (SD = 1.2) and 
had held a drivers’ licence for an average of 2.7 years (SD = .9). The males were 21.9 years old 
on average (SD = 2.9) and had held a drivers’ licence for an average of 3.6 years (SD = 2.6). 
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5.2.2 Materials 
The experiment was carried out using the University of Groningen driving simulator. 
The simulator is on a f ixed base, running software by STSoftware and uses three LCD screens 
to give par ticipants a 210-degree view of the road environment. In order to hide the speed 
information, and force par ticipants to rely on their own perception of speed, a cardboard 
cutout was placed over the instrument panel. A winding rural road was created in the 
simulator with lane widths of 3.0 m in both the right and left hand lanes. The road also 
had the same surface proper ties and road marking for the entire drive and never altered in 
elevation. There was no traff ic in the simulation and information about par ticipants’ speed 
was collected at a rate of 10 Hz. The secondary task chosen, was the Paced Auditory Serial 
Addition Test (PASAT, Gronwall & Sampson, 1974) created using E-Prime software and run on 
a Windows XP laptop with an USB powered external speaker system. 
5.2.3 Procedure 
The experiment required many different steps and trials, and is somewhat complex. Therefore 
the procedure is summarised in Table 5.1 below. 
Par ticipants provided consent to par ticipate and then f illed in a shor t questionnaire which 
collected information on their age, gender, and how long they had held their drivers’ licence. 
Par ticipants then completed a practice drive in the simulator for 5 minutes during which no 
data was recorded on their driving performance. If par ticipants were uncomfor table with 
the simulator they could continue to drive after this initial 5 minutes, however none of the 
par ticipants took this oppor tunity. If at this point, or at any other time during the experiment, 
the par ticipants star ted to feel nauseous or unwell they were asked to stop and did not 
progress in the study. 
After the practice drive, the PASAT task was explained to the par ticipants and they were 
given a chance to practice it for 3 minutes, without driving. During the PASAT task, par ticipants 
heard a string of numbers from 1 to 9 being read out, with 1.8 seconds between each number. 
Par ticipants then had to verbally respond by adding the number they just heard to the number 
that they had heard preceding it. For example if they f irst heard the number 1, and then next 
heard the number 4, they were required to call out “5” (1 + 4), and then if the next number 
they heard was 3 then they had to reply “7” (4 + 3) and so on. The par ticipants were told to 
answer verbally as quickly as possible, and that their accuracy was being assessed, although 
no data was recorded during the PASAT practice session. Outside of the practice session, 
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Table 5.1. Summary of the procedure, detailing when speed, subjective and PASAT data were collected. 
The Practice Drive and PASAT practice only occurred once per par ticipant, then each par ticipant completed the 
trial blocks 7 times, once for each speed category (-30,-20,-10, +0,+10,+20+30 km/h).
Stage & Condition Data Recorded
Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
Pre-trial
1. Practice drive 5 minutes NO N/A NO
2. PASAT practice 3 minutes N/A NO N/A
Trial blocks - Repeated 7 times (-30,-20,-10,0,+10,+20+30 km/h) in random order for each participant
1. Baseline condition Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
1.1 Par ticipants instructed to star t the vehicle and drive 
at the speed they f ind most comfor table. Variable NO N/A NO
1.2 Par ticipants notify the experimenter that they have 
reached the speed they f ind most comfor table.  Then 
they continue driving at this speed for 1 minute.
1 minute YES N/A NO
1.3 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a 
fashion that maintains their control of the vehicle and 
take their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective 
questions about the last minute of driving (period 1.2).  
During this time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
2. No load condition Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
2.1 Using the average speed driven during step 1.2 of 
the Baseline condition as a reference point the control 
of speed is taken away from the par ticipant, and given 
to the simulator and  increases or decreases by 10, 20, 
or 30 km/h or remains unchanged. Par ticipants must 
continue to control steering at this point but have no 
way of altering the speed.
Variable NO N/A NO
2.2 Par ticipants notify the experimenter that they could 
take control of speed back, and maintain the speed they 
are currently travelling at (the speed set in step 2.1)
Variable NO N/A NO
2.3 Speed control is given back to the par ticipants, 
returning them once again to full control. Par ticipants 
notify the experimenter when they believe they are trav-
elling at the new speed that was set for them in step 2.1
Variable NO N/A NO
2.4  Par ticipants are asked to maintain their current 
speed for 1 minute 1 minute YES N/A NO
2.5 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a 
fashion that maintains their control of the vehicle and 
take their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective 
questions about the last minute of driving (period 2.4).  
During this time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
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3. Load condition Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
3.1 Using the average speed driven during step 1.2 of 
the Baseline condition as a reference point the control of 
speed is taken away from the par ticipant, and given to 
the simulator and  increases or decreases by 10, 20, or 
30 km/h or remains unchanged. Par ticipants must con-
tinue to control steering at this point but have no way of 
altering the speed.
Variable NO N/A NO
3.2 Par ticipants then the experimenter that they could 
take control of speed back, and maintain the speed they 
are currently travelling at (the speed set in step 3.1)
Variable NO N/A NO
3.3 Speed control is given back to the par ticipants, 
returning them once again to full control.  Par ticipants 
notify the experimenter when they believe they are trav-
elling at the new speed that was set for them in step 3.1
Variable NO N/A NO
3.4 Par ticipants are asked to maintain their current speed 
for 1 minute and to simultaneously carry out the PASAT 
task to the best of their ability while maintaining control 
of the vehicle.
1 minute YES YES NO
3.5 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a fash-
ion that maintains their control of the vehicle and take 
their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective questions 
about the last minute of driving (period 3.4).  During this 
time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
4. Return to baseline condition Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
4.1 Par ticipants instructed to drive at the speed they f ind 
most comfor table. Variable NO N/A NO
4.2 Par ticipants notify the experimenter that they have 
reached the speed they f ind most comfor table.  Then 
they continue driving at this speed for 1 minute.
1 minute YES N/A NO
4.3 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a fash-
ion that maintains their control of the vehicle and take 
their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective questions 
about the last minute of driving (period 4.2).  During this 
time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
4.4 Par ticipants are asked to stop the vehicle, and then 
the simulation is reset to the star t in order to run a new 
block.  
Variable NO N/A NO
3.5 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a fash-
ion that maintains their control of the vehicle and take 
their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective questions 
about the last minute of driving (period 3.4).  During this 
time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
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the correct and incorrect answers were recorded by the experimenter but no feedback was 
given to the par ticipants as to the accuracy of their answers. During the experiment, while 
driving, par ticipants were instructed to perform the PASAT task to the best of their ability, 
while still maintaining control of the vehicle and the vehicle’s speed. 
After practicing the PASAT task, the f irst trial block was star ted. The f irst condition was 
always a baseline (condition 1 in Table 5.1): in the baseline condition par ticipants were instructed 
to star t the vehicle and drive at a speed that they found most comfor table. They could take 
however long they wished to do so, and once they had reached a comfor table driving speed 
they then notif ied the experimenter. Only then, after being notif ied, was information on their 
driving speed recorded by the simulator for 1 minute, to establish a baseline average speed. 
During this 1 minute, par ticipants were simply instructed to continue to drive at whatever 
speed they found comfor table. After 1 minute was up the par ticipants continued to drive but 
had to give four verbal ratings to the following questions, asked in the order presented below 
by the experimenter:
How diff icult did you f ind it to drive this section of road at this speed?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  Extremely Easy    Extremely Diff icult
How much risk did you experience driving this section of road at this speed?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  Maximum Risk          No Risk
How much effor t did it take to drive this section of road at this speed?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  No Effor t           Maximum Effor t
Would you typically, in these conditions, drive at this speed
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    Always                  Never
112
5  MAINTAIN THAT SPEED
It was stressed to the par ticipants that they should take their time to answer the above 
questions, and that remaining in control of the vehicle was the most impor tant factor. Ratings 
of feeling of risk were later reversed for data analyses.
The next step was the no load condition (condition 2 in Table 5.1): the par ticipants were 
informed, while still driving, that control of their speed would be taken away from them 
and given to the simulator, much like cruise control being engaged. Only speed control was 
taken away however, and par ticipants had to continue to steer. Using the average speed 
collected in the baseline condition, the speed of the vehicle was then increased or decreased 
by 10, 20, or 30 km/h or was set to the previous average speed. So if the par ticipant had 
driven 52 km/h on average during the baseline condition, then, in the plus 30 km/h trial the 
new speed would be set to 82 km/h. After the new speed was set, par ticipants were then 
asked to tell the experimenter when they thought they could take control of the speed back 
and continue to drive at the new speed they were currently travelling at. As with every 
step where the par ticipants were asked to notify the experimenter, par ticipants could take 
as much time as they liked to carry out this step. Once the par ticipants indicated that they 
could take control, then the experimenter switched speed control from the simulator back 
to manual. Since par ticipants could not see exactly the speed at which they were travelling 
from the speedometer, they had to rely on their own perception, which meant when speed 
was transferred back to the par ticipants it would sometimes increase or decrease. Therefore, 
par ticipants were instructed to say when they thought they were driving at the speed they 
had just observed. Once the par ticipants did indicate they were travelling at the appropriate 
speed, they were asked to attempt to maintain their speed of travel. Again, par ticipants had 
no feedback from the speedometer and had to rely on their own perception of speed to make 
this judgment. Speed data were then recorded for the next minute, after which par ticipants 
again had to give verbal ratings as described in the baseline condition. While giving these 
ratings par ticipants could vary their speed freely.
The next condition was the load condition (condition 3 in Table 5.1): this condition was 
nearly completely identical to the no load condition, including using the same average speed 
data from the baseline condition (condition 1 in Table 5.1). The only change is that par ticipants 
were required to complete the PASAT task as well as maintaining their speed during the 
1 minute period before subjective impressions were collected. 
The f inal condition in each trial was the return to baseline (condition 4 in Table 5.1) which 
was simply a repeat of the baseline condition. Once the return to baseline condition was 
completed in a trial, par ticipants were asked to stop the vehicle and the simulation was reset 
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so that another trial could begin. Each par ticipant completed 7 blocks of trials, each containing 
the 4 conditions described above. Each block represented one speed manipulation, and the 
blocks were presented in a randomly generated order for every par ticipant. This means that 
each par ticipant experienced driving at 10, 20, and 30 km/h faster and slower than their 
baseline periods, as well as one condition where the target speed set was the same as the 
average speed they drove during the baseline period. Fur thermore, the load and no load 
conditions were counter balanced across the par ticipants. This means that 26 par ticipants 
(11 males, 15 females) carried out the task as described in Table 5.1, and 27 par ticipants 
(10 males, 17 females) carried out the load condition (condition 3 in Table 5.1) of each trial 
before the no load condition (condition 2 in Table 5.1). On average the whole experiment 
took around one and a half hours to complete.
5.2.4 Analysis
The ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed were collected 
and averaged across all par ticipants for each speed category (+/- 0, 10, 20, 30 km/h) and 
condition (baseline, no load, load, return to baseline). For the analysis of the ratings of feeling 
of risk, the scores were reversed to bring them in line with the other ratings used. Analyses 
were also carried out for the objective data on the speeds travelled by the par ticipants. 
The independent variables in this experiment, therefore, are the speed conditions (+/- 0, 10, 
20, 30 km/h) and the four trial conditions; baseline, no load, load, and return to baseline. The 
dependent variables are the actual speed driven and the subjective ratings of task diff iculty, 
feeling of risk, effor t, and the typical driving speed question. Accuracy on the PASAT task 
was the f inal dependent variable assessed. The programs used for analysis were SPSS 16 for 
Windows and IBM SPSS 18 for Macintosh.
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5.3 Results
5.3.1 Ratings of task diff iculty, risk, effort and typical driving speed
A separate, repeated measures MANOVA analysis was run for each of the subjective variables, 
to compare them between the four different conditions with a polynomial contrast, baseline, 
no load, load and return to baseline, at each of the seven speeds. There were signif icant 
differences across the four conditions for all speeds (-30, -20, -10, 0, +10, +20, +30) in ratings 
of task diff iculty (F(3) = 31.72 to 192.91, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39 to .80), effor t (F(3) = 25.09 to 
136.66, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39 to .74), feeling of risk (F(3) = 15.71 to 187.85, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39 to .74), 
and typical driving speed (F(3) = 22.31 to 91.47, p < .001, ηp
2 = .24 to .79). A breakdown into 
comparisons of par ticular interest, and relevant post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction, 
are presented in the following sections.
5.3.1.1 Baseline condition and return to baseline condition
The post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction failed to f ind any signif icant difference 
(p = 1.00) in ratings of task diff iculty (MD = -.16 to .16, SE = .10 to .15), effor t (MD = -.22 to. 
08, SE = .11 to .18), feeling of risk (MD = -.10 to. 16, SE = .10 to .17), and typical driving speed 
(MD = -.36 to .28, SE = .13 to .20), between the baseline and return to baseline data. This held 
true for every speed condition, and is shown in Figure 5.2.
It is also clear from Figure 5.2 that ratings of all the subjective variables stayed essentially 
f lat across all the speed conditions during the baseline and return to baseline trials. The f lat, 
non signif icant, natures of these trends are supported by regression analysis shown in Table 5.2.
5.3.1.2 Baseline condition and no load condition
Post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction showed that for the f irst three speed conditions 
(-30 to -10 km/h) there was no signif icant difference between the ratings for task diff iculty 
given during the baseline and no load conditions (MD = -.06 to .40, SE = .15 to .21 p > .05). 
The same was found to be true during the f irst four speed conditions (-30 to +0 km/h) for 
ratings of effor t (MD = -.42 to -.08, SE = .16 to .20, p > .08) and feeling of risk (MD = -.28 
to .36, SE = .13 to .17, p > .18). As can be seen in Figure 5.3, however, from the 4th speed 
condition for task diff iculty (MD = .54 to 2.88, SE = .16 to .22), and the 5th speed condition 
for effor t (MD = 1.14 to 2.46, SE = .19 to .25) and feeling of risk (MD = 1.44 to 2.90, SE = .20 
to .23) the ratings given during the no load conditions were signif icantly higher than those 
given during the baseline periods (p < .01).
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Figure 5.2. Average ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and I would typically drive at this speed across 
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Figure 5.3. Average ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and I would typically drive at this speed 
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Speed Categories – Baseline
-30 to -10 km/h 0 to 30 km/h
r2 Beta t p r2 Beta t p
Task Diff iculty .00 .00 -.04 .97 .00 -.03 -.42 .67
Effor t .00 .00 -.03 .98 .00 .02 .35 .73
Feeling of Risk .00 .04 .43 .67 .00 -.06 -.80 .42
Typical Driving Speed .01 -.07 -0.85 .39 .00 -.02 -.34 .74
Speed Categories – Return to Baseline 
-30 to -10 km/h 0 to 30 km/h
r2 Beta t p r2 Beta t p
Task Diff iculty .00 -.05 -.66 .51 .00 .06 .87 .38
Effor t .00 .01 .10 .92 .01 .09 1.26 .21
Feeling of Risk .00 -.03 -.35 .73 .00 -.02 -.34 .74
Typical Driving Speed .00 -.04 -.51 .61 .00 .04 .58 .56
Table 5.2. Regression analysis of the ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed for 
the baseline and return to baseline conditions.
Conversely ratings of whether the par ticipants would typically drive at the speed they 
were experiencing were signif icantly higher (p < .01) during the no load condition than those 
given during the baseline condition for all speed categories (MD = .98 to 3.12, SE = .20 to .31). 
As seen in Figure 5.3, ratings of typicality of speed appear to follow a somewhat U-shaped 
curve, with the bottom of the U being at the no speed change category. This means that 
par ticipants indicated that speeds were more and more typical as they approached no speed 
change, and then less so as they moved away from it. The trends described above are 
suppor ted by the results of the regression analysis for the no load condition, as shown in 
Table 5.3. There is no signif icant trend for ratings of task diff iculty and effor t between the -30 
and -10 km/h speed categories (r2 = .00, p > .45) and then there is an increasing trend from 
the preferred speed category onwards (r2 = .26 and .25, p < .001).
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Table 5.3. Regression analysis of the ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed for 
the no load condition.
Speed Categories – No Load
-30 to -10 km/h 0 to 30 km/h
r2 Beta t p r2 Beta t p
Task Diff iculty .00 -.01 -.16 .87 .26 .51 8.48 < .001
Effor t .00 .06 .76 .45 .25 .50 8.39 < .001
Feeling of Risk .07 .26 3.32 < .001 .26 .51 8.49 < .001
Typical Driving Speed .19 -.44 -6.06 < .001 .20 .45 7.19 < .001
Ratings for feeling of risk are different, as they show a slight signif icant increasing trend 
before the par ticipants’ preferred speed is exceeded (r2 = .07, p < .001) which then changes 
to a larger increase afterwards (r2 = .26, p < .001). The regression results for typically driven 
speed are consistent with the U-shaped description given above.
5.3.1.3 No load condition and load condition
As can be seen in Figure 5.4, the general trend of ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of 
risk, and typical driving speed, appear to be relatively the same between the no load and 
load conditions. However, it does seem that, at least in the case of ratings of task diff iculty 
and effor t, that the curve for the load task has been shifted upwards.
The results of the post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction conf irm that ratings of 
ratings of task diff iculty (MD= .68 to 1.96, SE = .20 to .28) and effor t (MD= .78 to 1.88, 
SE = .21 to .27) were signif icantly higher than in the no load condition (p < .01) for each speed 
category during the load condition. Ratings of feeling of risk were also signif icantly higher 
(MD= 1.26 to 1.74, SE = .23 to .29, p < .001) during the load condition for the f irst 4 speed 
categories (-30 to +0 km/h). However for the next two speed categories (+10 to +20 km/h) 
there was no signif icant difference (MD= .64, SE = .25, p > 0.09) between ratings of feeling 
of risk given during the load and no load conditions. A signif icant difference in ratings of 
feeling of risk is detectable for the f inal, +30 km/h condition, however (MD= .58, SE = .21, 
p < .05). Ratings of whether the par ticipants would typically drive at the speed experienced, 
only signif icantly (p < .05) differed during the -30 km/h (MD=-.82, SE = .28) and no change 
speed categories (MD= .86, SE = .30), otherwise there was no signif icant difference (p > .09) 
in the ratings given during the no load and load conditions (MD=-.52 to .74, SE = .24 to .31). 
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Figure 5.4. Average ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and I would typically drive at this speed across 
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However, the U-shape for ratings of typical driving speed appears less acute during the 
load condition. The trends for the load condition are generally conf irmed by the results of a 
regression analysis as shown in Table 5.4. It can be seen that the trends are similar to those 
in the no load condition (see Table 5.3) but shallower.
Speed Categories – Load
-30 to -10 km/h 0 to 30 km/h
r2 Beta t p r2 Beta t p
Task Diff iculty .00 .00 -.05 .96 .11 .33 5.10 < .001
Effor t .01 .1 1.21 .23 .08 .28 4.22 < .001
Feeling of Risk .04 .20 2.51 < .05 .15 .39 6.00 < .001
Typical Driving Speed .03 -.16 -2.03 < .05 .14 .37 5.72 < .001
Table 5.4. Regression analysis of the ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed for 
the load condition.
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5.3.2 Correlations between task diff iculty, effort and feeling of risk
Across all conditions, task diff iculty and effor t are highly correlated with each other (r = .69 
to .85, p < .01). With the lowest correlations during the baseline and return to baseline 
periods (r = .69 and r = .71 respectively, p < .01), and the highest, during the no load and load 
conditions (r = .85 and r = .83 respectively, p < .01). Ratings of feeling of risk are moderately 
correlated with task diff iculty and effor t for the baseline (r = .60 and r = .56, p < .01) and 
return to baseline conditions (r = .65 and r = .62, p < .01). The no load condition (r = .81 and 
r = .75, p < .01) produced the highest correlations between task diff iculty, effor t and feeling 
of risk, with the load task also producing moderately high correlations (r = .69 and r = .70, 
p < .01).
5.3.3 PASAT accuracy
Accuracy at the PASAT task across all par ticipants ranged from an average of 67.24% 
(SD = 18.85) for the +30 km/h condition to 71.30% (SD = 14.21) for the -10 km/h condition, 
resulting in an average performance across all speed categories of 69.09% (SD = 12.81). 
Repeated measures MANOVA analysis found no signif icant differences between speed 
conditions (F(6) = 1.27, p > .27).
5.3.4 Speed differences between the baseline and return to baseline conditions
Repeated measures MANOVA with a polynomial contrast for condition, showed a clear 
effect on mean speed by condition for the -30, -20, -10, +10, +20 and +30 km/h speed trials 
(F(1) = 5.62–19.72, p < 0.05, ηp
2 = .11 to .30) but no signif icant effect during the no speed 
change category (F(1) = .61, p < .44, ηp
2 = .01). This can be seen in Figure 5 where the -30, -20, 
-10 km/h trials resulted in signif icantly lower speeds during the Return to Baseline condition, 
and the +10, +20 and +30 km/h categories resulted in signif icantly higher speeds. This was 
conf irmed through the use of a post hoc test with a Bonferroni correction, which again 
showed signif icantly different speeds (p < .001 to p < .05) for the -30, -20, -10, +10, +20 and 
+30 km/h conditions.
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Figure 5.5. Average speed travelled (km/h) during each speed category (-30 to +30 km/h) for the baseline and 
return to baseline conditions. Speed category ‘0’ is the preferred speed.
5.3.5 Speed differences between the no load and load conditions
The average speed during each speed category for the no load and load conditions are 
shown in Figure 5.6. While the speeds are generally similar it does appear that in the load 
condition par ticipants drove faster than during the no load condition during the -30 and 
-20 km/h speed categories, and slower during the +30 km/h condition. The use of a repeated 
measures MANOVA, with a polynomial contrast for condition, conf irms this with a signif icant 
main effect of speed during the -30 (F(1) = 6.26, p < .05, ηp
2= .13), -20 km/h (F(1) = 4.51, 
p < .05, ηp
2= .10) and +30 km/h (F(1) = 4.91, p < .05, ηp
2  = .10) speed categories. There was 
no signif icant difference between the average speed driven during the no load and load 
conditions for any of the other speed categories (F(1) = .02 to 2.4, p > .13). A post hoc test 
with a Bonferroni correction, conf irms these f indings, with a signif icant effect of load for the 
-30, -20 and +30 km/h conditions (p < .05) (Figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6. Average speed travelled (km/h) during each speed category (-30 to +30 km/h) for the no load and 
load conditions. Speed category ‘0’ is the preferred speed.
5.4 Discussion
The results of this study seem to add fur ther suppor t to theories of driver behaviour that 
posit a threshold relationship between variables such as task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, 
and driving behaviour. In par ticular, in the no load data there does appear to be a clear 
threshold effect, par ticularly for task diff iculty and effor t, where these variables star t out 
rated as low and stable and then increase once a cer tain speed has been exceeded. For 
ratings of effor t, this threshold point occurred when par ticipants were f irst forced to go faster 
than they would usually freely choose. In the case of task diff iculty, however, it could be said 
to occur slightly earlier, during the no speed change trial.
This threshold type relationship appears to be slightly different when considering ratings of 
risk, however. In the no load and load conditions it would seem that ratings of risk increase 
slightly before the no speed change category, and then increase at a much more rapid rate 
after this apparent threshold point has been crossed. This is still a threshold type effect but 
there also appears to be some constant monitoring of change in feeling of risk. However, 
care should be taken with this assumption. It is possible that by the nature of the experiment, 
where par ticipants were initially asked to drive how they preferred, rate the risk, diff iculty, 
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and effor t, and then explicitly saw an ar tif icial increase or decrease in their speed, and were 
then again asked to provide ratings for that new speed, that this could have introduced bias 
into their answers. Explicitly seeing the speed changes may have induced more rational 
comparative thinking when asked for ratings of risk than is likely to exist in normal driving.
The par ticipants’ average ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk were found to 
be highly correlated with each other, although the correlations did differ somewhat between 
the conditions. This is in line with previous research and is likely due to the naturalistic linkage 
between these variables during most tasks (Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; 
Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans et al., 2010).
The additional diff iculty of performing the PASAT task is clearly demonstrated by the 
higher ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk given by the par ticipants during 
the load condition. In par ticular, the average ratings for task diff iculty and effor t during the 
minus 30 km/h trial are higher even than those given during the plus 10 km/h trial in the no 
load condition. However the threshold trend in the subjective ratings is still apparent in the 
load condition data, with an increasing trend in ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of 
risk after the no speed change category has been exceeded. This highlights the impor tance 
of actual travelled speed, and par ticularly the usually travelled speed, rather than subjective 
impressions of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk in triggering this threshold effect.
There is one variable in the paper that could be described as constantly changing, and 
thus open to constant monitoring, and that is the rating of the typicality of the speed being 
experienced by the par ticipants. In the no load condition data, and to a lesser extent in the 
load condition data, ratings of how typical the speed experienced was, trends down towards 
where the threshold point for the other variables occurs and then trends upward after this 
point has been exceeded. This indicative nature of how typical the experience is, has also 
been found in previous studies of both speed (Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009) and close 
following behaviour (Lewis-Evans et al., 2010) where again, the ratings of this variable pointed 
to where the threshold point for ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk would 
occur. This suggests that choosing a speed of travel could be based more on past experience 
and driving in a habitual, automatic fashion, rather than on aiming for a par ticular level of a 
subjective variable.
Fur ther suppor t for a tendency to move towards a habitual speed is in the recorded speed 
results for the no load and load conditions. During these tasks the par ticipants had to target 
and maintain a new speed initially set for them by the simulator. In most cases, they were able 
to do so, with or without the PASAT task. However, during the -30 and -20 speed categories 
123
5  MAINTAIN THAT SPEED
in the load condition, the par ticipants drove signif icantly faster than they did during the no 
load condition. This means that despite indicating that the task was more diff icult, more 
effor tful, and felt more risky than the in no load condition, the par ticipants actually drove 
faster in this condition and therefore technically increased the objective diff iculty and risk 
of the situation. This is in contrast to conventional thinking that when under load, action 
should be taken to objectively decrease load. The increase may be because the extra mental 
workload created by the PASAT task reduces a par ticipant’s ability to consciously control 
or monitor their speed, which leads to speed maintenance being handled more by lower 
level automated processes which work to increase the speed back towards a habitually 
learnt speed. However, increasing their speed does bring them back towards the speed they 
would choose to drive if freely able to. If this speed control is indeed somewhat habitual, 
and automatic, it is likely that it takes very little cognitive effor t to drive at your preferred 
speed (Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974), therefore, it could be claimed that by driving faster the 
par ticipants are in fact reducing the effor t needed to perform the task. There was only one 
signif icant drop in speed during the high speed categories while under the load condition, 
which occurred for the +30 km/h category. This suggests that people may be better at 
maintaining speeds in excess of what they prefer to drive when under secondary task load 
than they are at maintaining speeds which are lower than they would typically drive, at least 
for the shor t periods of time examined in this experiment. The above f indings are consistent 
with the accounts of threshold theories, as they suggest that driving, including speed choice, is 
often controlled by habitual, over learnt and often unconscious automated skills (Fuller, 1984; 
Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 2005).
A potential issue with the speed f indings is that in this experiment par ticipants did not 
have access to their exact speed through a speedometer. This is a threat to the ecological 
validity of the experiment and may mean that the results found here would not occur in real 
situations where drivers could check the speedometer at any time. However, Recar te and 
Nunes (2002) found a similar effect where their par ticipants increased their travelling speed 
when given additional mental tasks, but only if the par ticipants were driving at a slower 
speed than they would typically choose, otherwise no change in driving speed was found. 
The increase occurred irrespective of whether the par ticipants had access to a speedometer 
or not. Additionally, research on driver gaze patterns has found that drivers do not spend 
much time looking at their instruments. For example Harbluk et al. (2007) found that their 
subjects only devoted around 1.5% of their time gazing at their instruments, and that this 
signif icantly reduces to around .6% of their time when placed under cognitive load. This means 
that at other times drivers are likely to be relying on their own perception of the speed from 
the environment around them, much as they had to in this experiment. The f inding that 
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drivers are worse at maintaining lower speeds when under mental load also lends suppor t 
to the claim that some propor tion of speeding may be carried out unintentionally (Fuller et 
al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). It may be the case that automatic, habitual, speed 
preferences have build up from a history of repeated intentional speeding, or it may be that 
par ticular elements of road design suggest an inappropriate speed to drivers when they are 
distracted, and is acted on by automatic processes despite the presence of contrary legal 
speed limits, temporary or permanent. This distinction could be investigated through fur ther 
study.
Finally, if ratings of all the subjective variables are compared between the after and 
baseline periods then there is no difference in the ratings given. However, in terms of the 
speed driven, the par ticipants drove signif icantly slower in the return to baseline conditions 
when they had previously been made to drive slower than they preferred in the no load and 
load conditions, and drove signif icantly faster if they had been made to drive faster in the no 
load and load conditions. This f inding points to a speed adaptation effect, where driving at 
the faster or slower speed has altered the par ticipants’ visual perception of speed (Schmidt & 
Tiff in, 1969). This f inding does not par ticularly add to the discussion around the two groups 
of driver behaviour models, but it is surprising that the apparent speed adaptation occurred 
so quickly, given that par ticipants were only driving at increased or decreased speed for a 
few minutes.
There are a few potential problems with this study which are worth noting. The f irst is the 
ar tif icial nature of the speed maintenance task. Speed choice is typically seen as being freely 
manipulated by drivers. Forcing drivers to pay attention and maintain a speed, rather than 
vary it naturally, may in itself have increased the diff iculty of the driving task and inf lated the 
subsequent subjective ratings. Similarly just by making the par ticipants aware that they had to 
provide ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feelings of risk, and how typical the speed experienced 
was, may have made these variables more salient than they would usually be in day to day 
driving. Again, this would be expected to have perhaps inf lated their ratings of the subjective 
variables. Conversely, it is possible that the Liker t scale the par ticipants used to provide 
subjective impressions of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed, was 
not sensitive enough to pick up small changes in these variables and, therefore, suppressed 
the ratings and changed the nature of the trends shown, especially at the speeds below the 
par ticipants’ preferred speed. The changes in speeds used in this experiment were quite large 
however, and the scales used were consistent with those appearing in previous studies (Fuller, 
McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008; Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans et 
al., 2010). Perhaps future research should investigate the use of a continuous scale, although 
these scales do carry the possibility of over exaggeration of values by par ticipants.
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Another potential problem is that the distance covered by the individual participants was not 
constant across all speed categories. For example, during the minus 30 conditions, participants 
would have covered on average around 4.38 km across the four 1 minute periods in which data 
was collected. In the plus 30 condition this would have increased to an average of approximately 
6.40 km travelled. This is further complicated because, as can be seen from Table 1 in Section 2, the 
participant’s own free choice of speed during the baseline condition was used as a reference point 
for setting speeds for the no load and load condition in each block of trials. This means that driving 
speed could vary across participants, and across trials within participants. Therefore, the distance 
covered could also vary. All of this means the ratings given for the higher speeds are confounded by 
the participants also having travelled more distance and, therefore, encountered more turns and 
twists of the road network, and vice versa for the slower speeds. Furthermore, as shown in Table 
1, participants could also take however long they wanted to notify the experimenter that they are 
either at a comfortable speed, in the baseline or return to baseline condition, or that they can take 
control of the speed back in the load and no load conditions. During this time the participants 
continued to drive and, therefore, progress down the road. While participants were not asked 
about this time and no data was recorded, it could have also impacted on their subjective ratings, 
likely increasing them due to the increased diff iculty of the task in terms of deciding when to give 
control back. Given this, it is promising that we still f ind a threshold relationship. Also, it is hoped 
that the random order of speed trials helped to minimise any bias this introduced.
The f inding that performance in the PASAT task was constant across all speed categories is 
another potential problem. It would be expected that as the diff iculty of the main driving task 
increased then the accuracy of the secondary PASAT task should decrease with the increased 
external load caused by faster speeds due to there being only a limited amount of cognitive 
resources available at any one time (de Waard, 1996). This did not occur. One possible explanation 
is that the PASAT task was not diff icult enough, although on average participants did only have 
an accuracy of around 70% which suggests it was challenging for them, although consistently so. 
In future studies it may, therefore, be better to use a shorter time interval between presentations 
of the numbers, or perhaps modify the PASAT task so that, for example, participants are required 
to add the number they just heard to the number they heard two presentations ago. It is also 
possible that PASAT is not sensitive enough to changes in cognitive load brought about by changes 
in speed. It should also be said that simply by including a secondary task such as the PASAT lowers 
the ecological validity of the experiment. The PASAT task is not a realistic task that drivers will 
be typically carrying out while driving. Therefore, perhaps for future studies a more naturalistic 
secondary task should be chosen. However the PASAT task does have the advantage of creating 
a high level of load and is continuous, as well as easy to administer verbally, which is why it was 
selected for this experiment.
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Finally, the par ticipants who took par t in this experiment were all of one age group. 
Specif ically, they were young psychology students at the University of Groningen. As such, 
this limits the generalisability of the f indings. Future research would be aided by examining a 
wider age group, and also individuals of varying experience. However, previous research in 
this area found no differences in ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk between learner, 
inexperienced and experienced drivers (Kinnear et al., 2008; Lewis-Evans et al., 2010).
5.5 Conclusion
This paper, while not conclusive, does present fur ther evidence for a threshold relationship 
in the perception of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk. It does not fully suppor t an idea 
that the perception of these variables is necessarily nil before this threshold point is crossed. 
But rather, that they only seem to alter in a clear and systematic fashion after a threshold 
point has been exceeded.
This paper also highlights the habitual control of speed with ratings of the typicality of 
the speed experienced being the most sensitive of all the subjective measures. Fur thermore, 
it seems that drivers who are under cognitive load are not as good at maintaining speeds 
lower than they would typically drive as they are at maintaining speeds higher than normal, at 
least for shor t periods. The result of this could be that, when distracted, drivers could speed 
up unconsciously and break speed limits without intending to. If some signif icant propor tion 
of speeding is indeed unintentional then the countermeasures aimed at preventing it will have 
to be different from those which could target intentional speeding. The paper also appears 
to show that speed adaptation can occur after only shor t periods of increased or decreased 
speed.
CHAPTER 6 DID YOU SEE THAT?
A version of this chapter has been previously published as Lewis-Evans, B., De Waard, D., Jolij, 
J. & Brookhuis, K.A. What you may not see might slow you down anyway: Masked images 
and driving, PLoS One and can be accessed online here: http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0029857
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Abstract
Many theories of driver behaviour suggest that unconscious or implicit emotions play a 
functional role in the shaping and control of behaviour. This has not been experimentally 
tested however. Therefore, in this study the effects of emotive masked images on driver 
behaviour were examined. While driving a simulator, par ticipants were repeatedly exposed 
to negative or neutral emotionally laden target images that were sandwich masked by 
emotionally neutral images. These images were encountered across two different trials, each 
of which consisted of 3-4 minutes of driving on a rural road. The results indicate an effect 
of the negative target images primarily in reducing the extent of familiarisation occurring 
between the f irst and second experimental drives. This is evident in a reduced decrease in 
hear t rate and a reduced increase in high band hear t rate variability and actual travelling 
speed from the f irst to second drives if the negative target image was presented in the 
second drive. In addition to these f indings there was no clear effect of the target image on 
subjective ratings of effor t or feelings of risk. There was, however, an effect of gender, with 
the majority of the effects found in the study being limited to the larger female dataset. 
These f indings suggest that unconscious or implicit emotional stimuli may well inf luence driver 
behaviour without explicit awareness.
6.1 Introduction
Many recent models that seek to explain driver behaviour have come to incorporate functional 
views on the role of emotions in driving. These theories include Task Diff iculty Homeostasis 
theory (TDH) (Fuller, 2005; Fuller et al., 2008), Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT) (Fuller, 2011), the 
multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005) the Risk Monitor Model (RMM) (Vaa, 2003; 
Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011), feeling of risk homeostasis (Kinnear, 2009) and the situational control 
framework (Ljung Aust & Engström, 2011). The way that emotions are said to affect driving 
differs somewhat between the models; for example, in the multiple comfor t zone model 
(Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) they operate in a threshold manner with emotions being 
produced by breaches in safety margins. This is in contrast to the account given by RAT 
(Fuller, 2011) or RMM (Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) where levels of preferred emotions 
or feelings are set and constantly monitored. However, as mentioned above, all the models 
view emotions in a functional fashion, suggesting that they play an impor tant role in biasing 
or inf luencing driver decision making, sometimes even without entering into explicit conscious 
awareness. So for example, uncomfor table emotions such as those related to the risk arising 
from a narrow road, would signal to the driver to be cautious and to reduce their speed. 
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RMM in par ticular, takes a strong functionalist stance, suggesting that risk and the detection 
of risk via emotions and feelings is a vital evolutionary adaptation for survival (Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 
2007; Vaa, 2011). 
Most of the above models approach the issue of emotion via reference to the Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). The Somatic Marker Hypothesis states 
that emotions, def ined as unconscious physiological states, and feelings, which represent the 
later conscious awareness of these emotions, have a signif icant impact on human decision 
making. In par ticular, unconscious emotional physiological states are presumed to arise in 
reaction to cer tain learnt or innate stimuli and ‘mark’ such stimuli or situations in ways 
that bias decision making towards or away from them. The presence of these emotional 
physiological states can typically be detected via psychophysiological measurements.
The main experimental evidence for the Somatic Marker Hypothesis comes from a study 
carried out using the Iowa Gambling Task that compared neurologically ‘normal’ people 
with patients who had impaired emotional systems due to ventromedial prefrontal damage 
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). The Iowa Gambling Task involved par ticipants 
losing or gaining fake US currency by drawing from four decks of cards. Two of the decks had 
high gains but also high losses, making them poor choices in the long run, and the other two 
had smaller pay outs but also smaller losses, making them a better long term choice. What 
was found is that even before the ‘normal’ par ticipants could repor t that they consciously 
knew which decks were the best they were producing detectable changes in skin conductance 
when choosing a card from a poor choice deck. This was taken as a sign of somatic, or 
body, markers being formed, which predated conscious awareness and eventually helped 
the par ticipants to decide which deck was the best decision. The skin conductance response 
was missing in the impaired individuals and they continued to select cards from the poor 
decks. This par ticular interpretation of the Iowa Gambling task has been challenged however, 
with some researchers suggesting the results obtained, at least in terms of the deck choice 
performance, could better be explained via problems with working memory, attention, or 
rehearsal learning in the impaired individuals (Fellows & Farah, 2005; Manes et al., 2002). 
Outside of the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, the majority of the above driver behaviour 
models also owe some of their structure, in terms of how they refer to emotions, to the work 
of Taylor (1964). Taylor claimed to show that skin conductance reacted during a drive at areas 
of high accident occurrence. Fur thermore, Taylor claimed that over time, skin conductance 
levels were kept relatively stable and suggested that this meant that drivers were targeting 
or trying to maintain a set level of anxiety or risk while driving. This same targeting view 
is taken by TDH (Fuller, 2005; Fuller et al., 2008), RAT (Fuller, 2011) and RMM (Vaa, 2003; 
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Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) who all reference Taylor’s f indings in terms of the consistency of skin 
conductance responses. This view was also inf luential on earlier models of driver behaviour 
such as Risk Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1976; Wilde, 1988). The idea of skin conductance 
response consistency is not universally accepted however. In par ticular, Taylor’s f indings have 
been challenged on the grounds that skin conductance is a quite reactive and relatively 
non-specif ic measure. Skin conductance responds to many other factors in addition to, or 
instead of, emotional changes (Fuller, 2005; Heino, 1996; McKenna, 1988; Summala, 2007). For 
instance, it is possible that Taylor’s f indings in terms of skin conductance could be explained as 
simply arising through the motor control of the vehicle required for driving (Summala, 2007) 
rather than reacting to any changes in, or ref lecting the maintenance of, emotional or risky 
elements. The zero-risk theory of driver behaviour (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 
1997) and the later multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) have 
also challenged the idea of maintaining and targeting a constant level of risk or anxiety. 
These two models, instead, argue that most of the time drivers experience, both consciously 
and unconsciously, no risk or anxiety when driving and that when it is experienced it acts 
as a warning to change behaviour, unless drivers are otherwise motivated to accept the 
experienced risk. 
Putting aside the differences between the par ticular theories, there is no doubt that driver 
behaviour models are trending towards a functional role of emotion and feelings in the 
control of driving, par ticularly when it comes to risk judgment. This trend in traff ic psychology 
is a ref lection of a wider trend in psychology where the functional impor tance of emotions 
and feelings in decision making is being stressed (Fuller, 2007; Fuller, 2011; Keltner & Gross, 
1999; Vaa, 2011). For example, in Slovic et al.’s (2004) view of risk assessment there are 
‘affect heuristics’ which are fast and automatic emotive reactions to risky situations that 
can be used in guiding decision making. This affect based system is contrasted to the more 
traditional, analytic, and subjective utility maximization view of risk assessment, which can still 
operate in cer tain situations. However, the ‘affect heuristic’ is hypothesized to be commonly 
used in day-to-day decision making.
While the idea of implicit or unconscious emotional effects on decision making has become 
popular, it presents an interesting challenge to experimentally test in a complex task like 
driving. Exactly how can an emotion be generated in a par ticipant without it entering into 
awareness and becoming a feeling? And then, how can its impact be tested without again 
explicitly aler ting the par ticipant?
One possible solution to this challenge is the use of masked images. This is where 
emotionally charged images are very brief ly shown to par ticipants with other, longer lasting 
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images shown before and after the emotionally charged image in order to ‘mask’ it from the 
par ticipant’s conscious perception. The idea is that the image can still generate an emotive 
response but it does so without entering into the conscious awareness of the par ticipant, or 
at least without the par ticipant becoming explicitly aware of it. This process is also referred 
to as priming, in that the target images used are associated with situations that prime or 
trigger cer tain emotions, feelings, and cognitions in individuals via preconscious processing. In 
the case of this study, for instance, it was hoped that the negative images used would prime 
reactions in the physiology of par ticipants and lead to slower speeds and faster reaction 
times to road safety relevant stimuli, such as a stop sign. The idea that emotionally negative 
images can be processed preconsciously is well in line with functional thinking in terms of 
emotions and feelings, in that it would be potentially evolutionary advantageous to react to 
threatening or emotionally negative situations as fast as possible. However, it should also 
be noted that whether masked images are truly unconscious, or subliminal, is a matter of 
great debate (Pessoa, 2005; Robinson, 1998; Siegel & Weinberger, 2009). As such, they will be 
referred to as simply masked, rather than subliminal, in this paper. 
Using masked images has cer tain merits. Past studies have shown that emotionally 
negative masked images produce skin conductance responses (Kimura, Yoshino, Takahashi, 
& Nomura, 2004; Öhman & Soares, 1994; Öhman & Soares, 1998) and activate areas of 
the amygdala that are in accordance with fear or threat detection (Carlsson et al., 2004; 
Gläscher & Adolphs, 2003; Whalen et al., 1998; Öhman, 2005) without being able to be 
repor ted as perceived by par ticipants. Fur ther evidence for the emotional inf luence of 
unconscious images comes from research on patients with blindsight. Blindsight is a condition 
where, due to damage to the visual cor tex, individuals are unaware of visual stimuli but still 
retain a limited ability to make judgements about visual aspects of the world around them 
(Weiskrantz, 1996). Research with blindsight patients, or with individuals in which blindsight 
has been induced (Jolij & Lamme, 2005), has shown that they still have some ability to detect 
visual emotional stimuli and that these stimuli activate relevant fear or threat detection areas 
of the amygdala despite not entering into explicit conscious awareness (De Gelder, Vroomen, 
Pour tois, & Weiskrantz, 1999; Jolij & Lamme, 2005; Pegna, Khateb, Lazeyras, & Seghier, 2004).
Masked images have also been shown to impact on attitudes and judgements about 
others (Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, & Lynn, 1992), as well as the level of hostile behaviour 
performed towards them (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Additionally, masked images have 
been found to affect risky decision-making based on masked monetary rewards in simple 
gambling-like experimental tasks (Pessiglione et al., 2007; Pessiglione et al., 2008). There is also 
some evidence that masked images can affect attention and mental workload. For example 
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Carlson, Fee, and Reinke (2009) found that par ticipants would react faster on a dot-probe 
task when the dot occurred on the same side as a threatening masked image. In other 
research (Hirschberger, Ein-Dor, Caspi, Arzouan, & Zivotofsky, 2010) it has been found that 
presenting masked images showing death and mutilation or physical threats (such as a 
growling dog or striking snake) increased gaze duration towards the images that showed 
the physical threat, and decreased gaze duration towards the images that simply contained 
physical injury or death.  
Ultimately the above studies suggest that masked images can have some inf luence on 
an individual’s decision making or attention. However, these studies have been carried out 
with relatively easy tasks in relatively simple conditions and we are unaware of any research 
examining the inf luence of masked images on a complex task such as driving. 
Driving is generally viewed as a self-paced task (Michon, 1985; Michon, 1989; Näätänen 
& Summala, 1974; Taylor, 1964), in that drivers can, to a large extent, set their own pace of 
movement through the road system and generally can alter and control the challenge of the 
driving task. This is mostly done through highly automated actions (Summala, 2007). It is, 
however, a task that involves many individual drivers interacting within a large and varied 
road system and with a wide range of regulative control. Navigating this complex system 
properly is impor tant because, objectively speaking, at most times drivers and other road 
users are only moments away from death or serious injury; a fact that is sadly well represented 
in road accidents being the leading cause of death for people aged 15-29 worldwide, and the 
9th leading cause of death overall across all age groups (World Health Organization, 2009). 
It is, therefore, impor tant to develop a good understanding of what variables shape and 
affect driver behaviour.
The study described in this paper therefore sets out to experimentally test the inf luence 
of implicit or unconscious emotional signals on driver decision making, with a focus on driver 
speed choice. Speed is one of the most prominent road safety issues. Not only because of 
the inf luence of inappropriate speed choices on the chance of having an accident, but also 
because of the undeniable inf luence of velocity on physical trauma and proper ty damage 
when an accident does occur (Fuller et al., 2008; Patterson, Frith, & Small, 2000). Speed is 
also one of the main ways in which drivers can regulate the task demands of driving and 
therefore can ‘self-pace’ the driving task (Michon, 1985; Michon, 1989; Näätänen & Summala, 
1974; Taylor, 1964). 
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Par ticipants in the present study were asked to drive a simple rural road in a driving 
simulator while paying attention to a series of images presented just below the rear view 
mirror. The images were presented under the pretence of carrying out a memory task. Each 
par ticipant drove the road twice, with one drive involving the presentation of emotionally 
negative target images and the other of emotionally neutral target images. These images 
were in both cases backwards and forwards masked by different emotionally neutral masking 
images. At some point these masking images would change to include a stop sign. When this 
occurred par ticipants had to stop the car as quickly as possible. Information on speed and 
stopping time along with subjective impressions of effor t and feeling of risk were collected 
alongside physiological measures of skin conductance, hear t rate, and respiration. 
In line with the functional account of emotion provided by the various models of driver 
behaviour discussed above (Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, 2011; Kinnear, 2009; Ljung 
Aust & Engström, 2011; Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) it 
was predicted that when par ticipants were exposed to the negative target images they 
would drive at a slower speed than when exposed to the neutral target images. This was 
predicted to occur due to the production of uncomfor table emotions associated with the 
images, which signal to the drivers that something is amiss with their behaviour or the road 
environment and therefore leads them to take action to remove or reduce this emotion. 
Due to the use of masking, these emotions should occur unconsciously or at least without 
explicit awareness, and therefore it is also hypothesised that any behaviour changes will occur 
without any meaningful change in risk or effor t ratings between the two different target 
image conditions. In addition, in line with a physiological and functional account of emotion, 
it was also predicted that the psychophysiological measures taken would show a signif icant 
response in line with a negative emotional reaction arising from the emotionally negative 
images. Finally, it was predicted that when par ticipants were exposed to the negative target 
images that they would become more aler t to potential road safety related stimuli and 
therefore respond faster to the stop sign image in bringing their vehicle to a stop.
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6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants and Ethics Statement 
Ethics approval, including permission to deceive the par ticipants, was gained from the University 
of Groningen Psychology Ethics Committee. Par ticipants were informed that their information 
would be treated anonymously and that they could withdraw from the experiment at any 
time with no penalty. Par ticipants were also debriefed at the end of the study and the 
masking procedure was fully explained.
Par ticipants were recruited through the English speaking University of Groningen 
par ticipant pool and given course credit for par ticipation. Par ticipants were required to 
have held a valid car drivers’ licence for at least one year. This resulted in 74 females and 
39 males being recruited for the study. However, one female repor ted feeling uncomfor table 
with the simulator during the practice drive and therefore did not progress in the study. In 
addition, two female, and six male par ticipants repor ted being explicitly aware of the target 
images and were also removed from the sample. Fur thermore, seven males and 12 females 
mentioned that they thought that perhaps there was an image being shown that they could 
not see even though they could not repor t what it was. In order to present results that are 
as conservative as possible in terms of the awareness of the target images, these par ticipants 
have also been excluded. 
This results in a f inal sample size of 85 par ticipants. The remaining 59 females were 
21.09 years old on average (SD 2.07) and had held their licence for an average of 3.19 years 
(SD 1.97). The remaining 26 males were 21.62 years old on average (SD 1.83) and had held 
their licence for an average of 3.44 years (SD 1.41).
6.2.2 Materials
6.2.2.1 Driving Simulator
The University of Groningen driving simulator was used in this study. It is a f ixed base simulator 
running on STSoftware software©. The simulator consists of three high def inition plasma 
screens, all set to a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The graphics engine of the simulator software 
itself runs at 60 frames per second, which was conf irmed via the FRAPS© software package. 
In total the simulator provided par ticipants with a 210-degree view of the road environment.
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The road environment resembled a simple rural road with a consistent gentle s-curve in 
order to create some steering demand during the task. During all drives, speed information 
was concealed through the use of a cardboard cut-out. This was to force par ticipants to 
rely on their own perception of speed rather than the speed provided by the speedometer. 
The simulated car was set to operate in automatic gear mode in order to minimise any 
movement related ar tefacts in the collection of the psychophysiological data.
6.2.2.2 Images
The images used during the task were taken from the International Affective Picture Set 
(IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthber t, 1999). The following images where used as negative 
target, neutral target, and masking images:
•	  Negative target images: IAPS numbers 3000, 3010, 3015, 3053, 3060, 3064, 3068, 3069, 
3080, 3102, 3110, 3120, 3150, 3400, 9410, 9433, 9901, 9910, 9911, 9920
•	  Neutral target images: IAPS numbers 5130, 6150, 7000, 7009, 7010, 7020, 7030, 7037, 7040, 
7050, 7060, 7080, 7090, 7190, 7217, 7234, 7235, 7500, 7700, 7705
•	  Masking images: IAPS numbers 7002, 7004, 7006, 7031, 7035, 7036, 7038, 7042, 7052, 7055, 
7056, 7057, 7059, 7100, 7150, 7175, 7224, 7233, 7491, 7950
The negative target images mostly consisted of mutilated and deceased humans along 
with some images of car accidents. According to the IAPS standardised scores, the negative 
images had valence ratings between 1.31 and 2.5 (mean 1.80), and arousal ratings between 
5.70 and 7.26 (mean 6.59). The neutral target images and masking images consisted mostly 
of household items such as mugs, bowls, and forks, along with some pictures of buildings. 
The neutral target images had valence ratings between 4.23 and 5.55 (mean 4.86), and 
arousal ratings between 2.17 and 3.84 (mean 2.78). 
The images used for masking (the masking images) had valance ratings between 4.45 
and 5.55 (mean 4.97), and arousal ratings between 1.72 and 4.02 (mean 2.76). It was these 
masking images that were used to forward and backwards mask the above neutral and 
negative target images during the trials. Variations of the masking images were also created 
for the reaction time task that had standard stop street signs placed in the centre of the 
images (see Figure 6.1). All of the images were stored in JPG format, with a resolution of 
256 x 192 pixels.
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Figure 6.1. An example of a masking image with the stop sign added.
6.2.2.3 Psychophysiological Measures
Par ticipants were asked to wash and dry their hands and Tin (Sn) electrodes with some saline 
paste where taped to the distal phalanxes of the index and third f inger of their left hand to 
measure skin conductance. This method of attachment is somewhat unusual but has been used 
successfully in the past and allows for good control of steering without creating interference 
in the skin conductance measures (Petit, Clarion, Ramon, & Collet, 2009). Par ticipants were 
also f itted with Polar© and Respitrace© belts in order to collect cardiovascular and respiration 
data. Prof iles of skin conductance and respiration information were created using the Brain 
Vision Analyzer© software package and mean skin conductance and respiration levels were 
calculated. Hear t rate was processed via the CARSPAN software package, with each f ile 
also being visually inspected for ar tefacts and manually corrected if necessary (Mulder, de 
Waard, & Brookhuis, 2005). Along with the collection of hear t rate, spectral analysis was 
also run in CARSPAN to calculate hear t rate variability in the high (0.15-0.40 Hz) and mid 
(0.07-0.14 Hz) frequency bands (Mulder, 1992). Finally Brain Vision Analyzer© was also used to 
calculate mean hear t rate, and mean hear t rate variability.
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Due to the variation in the moment the stop sign was shown, the psychophysiological 
data was shor tened to only account for the f irst 180 seconds of driving. Fur thermore, there 
is an immediate effect of beginning to drive on all the physiological measures, so the f irst 
30 seconds of data was also removed to eliminate any biasing effect that this may have caused. 
This left 150 seconds of data for use in later analysis. In addition, four males and 16 females 
had distor ted or missing psychophysiological data and had to be excluded from analyses, 
resulting in a sample size of 65 par ticipants for the analysis of the psychophysiological data. 
The par ticipants in this smaller sample did not signif icantly differ (p > 0.05) in gender, age, 
licence status, speed of driving or any of the subjective measures from the larger 85 person 
sample and, therefore, are assumed to have come from the same underlying population.
6.2.3 Procedure
Par ticipants f irst f illed out a demographic questionnaire to gather data on their age, gender, 
and driving experience. The experimental procedure was then described to them under the 
pretence of being a study about the effect of memory tasks on driving. Par ticipants were 
told that they were to drive at whatever speed they found comfor table but that while doing 
so they were to carry out a memory task. This memory task involved paying attention to 
constantly changing images that were presented in the upper centre of the screen (just under 
the rear view mirror as shown in Figure 6.2.) 
The par ticipants were told that they had to count the total number of times that the 
currently presented image was the same image that they had seen presented directly before. 
Par ticipants were able to do this, as there was a noticeable f lash when each image was 
presented which signalled that a new image had appeared. So, if the par ticipants saw a shoe, 
and then a shoe again, they would have to add one to the count of image couples that they 
had observed. However, if they saw a cup, then a chair, and then a cup they were to ignore 
that as none of the images were repeated directly after each other. They were told that 
they did not have to remember what the images were, only the total number of direct image 
repeats that they had seen during the drive, and that they would have to write this down 
at the end of the trial. Par ticipants were also told that at some point during the drive a stop 
sign would appear over top of the normal (masking) images and that when they saw this 
sign they were to stop counting repeats and bring the car to a full stop as quickly as possible. 
The images that the par ticipants were instructed to pay attention to were the masking 
images mentioned above, which were presented on the screen for 50 frames (800 ms). 
Unbeknownst to the par ticipants, in between each masking image a target image was 
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Figure 6.2. Screenshot of the simulator’s centre screen showing the road environment and an example masking 
image in the position in which the images were presented during the trials.
presented for 2 frames (32 ms). With the timing of the image presentation conf irmed through 
the use of a high speed digital camera over three, four-minute periods during the initial setup 
of the experiment. The target images shown were either negative or neutral in emotive 
content depending on the trial. The presentation of the images began once the par ticipants 
had driven 100 metres, and continued until the par ticipants brought the vehicle to a complete 
stop. After three minutes a random timer was star ted that triggered the presentation of the 
stop sign variant images to replace the masking images within 1–60 seconds. 
The masking and target emotive images were selected randomly every time they were 
presented and programmed to usually avoid directly repeating themselves so that the same 
image would not often be shown twice in a row. However, this was allowed to randomly 
occur on occasion, creating the supposed ‘memory task’ for the par ticipants when the masking 
images would repeat two times in a row. 
Par ticipants were asked to sit in the driving simulator and adjust the seat so that it was 
comfor table. They were then given a practice drive to get familiarised with the simulator and 
the memory task. During this practice task no data was recorded. The practice drive lasted 
3–4 minutes, depending on the timing of the stop sign and was identical to a neutral image 
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experimental trial. Also, at the star t of the practice drive the experimenter verbally pointed 
out the f irst directly repeating image to the par ticipant. This was done to make sure that the 
exact nature of the memory task was understood.
After the practice drive par ticipants were asked if they felt comfor table with the simulator 
and the memory task. At this point all par ticipants stated that they were comfor table and 
wished to continue. Then the par ticipants were asked to hold the steering wheel, but to 
otherwise sit still and quietly while baseline physiological measures were taken. These baseline 
measures were then collected for 3 minutes.
After the baseline data collection period par ticipants were asked to drive the road again 
twice, while carrying out the memory task. During these two drives data on travelling speed 
was collected at a rate of 10 Hz. Also the braking reaction time to the stop sign image 
was calculated as the time from when the f irst stop sign appeared until the par ticipant 
had depressed the brake pedal by more than 5 percent. One trial for each par ticipant 
involved the neutral target images and the other the negative target images. The order 
was counterbalanced across par ticipants, however, due to scheduling issues and loss of 
par ticipants due to the earlier mentioned incomplete data sets, the end result was that 
43 par ticipants (32 female, 11 male) drove with the negative target image trial f irst and then 
the neutral, and 42 (27 female, 15 male) with the neutral target image trial f irst and then 
the negative.
After each trial par ticipants were asked to f ill in a questionnaire containing the following 
open ended questions:
1. How many times during the drive did you see paired presentations of images?
2. On average, what speed (in km/h) do you think you drove at during the last trial?
3. On average, what speed (in km/h) would you typically drive while following the route 
you just saw?
Then par ticipants were also asked to provide a driving effor t rating for the trial they had 
just completed on the rating scale for mental effor t (RSME). The RSME is a unidimensional 
scale ranging from 0 to 150, with several unevenly placed anchor points along it going from 
‘absolutely no effor t’ at the bottom (a RSME score of 2) to ‘extreme effor t’ near the top 
(a RSME score of 112). A modif ied version of the RSME was also used to assess feeling of 
risk, with the effor t related anchors being replaced with the following risk related anchors; 
absolutely no risk, almost no risk, a little risk, some risk, rather much risk, considerable risk, 
140
6  DID YOU SEE THAT?
great risk, very great risk, and extreme risk. After the second trial the par ticipants were 
additionally asked the following two open ended questions which served as manipulation 
checks to make sure that the negative or neutral images had not been detected:
4. What was/were the difference(s), if any, that you noticed between the f irst and second 
roads you drove?
5. Did you notice any images during either drive that seemed out of place, unusual or 
par ticularly disturbing? If so, what were they?
Once par ticipants had completed the practice drive and both experimental trials, the 
psychophysiological recording equipment was removed and they were fully debriefed about 
the use of the hidden, neutral and negative images in the experiment. This included an 
additional verbal check to see if they had detected the negative or neutral images, and an 
oppor tunity for par ticipants to ask any questions that they may have had.
6.2.4 Analysis
Due to the variable nature of when the stop sign was displayed (1–60 seconds after the f irst 
3 minutes of driving) only the f irst 3 minutes (180 seconds) of driving were used for analysis 
of the effects of the images on speed of travel. This is in contrast to the 150 seconds of data 
used in the analysis of the psychophysiological measures mentioned in section 6.2.2.3 above.
The dependent measures analysed in this experiment were actual speed driven, stopping 
reaction time, the subjective ratings of speed, effor t and risk, performance on the memory 
task, and the psychophysiological measures of hear t rate, hear t rate variability, skin 
conductance and respiration. In addition, qualitative data on differences between the roads 
and on whether the par ticipants noted anything unusual were also examined.  
Using PASW SPSS 18.0.3 for Windows, individual full factorial repeated measures analyses 
were carried out to examine the effect of the independent variable of the target image 
type within the subjects (2 levels, emotionally negative or neutral target image). In addition, 
the between subjects factors of condition order (2 levels, neutral image presented f irst 
or negative image presented f irst) and gender were also examined. Possible interactions 
effects were examined and post-hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction were used where 
appropriate. The above analyses were run for both the total dataset and separately for the 
males and females.
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6.3 Results
6.3.1 Subjective ratings of speed, effort and feeling of risk
In general the par ticipants gave higher ratings for effor t than for feeling of risk, with average 
scores between 53.77 and 59.12, corresponding approximately with a level of ‘Rather much 
effor t” on the RSME. Whereas feeling of risk scores averaged between 30.50 and 34.93, 
placing them somewhere between ‘A little risk’ and ‘Some risk’ on the modif ied version of 
the scale. As shown on table 6.1 there was no signif icant main effect of the target image type 
(negative or neutral) on subjective ratings of speed, typical travel speed, effor t, or feeling of 
risk.
Table 6.1. Subjective ratings of speed, effor t, and feeling of risk by target image type, gender, and condition 
order for the combined dataset (N=85)
Negative then Neutral order Neutral then Negative order
Negative Neutral Neutral Negative
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Subjective Speed (km/h) 60.41 20.53 69.88 20.66 60.69 18.21 72.50 21.02
Typical Speed (km/h) 92.33 15.97 94.07 15.78 88.81 18.04 90.36 15.94
Effort 59.12 24.10 55.62 25.38 57.52 24.83 53.77 26.20
Feeling of risk 31.73 25.92 34.93 26.46 30.50 25.09 34.36 24.71
Statistical tests
Main effects Interaction effects
Image Gender Order Image * Order Image * Gender
Image 
*Order*Gender
F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2
Subjective Speed (km/h) 1.94 .17 .02 1.45 .23 .02 .18 .68 .00 42.87 <.001 .35 1.3 .26 .02 2.36 .13 .03
Typical Speed (km/h) .17 .68 .00 3.89 .052 .05 1.06 .31 .01 3.05 .09 .04 .70 .41 .01 .02 .88 .00
Effort .39 .54 .01 .38 .54 .01 .50 .48 .01 8.54 < .01 .10 2.26 .14 .03 1.4 .24 .02
Feeling of risk 1.43 .24 .02 2.05 .16 .03 .04 .84 .00 1.40 .24 .02 4.15 <.05 .05 4.16 < .05 .05
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There was however a signif icant interaction of target image type and condition order for 
the subjective ratings of travelling speed (F (1, 81) = 8.21, p < .001, η2 = .35) with the second 
trial generally resulting in higher average perceived speeds. In combination with this, trials 
where the negative target image condition was second resulted in larger increases in ratings 
of subjective travelling speed between the two drives. This indicates that the par ticipants 
perceived a speed increase between the f irst and second drive, but perceived it as being a 
greater increase if they had been exposed to the negative image in the second, rather than 
f irst, trial. 
A signif icant (F (1, 81) = 4.16, p < .05, η2 = .05) interaction of target image type, gender 
and order was also found for ratings of feeling of risk. This appears to have resulted from the 
males tending to give higher average ratings of feeling of risk for the negative target image 
than the females (40.72 or 41.70 on average for the males compared with 28.30 or 30.82 for 
the females). This also points to a different effect in terms of the order of image presentation, 
in that the males appear to decrease ratings of risk from the f irst to the second trial by 6.64 
points if the negative target images were presented f irst, and increase ratings of risk by 3.86 if 
the negative target images were presented second. Conversely the females always increased 
their ratings of feeling of risk from the f irst to the second drive, and did so more if the neutral 
target images were presented second (an increase of 6.59 versus an increase of 3.86 if the 
negative target images were second). 
There was also a signif icant (F(1,81) = 8.54, p < .01, η2 = .10) order and target image type 
interaction on ratings of effor t, with ratings of effor t generally decreasing in the second trial, 
but doing so more if the negative target images were second (a decrease of 3.75 compared 
with a decrease of 3.50 if the neutral target images were second). However if the male and 
female datasets are examined separately then this signif icant order and target image type 
interaction is only apparent in the male data (F (1, 24) = 6.19, p < .05, η2 = .21) and is different 
from the combined dataset. This is evident by the decreases in effor t ratings from the f irst to 
second drive which are still apparent in the male data set but are greater when the neutral 
target images were second (a decrease of 9.76 compared with a decrease of 3.10 when the 
negative target images were second). No signif icant main (F (1, 57) = .64, p = .43, η2 = .01) 
effects of the images or interaction effects (F(1, 57) = 2.48, p = .12, η2 = .04) with order on 
ratings of effor t were found for the female par ticipants However, the females did tend to 
also decrease effor t ratings from the f irst to the second trial, and did so somewhat less if 
the neutral images were second (a decrease of 1.35 compared with a decrease of 4.11 if the 
negative images were second), although again this effect was not signif icant.
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When data from the males and females was examined separately then a main effect of 
target image type (F (1, 24) = 4.56, p < .05, η2 = .0.16) was found on ratings of typical speed 
for the males (N = 26), which is not in the combined dataset. In addition, in the male dataset 
signif icant target image type and order interactions were found on typical speed (F (1, 24) 
= 7.45, p < .05, η2 = .24), subjective travelling speed (F (1,24) = 8.87, p < .01, η2 = .27), and 
effor t (F (1,24) = 6.19, p < .05, η2 = .21). Finally, in the male data there was no signif icant main 
effect (F (1, 24) = 2.81, p = .81, η2 = .11) nor any interaction effects with order (F (1,24) = .20, 
p = .66, η2 = .01) of target image type on feelings of risk. In the case of the above effects 
it seems that the males tended to repor t higher subjective travelling speeds in the second 
trial, although more so when the negative target images were second; with an increase of 
11.07 km/h on average compared with an increase of 3.64 km/h if the neutral target images 
were second. The impacts in terms of effor t are discussed above, with lower effor t being 
generally repor ted in the second trial, but more so if the neutral target image trial was second. 
The effects seen for typical speed seems to have arisen because the male par ticipants who 
received the neutral and then negative target image trial order, on average only increased 
their ratings of typical speed by 0.33 km/h between trials. Whereas those who experienced 
the neutral and then negative target image trial order increased their ratings by 2.73 km/h 
between the f irst and second trial. This result is unlikely to be meaningful. 
In terms of the results for the females (N = 59), they were similar to those of the total 
sample, with signif icant target image and order interactions for subjective travelling speed 
(F (1, 57) = 54.37, p <.001, η2 = .49) and feeling of risk (F (1,57) = 9.98, p < .01, η2 = .15). Again, 
it seems that for the females their perceptions of the subjective travelling speed increased 
from the f irst to the second drive with larger increases when the negative target images 
were presented second (12.22 km/h versus 11.48 km/h when the negative images were f irst). 
As described above, the effect on feeling of risk for the females was an increase between 
the f irst and second drive, with a larger increase if the neutral target image was second 
(6.59 versus 3.86 if the neutral target image was f irst). As mentioned above, no signif icant 
main or interaction effects of the target image type or order were found for ratings of effor t 
in the female dataset. As with the combined dataset, there were also no signif icant main 
(F (1, 57) = .11, p = 0.74, η2 = .74) or interaction (F (1, 57) = 2.16, p = .15, η2 = .04) effects of 
the target images on ratings of typical speed either.
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6.3.2 Stopping reaction time
There was no signif icant (F(1,81) = 2.98, p = .09, η2 = .04) main effect of target image type 
on stopping reaction time in reaction to the stop sign, with an average reaction time of 2.04 
(SD = 1.03) seconds for the negative target image trial and 1.87 (SD = .61) seconds for the 
neutral target image trial. There were also no signif icant interactions or main effect of order 
or gender (F (1,81) = .12 to 2.59, p > .11, η2 = .00 to .03).
6.3.3 Driving Speed
As shown in table 6.2 there was no main effect of target image type (F (1, 81) = 1.69, p = .20, 
η2 = .02) on average speed driven during the f irst 3 minutes of the experimental trials. 
There was, however, a signif icant main effect of gender (F (1, 81) = 8.21, p < .01, η2 = .09), 
with males tending to drive faster on average (114.61 km/h) than the females (96.47 km/h) 
across all trials.
Table 6.2. Average speed by target image type, gender and condition order for the combined dataset (N= 85)
Negative then Neutral order Neutral then Negative order
Negative Neutral Neutral Negative
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Speed (km/h) 98.65 31.16 105.72 29.68 99.10 24.34 102.53 27.39
Statistical tests
Main effects Interaction effects
Image Gender Order Image * Order Image * Gender
Image 
*Order*Gender
F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2
Speed (km/h) 1.69 .20 .02 8.21 <.01 .09 1.31 .25 .02 20.25 <.001 .20 .65 .42 .01 .48 .49 .01
There was also a signif icant interaction effect of target image type and condition order 
(F (1, 81) = 20.25, p < .001, η2 = .20). This means that speed during the second trial tended to 
be higher than during the f irst, but also that this effect did not appear to be as pronounced 
when the negative target images were presented to par ticipants second. Specif ically, when 
the negative target images were second there was an increase of only 3.43 km/h on average 
from the f irst to second trial compared with a 7.08 km/h increase in speed when the neutral 
target images were second.
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As shown in Figure 6.3, when the speed data for the males and females was examined 
separately there were quite different outcomes. In the case of the males (N = 26) it appears 
that there was no signif icant difference (F (1, 24) = .06, p = .81, η2 = .00) in the speed they 
drove when exposed to either the negative (113.29 km/h on average) or neutral target 
images (113.19 km/h on average). Neither was there a signif icant interaction of target image 
type and order (F (1, 24) = 3.62, p = .07, η2 =.13) for the males. Conversely, if only the females 
(N = 59) were examined, then a signif icant main effect of target image type was found 
(F (1, 57) = 4.51, p < .05, η2 = .07) along with a signif icant interaction of target image type and 
order (F (1, 57) = 27.33, p < .001, η2 = .32). Therefore, in the case of the females, it seems that 
on average, the trials with the negative images resulted in lower driving speed (94.96 km/h 
on average) than trials with the neutral images (97.72 km/h on average). Fur thermore, as 
with the total sample, it appears that females tended to increase their speed from the f irst to 
second drive, but did so to a lesser extent if the negative target image trial was experienced 
second. In the females, this resulted in an increase of 7.91 km/h when the neutral target 
images were second, compared with an increase of 3.34 km/h when the negative images 
were second. As shown in Figure 6.3, the speed difference between the negative and neutral 
target image conditions in the females began to become apparent after less than 10 seconds 
of driving, and is pretty much established by 20–30 seconds into the drive and then remains 
relatively constant. When looking at Figure 6.3, this same initial speed pattern does seem 
to appear for the males, but quickly disappears, with some later average speeds for the 
negative target image trial exceeding those of the neutral target image trials. This is not 
statistically signif icant however.
6.3.4 Heart rate, heart rate variability, respiration and skin conductance response
All recorded psychophysiological measures were compared between the two target image 
trials, but also to the baseline measurement as a third variable. Fur thermore, as with the above 
analyses, condition order and gender were included as between subject factors. It should be 
noted that, as explained in section 2.2.3, the analysis of the psychophysiological data was 
carried out on only 150 seconds of data and with a smaller sample size of 65 par ticipants.
Signif icant (F (2, 60) = 19.16 to 50.02, p < .001, η2 = .39 to .63) main effects were found 
on average hear t rate, as well as mid and high band hear t rate variability. However post 
hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed this was only due to signif icant differences 
between the baseline measurement and the measurements collected during the target image 
trials (p < .001). This means that no signif icant differences in these measurements between 
the target image trials was found (p = 1.00).
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Figure 6.3. Average speed across the f irst 3 minutes of driving for the negative and neutral target image trials 
for the whole sample (N = 85), as well as for the males (N = 26) and females (N = 59) separately.
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There was also a signif icant (F (2, 60) = 5.85, p < .01, η2 = .09) main effect of gender on mid 
band hear t rate variability, with males having a higher variability than females on average. 
However, there were no interactions of the target image type with gender (F (2, 60) = .07, p 
= .92, η2 = .00) or condition order (F (2, 60) = .35, p = .71, η2 = .01) for mid band hear t rate 
variability.
A signif icant (F (2, 60) = 5.12, p < .01, η2 = .15) main effect of target image type on skin 
conductance was found with the experimental trials seeming to produce a higher average 
skin conductance response than the baseline. However, subsequent post hoc tests with a 
Bonferroni correction only found a signif icant difference between the baseline measurement 
and the negative target image trial (p < .05) but no signif icant difference between the 
baseline measurements and the neutral target image trial (p = .07) nor between the target 
image trials themselves (p = 1.00). No signif icant effects for any of the variables or conditions 
were found for the respiration measurements.
There were also signif icant interaction effects between image type and condition order for 
average hear t rate (F (2, 60) = 42.14, p < .001, η2 = .58) and high band hear t rate variability 
(F (2, 60) = 5.02, p < .01, η2 = .14). The average hear t rate decreased and the average high 
band hear t rate variability tended to increase in the second trial. As can be seen in table 6.3, 
the average decrease in hear t rate was smaller between the f irst and second trials when 
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the negative target image trial was second (a decrease of 6.39 beats per minute versus 6.82 
when the neutral target image trial was second), and the average increase in high band 
hear t rate variability was higher in these conditions (an increase of 0.34 versus 0.31 when the 
neutral target image trial was second).
Table 6.3. Average hear t rate, hear t rate variability, skin conductance response and respiration amplitude by 
target image type, gender and condition order for the combined dataset (N = 65)
Negative then Neutral order Neutral then Negative order
Baseline Negative Neutral Baseline Neutral Negative
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
HR (bpm) 79.92 11.39 90.05 11.15 83.22 10.35 79.38 12.80 89.27 11.43 82.89 12.05
Mid HRV (mi2) 6.94 .87 6.22 .89 6.27 1.20 7.48 1.18 6.51 1.00 6.60 1.05
High HRV (mi2) 7.32 .92 6.36 .80 6.66 .90 7.78 1.24 6.64 1.00 6.98 1.11
SCR (Ω) .16 .29 .23 .28 .16 .35 .07 .08 .23 .32 .19 .18
Respiration amplitude 1.04 .70 .72 .52 .75 .62 1.89 4.81 1.03 1.39 .87 1.45
Statistical tests
Main effects Interaction effects
Image Gender Order Image * Order Image * Gender
Image 
*Order*Gender
F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2
HR (bpm) 44.19 < .001 .60 .06 .82 .00 .06 .81 .00 42.14 < .001 .58 .05 .95 .00 .16 .86 .01
Mid HRV (mi2) 19.16 < .001 .39 5.85 < .01 .09 3.64 .06 .06 .35 .71 .01 .07 .92 .00 .39 .70 .01
High HRV (mi2) 50.02 < .001 .63 1.13 .29 .02 1.63 .21 .03 5.02 < .01 .14 .26 .78 .01 .03 .97 .00
SCR (Ω) 5.12 < .01 .15 .57 .45 .01 .01 .92 .00 2.43 .10 .08 .70 .50 .02 1.64 .20 .05
Respiration amplitude 1.49 .23 .05 0.86 .36 .01 .96 .33 .02 .34 .72 .01 .05 .95 .00 .42 .66 .01
When the male (N = 22) and female (N = 43) par ticipants were examined separately 
then similar results to those mentioned above were found, with two exceptions. The f irst was 
a signif icant (p < .05) difference for the males between their average baseline respiration 
measure and the average respiration measure during the negative target image trial. 
There was, however, no signif icant difference in respiration for the males between the baseline 
measures and the measures during the neutral target image trial (p = .20), nor any signif icant 
difference between the average respiration in the neutral and negative image trials (p = .69). 
The second difference is that for the females there was no main effect of condition (baseline, 
negative, or neutral target image) on skin conductance response at all (F (2, 40) = 2.47, 
p = .10, η2 = .11).
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6.3.5 Memory task accuracy
While the memory task was simply an excuse to have images presented on the screen, it is 
wor th noting that there was no signif icant effect of the type of target image (negative or 
neutral) on the number of pairs repor ted. Rather the par ticipants performed this task well 
in both conditions with an average repor ted number of image pairs of 11.67 (SD = 3.15) 
during the negative target image trials and 11.49 (SD = 3.81) during the neutral target image 
trials. The actual number of image pairs was 12.06 (SD = 2.84) and 11.33 (SD = 2.79) for 
the negative and neutral target image trials respectively. This indicates that the ‘memory 
task’ was equally demanding during both conditions, and that the par ticipants were paying 
attention to the images. If the male and female par ticipants are examined separately then 
their performance on this task and the average number of images presented to them is 
similar to the combined dataset.  
6.3.6 Reported differences between the roads
At the end of the experiment par ticipants were asked ‘What was/were the difference(s), if 
any, that you noticed between the f irst and second roads you drove?’ This question, along 
with a question about the images, was primarily to check if the par ticipants had seen any of 
the target images (as the road did not differ between the two drives). However, only 43.53% 
(11 male, 26 female) of the par ticipants correctly repor ted that there was no difference 
between the roads. A fur ther 38.82% (9 male, 24 female) repor ted that something about 
the construction of the road had differed. Out of these people, 19 (7 male, 12 female) stated 
that either the road in the negative image trial was more curvy (12; 4 male, 8 female) or 
that the road in the neutral image trial was less curvy (6; 3 male, 3 female) or, in the case of 
one female, that the roadside trees were fur ther away during the neutral trial. Conversely, 
14 par ticipants (2 males, 12 females) said that either the road in the neutral image trial 
was more curvy (9; 1 male, 9 females) or had more hills (1 female), or that the road in the 
negative image trial was less curvy (4; 1 male, 3 females). In nearly all of the cases (18; 5 male, 
13 female), if a road was labelled as more curvy it was the road that was driven second. 
Therefore, it is likely that this impression of more or sharper curves was created by the fact 
that par ticipants tended to drive faster during the second drive. In answer to this question, 
a fur ther 9 (3 male, 6 female) par ticipants commented that they had detected more image 
pairs during the ‘memory task’, or that the images were placed in a different position on the 
second drive (1 female). Of the remaining 4 par ticipants, 2 did not answer this question and 
the other 2 just mentioned being more used to the road on the second drive.
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6.4 Discussion
According to many models of driver behaviour (Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, 2011; 
Kinnear, 2009; Ljung Aust & Engström, 2011; Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007; Vaa, 2003; 
Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) our feelings and emotions play impor tant functional roles in guiding 
driver behaviour. What is more, it is claimed that this can occur even when emotions aren’t 
necessarily felt or explicitly considered as par t of the decision making process. The present 
study set out to investigate the impact of these implicit or unconscious emotions on driving 
behaviour. As such, masked images were used in an attempt to provoke an emotional 
response in drivers in a simulator under the guise of performing a memory task.
The primary behavioural variable examined was driving speed and if the total dataset 
of males and females is examined then there was no signif icant main effect of the target 
image type on driven speed. However, there was a signif icant interaction effect of type of 
target image, negative or neutral, and the order in which the images were presented to the 
par ticipants. This showed that there was a general tendency for par ticipants to drive faster on 
the second trial, most likely due to familiarity and learning effects. However, this general effect 
also interacted with the type of target image being used, with the increase in speed being 
smaller if the second trial contained the negative target images (an increase of 3.43 km/h on 
average) than if the neutral target images were presented second (an increase of 7.08 km/h). 
This suggests that the negative target image could have had a suppressing effect on speed in 
terms of reducing the normal increase associated with familiarity or learning effects.
Gender also played a role in this effect. When the male and female datasets were examined 
independently then was no effect, interaction or otherwise, of the target images on the 
males’ speeds. However, for the females there was the above interaction effect mentioned 
for the combined dataset, and also a fur ther signif icant main effect of image type on driving 
speed. This resulted in signif icantly lower average speed overall, for the female drivers, during 
the negative target image trials (94.96 km/h) than during the neutral target image trials 
(97.72 km/h). This gender difference is apparent in the statistics and also easy to see from the 
graph of speed over time shown in Figure 6.3 and suggests that most, if not all, of the effects 
seen in terms of actual driven speed in the larger combined dataset are due to the reactions 
of female par ticipants. 
The difference between the male and female par ticipants could be explained in several 
ways. Firstly, it is possible that the negative target images were more emotionally impactful 
for the female par ticipants than the males. Cer tainly, there is a difference in both valence 
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and arousal ratings by gender for many images in IAPS (Lang et al., 1999), and specif ically, 
if the negative target images used in this experiment are examined, then the female IAPS 
ratings are lower in valence (1.52 on average) and higher in arousal (6.98 on average) than 
the average provided by the male IAPS ratings (2.16 valance, 6.15 arousal on average). An 
increased reactivity to negative emotional images in females is also suppor ted by studies 
repor ting greater neurological (Lithari et al., 2010; Williams & Gordon, 2007) and autonomic 
reactions (Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001; Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2007) to 
explicitly presented negatively emotional images in females. This is especially so if the negative 
images contained humans (Proverbio, Zani, & Adorni, 2008) as many of the images used in 
the current experiment did. It is entirely possible, therefore, that the increased emotional 
reaction to consciously or explicitly processed stimuli in females may also hold for stimuli 
that have been implicitly or preconsciously processed. If this is so fur ther studies should use 
different image sets depending on the gender of the par ticipant. 
Another possible explanation for the gender difference is that, given the effect sizes 
observed, that there may not have been enough males to detect any consistent effect of 
the images on behaviour. This study did set out to recruit a large number of both male and 
female par ticipants to take par t, however, we did not succeed in the case of the male subjects.
Interestingly, at least in the case of the females, the effect of the negative target image on 
driving speed seems to be mainly on the initial setting of the speed, which is then generally 
maintained throughout the drive (see Figure 6.3). This pattern of a slower average driving 
speed for the negative image occurring near the star t of the drive does also seem to appear 
brief ly for the males, but then disappears quickly as the drive continues. The fact that the 
effect on driving speed occurs so quickly could be taken as suppor t for the asser tions of 
various models (Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, 2011; Kinnear, 2009; Ljung Aust & 
Engström, 2011; Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 1988; Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007; 
Taylor, 1964; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) that driver behaviour is inf luenced by a tendency 
to return to or maintain some kind of homeostatic body balance or preferred safety margin. 
Unfor tunately, it cannot throw light onto the differences between these models in terms of 
suggesting whether this body balance is itself constantly monitored and a set level targeted 
(Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, 2011; Kinnear, 2009; Taylor, 1964; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; 
Vaa, 2011) or if it is arrived at through an aversion to signals that arise because of a unbalance 
in this body state (Fuller, 1984; Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 1997; Summala, 2005; 
Summala, 2007). 
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Moving away from speed to the recorded psychophysiology, there is a signif icant 
target image type and order interaction effect in both hear t rate and high band hear t 
rate variability that is potentially interesting. This interaction effect is found in the combined 
dataset, in the males and, most impor tantly in light of the above speed effects, in the female 
dataset. The interaction indicates decreases in hear t rate and increases in high band hear t 
rate variability between the f irst and second drive. This is consistent with a familiarity or 
relaxation effect with the second drive becoming less stressful or effor tful for the par ticipants. 
Interestingly, however, the decrease in hear t rate and increase in high band variability was 
lessoned if the negative target images were second. This, when combined with the above 
speed data where the increase in speed was also less when the negative images were 
second, is suggestive of a physiological effect of the negative target images. Specif ically, it 
appears that the usual familiarity effect in terms of increasing speed, but also in terms of 
decreased physiological load for the second trial, was lessened if the negative images were 
presented second. That this effect is seen in the cardiovascular measures but not in skin 
conductance, which does not seem to meaningfully differ between the trials, or in the case of 
the female par ticipants even between the baseline and the driving task, is interesting. While 
both cardiovascular and skin conductance measures are sensitive to changes in emotional 
arousal, hear t rate and high band hear t rate variability are generally considered to be more 
ref lective of changes in mental workload or effor t (Mulder & Mulder, 1981; Mulder, 1992). 
This may imply that the negative target images used are actually impacting on the mental 
workload or effor t required by the task rather than creating feelings or emotions of risk, and 
it is the physiological reaction to this increase in effor t that leads to the reduction in driving 
speed. If so this would be more in line with predictions made by models such as the multiple 
comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) or Task Diff iculty homeostasis (Fuller, 
2005; Fuller et al., 2008) which claim that emotions and feelings associated with the diff iculty 
or effor t required in the driving task are more common guides of driver behaviour than 
emotions related to risk.. 
Care should be taken with this interpretation however. Another way to interpret the lack 
of an impact on skin conductance response would be to say that because the par ticipants 
(at least the females) drove, on average, slower when inf luenced by the negative image, 
they were bringing their body state back into its normal range. This process of returning to a 
normal, comfor table, or set body state may occur quite quickly during the f irst few seconds of 
driving, and therefore, may not show up in the averaged psychophysiological data presented 
here; especially since the f irst 30 seconds of psychophysiological data had to be excluded 
from analysis. This data was excluded because there was an immediate large impact of 
beginning to drive and star ting to perform the memory task, on the cardiovascular and skin 
conductance measures. The above mentioned physiological consistency or homeostasis is 
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what would be predicted by models of driver behaviour such as RAT (Fuller, 2011) or RMM 
(Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) which more closely embrace the work of Taylor (1964). 
Therefore, as already mentioned it is diff icult to use this data to distinguish between the 
competing models in traff ic psychology.
A related explanation for the lack of a meaningful response to the target images in skin 
conductance could be due to ceiling effects related to performing the driving task. Previous 
studies which have shown an effect of masked images on psychophysiology have tended to 
involve simple experimental tasks carried out in a standard lab environment (Kimura et al., 
2004; Öhman & Soares, 1994; Öhman & Soares, 1998). This relatively simple task environment 
means that any physiological impact will be easier to detect. Fur thermore, the physiological 
impacts of the masked images repor ted in these previous studies are often relatively small. 
On the other hand, simply driving has a large impact on psychophysiological measures, even 
with the simple road design used in this study (de Waard, 1996). This driving task related 
impact may therefore have masked the detection of any physiological effect of the emotional 
images. This, however, does make it even more signif icant that the order effect on hear t rate 
and high band hear t rate variability discussed above was found.
It was also thought that the negative image may have primed the par ticipants to be 
aware of any possible threats and made them ready for action, resulting in a faster reaction 
time in response to an image of a stop sign being presented on the screen. However, no such 
effect was found in the combined, male, or female datasets. This could again be explained 
through the above mentioned return to a normal body state at the star t of the drive. If 
par ticipants had indeed quickly eliminated or balanced out the effect of the negative image 
on their body state by lowering their speed, then the negative image would possibly have 
no fur ther impact, and could not help in raising their aler tness to the onset of the stop 
sign. Another explanation could be that the stop sign in itself, while a road safety related 
stimulus, is not threatening enough when it occurs in an open road situation with no other 
traff ic. Therefore, perhaps future experiments investigating the inf luence of masked negative 
images on threat detection could use a more relevant stimulus such as a car unexpectedly 
pulling out from a parking spot. 
There was also a signif icant interaction effect of target image and order on par ticipants’ 
perceived speed in the combined, male, and female datasets. This ref lects that actual travel 
speeds increased between the two trials. However, in this case the perceived increase in 
speed was larger if the negative images were presented during the second trial (a perceived 
average increase of 11.8 km/h compared to 9.48 km/h if the neutral target image was 
second). At least for the female par ticipants, this is the reverse of the effect on actual driven 
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speed, with the speed increase in this case being smaller when the negative target images 
were presented second. This could be interpreted as exposure to the negative target images 
creating an impression of faster driving speeds and therefore inf luencing the speed actually 
driven. However, it is clear from the data that this difference in speed perception, while 
present in the female par ticipants, is mostly contributed to by the male par ticipants who 
did not seem to be signif icantly affected by the target images in terms of their actual driving 
speed.
The results for the subjective ratings of feeling of risk and effor t are somewhat diff icult to 
interpret for the combined dataset. In the case of ratings of risk, there is not only a signif icant 
interaction of target image type and order, but also a signif icant interaction with gender. 
This means that in the case of the male par ticipants, they decreased their ratings of feeling of 
risk from the f irst to second trial if the negative target images were presented f irst (a decrease 
of 6.64 on average), but increased their ratings if the negative target images were second (an 
increase of 3.86 on average). However, if the male dataset is analysed separately, there are 
no signif icant target image or order effects or interaction on ratings of feeling of risk, which 
makes it diff icult to draw any conclusions from this f inding. Conversely, if only the female 
par ticipants are examined, there is a signif icant target image type and order effect with a 
tendency to increase ratings of risk between the f irst and second drives, with larger increases 
occurring if the neutral target images were second (an average increase of 6.59 compared 
with an increase of 3.86 if the negative target images were second). This again is diff icult to 
explain, but perhaps could be related to the par ticipants’, correct, perception that speeds 
were increasing from the f irst trial to the second. It is, therefore, possible that par ticipants 
rationalised that since they were driving faster, then the risk must also be greater. Although 
why this effect occurs signif icantly more in the presence of the neutral image for the females 
is not clear. However, it does at least in the case of the female par ticipants, suggest that the 
emotionally negative images were not having any signif icant increasing effect on the female 
par ticipants’ feelings of risk. 
The situation in the case of ratings of effor t differs from that for ratings of feeling of risk. 
In the combined dataset there is a signif icant order and target image type interaction, with 
ratings of effor t generally decreasing between the f irst and second trials, and this effect 
seems to be larger if the negative target images were second (a decrease of 3.75 compared 
with a decrease of 3.50 if the neutral target images were second). However, if the male and 
female datasets are examined separately it appears the majority of this effect comes from 
the male par ticipants, who in contrast to the combined dataset and the female par ticipants, 
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decrease their ratings of effor t more if the neutral target images were second. In the case of 
the female par ticipants, their data appears similar to that for the combined dataset, although 
there were no signif icant main effects or interactions. 
The above f indings for ratings of effor t are par ticularly interesting in light of the previously 
discussed impacts of the target images on perceived speed, actual speed driven and on the 
psychophysiological measures of hear t rate and high hear t rate variability. In this case, the 
target image type and order interaction effect observed in the other variables is reversed in 
the combined dataset for ratings of effor t, or in the case of the females is non-signif icant. This, 
when combined with no consistent effect on ratings of subjective feelings of risk, does seem 
to suggest that the par ticipants’ subjective feelings were not altered by the images, despite 
producing the observed effects on speed, perceived speed and psychophysiology. 
Finally, when asked about the differences between the roads they had driven, only 43.53% 
of the par ticipants correctly identif ied that the roads had not differed. If the remaining 
par ticipants are examined, then 38.82% repor ted something had changed about how the 
road was constructed. Typically, par ticipants mentioned that the second road they drove had 
more curves. The rest of the par ticipants either commented on the memory task, suggesting 
that they had seen more pairs on one of the trials, or did not answer this question. That some 
par ticipants did repor t a difference in the road is likely due to the demand characteristics of 
being in an experiment and being asked if there were differences. Having been asked, they 
perhaps felt pressured to say that there were. It is interesting, however, that this resulted 
in the second drive being generally attributed the characteristic of being more curvy, and 
this is likely to do with the fact that the second road tended to be driven at a higher speed. 
A similar f inding was made by Lewis-Evans and Charlton (2006) where drivers ascribed risky 
characteristics such as heavier traff ic, missing road marking and more curves to a simulated 
road that had been narrowed by 2 meters but was otherwise identical to other roads they 
had driven.
Apar t from the points already made above, there are several other potential issues that 
can be raised with this study. One obvious issue is the question of whether the par ticipants 
really were unaware of the images. As mentioned in the introduction, this is a controversial 
issue (Pessoa, 2005; Robinson, 1998; Siegel & Weinberger, 2009), and therefore care has 
been taken to ensure that, at the very least, our par ticipants could not explicitly repor t 
having seen the images. As such, during the setup of the experiment, the timing of the image 
presentation in the simulator was conf irmed over three separate four minute periods using 
a high speed camera. Also, a manipulation check question was included, asking par ticipants 
if they had noticed anything unusual about the images and they were also debriefed after 
155
6  DID YOU SEE THAT?
the experiment and asked if they had seen any of the images. Based on this manipulation 
check, two females and six males who explicitly repor ted seeing the images were removed 
from the study, and data from an additional seven males and 12 females were removed on 
the grounds that they mentioned that maybe they saw something in between the masking 
images. These last 19 par ticipants generally made statements along the lines of ‘perhaps 
there was an image between the ones I saw, but I could not tell you what’ or ‘I think I saw 
f lashes of colour’. The removal of these par ticipants means that the remaining data is only 
from par ticipants that explicitly stated that they did not see anything unusual with the images, 
and did not at any time during the experiment, including during the debrief, mention explicit 
awareness of the target images nor any suspicion that a masking procedure was occurring. 
As such, we are relatively conf ident that the par ticipants were not explicitly aware of the 
target images. Future studies may, however, want to consider using a forced recognition 
task for each subject as par t of the experiment in order to conf irm that par ticipants were 
completely unable to consciously perceive the target images.
A greater propor tion of males (15.38%) explicitly saw the target images compared to 
the female par ticipants (2.78%) although a similar propor tion of males (17.95%) and females 
(16.67%) were in the group that was removed for suspecting that masking was occurring. 
This gender difference could be related to the generally better visuospatial abilities typically 
attributed to males (Halpern, 2000; Kimura, 2000). Also, anecdotally, most males who 
explicitly saw the images, also repor ted during the debrief ing period that they considered 
themselves to be gamers. Since video games are also suggested to improve visual attention 
(Feng, Spence, & Pratt, 2007; Green & Bavelier, 2003; Huber t-Wallander, Green, & Bavelier, 
2010; Subrahmanyam & Greenf ield, 1994), par ticularly for fast moving or rapid stimuli, this 
may also be a contributing factor in noticing masked images. 
Another issue is with the order effect that was encountered. The general tendency 
for par ticipants to increase their speed from the f irst to second trial is not uncommon in 
simulator research (Schaap, Van Arem, & Van der Horst, 2008), but could still be of concern. 
On one hand, this may have been because the practice time given to the par ticipants was not 
suff icient for them to become comfor table with the memory task and simulator. However, as 
repor ted in section 6.2.3, par ticipants were asked if they felt comfor table with the memory 
task and the simulator after the practice drive and offered the option of repeating the task if 
they felt it was necessary. None took this oppor tunity. Never theless, this could be addressed 
in future studies through the provision of a longer practice period. It is also worth noting that 
the order effects found were always in interaction with the target image variable, and that 
there were no main effects of the trial order alone on any of the variables.
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In addition to a longer practice period, longer experimental driving trials could also be 
investigated. These could, perhaps, include changes from emotionally neutral to emotionally 
negative image targets occurring on several occasions during the drive itself. This would also 
allow for the psychophysiological data to be collected for longer periods, and reduce the problem 
of having to remove the initial increase in these variables caused by simply starting to drive. All this 
said, at least in the case of the female participants, the effect of the negative target images on 
speed behaviour appears to occur within the f irst 20 seconds or so after the images have been 
presented and then maintained overtime. Therefore, the time periods used in this experiment do 
appear suff icient to catch at least this critical moment in terms of the impact of the target images 
on driving speed. 
Another potential issue is the high level of variability in the speed data. This was likely caused 
by the fact that participants were denied the use of a speedometer and told to drive at whatever 
speed they were most comfortable at, resulting in large between subjects differences in speed. 
However, due to the nature of the within-subjects repeated measures analyses used in this study, 
the large variability between the subjects should not have had a negative impact on the results. 
The fact that the participants were denied the use of the speedometer could also challenge 
the validity of this experiment. The speedometer was removed in an attempt to force participants 
to rely on their own perception of speed, and, therefore, hopefully encourage them to use the 
automatic or implicit control processes that are most likely to be affected by the masked target 
images. Furthermore, it allowed for the question about participants perceived speed of travel to be 
asked. Still, the lack of a speedometer is not a common occurrence in everyday driving. However, 
evidence from studies of drivers’ gaze patterns show that they typically devote very little time, as 
low as 0.6% of total gaze time during a drive, glancing at their speedometers (Harbluk et al., 2007). 
This indicates that most of the time, drivers on the road, are relying on their own perception of 
speed, not information from the speedometer, much like they had to in this experiment.
The type of target images used could also be questioned, especially in terms of the negative 
target images. In the case of this study the images were selected as being some of the lowest 
valence and highest arousal negative images in IAPS, along with four motor vehicle accident 
related images. This means that the majority of the negative target images were of mutilated 
and deceased humans, removed from the typical driving context. These IAPS images were 
used as they were of a known quality, taken from an internationally recognised sample and had 
been previously used in masking studies (Hirschberger et al., 2010; Kimura et al., 2004). As such, 
this experiment should be taken as a proof of concept. Future studies could perhaps use more 
driving relevant stimuli, such as risky traff ic situations or images related to the presence of police 
enforcement.
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The validity of the “memory task” that the participants were performing, in terms of normal 
driving, could also be challenged. It is indeed a somewhat unusual task to be paying attention to 
an additional visual element and trying to detect repeated patterns in it while driving. However, 
driving is a visual task and often does require that visual attention be split, and that changes or 
the lack of change in the visual environment be detected and remembered. For example, it may 
be important to recognise landmarks and know if you have seen them before, when trying to 
navigate from A to B. Also, given that the same task was required of all participants and seems 
to have been consistently well performed, it is unlikely that it impacted on the results of the 
experiment in any meaningful way.
6.5 Conclusions
It appears that the masked negative target images did have an impact on at least the 
female par ticipants in this experiment. This seems to primarily have occurred via suppression 
or a lessening of the normal familiarity effect between the f irst and second experimental 
drives when the negative target image was shown in the second drive. The data from 
the psychophysiology measures in terms of hear t rate and high band hear t rate variability 
suppor t this interpretation and when coupled with the lack of any meaningful effect on 
subjective ratings of effor t or risk suggests that the impact of the negative target images 
was not explicit. Interestingly, there does seem to be one clear subjective effect, with the 
par ticipants perceiving the second drive as faster in general, but more so when the negative 
target image was second. This also, therefore, suggests an impact of the negative target 
image on speed judgement, although care should be taken with this interpretation as the 
majority of this effect seems to be amongst the male, rather than the female, par ticipants. 
The explanations given above for the results of this study could be labelled as speculative. 
However, this study does represent the f irst attempt to use masked images as par t of a 
driving task, which in itself is noteworthy. We are unaware of any other studies examining 
the effect of masked images on a behaviour as complex as driving, which just by itself can 
have a large impact on psychophysiology (de Waard, 1996). Therefore, the very fact that 
any effect in behaviour was found, despite the usually somewhat small changes in physiology 
in reaction to masked images repor ted by other studies (Kimura et al., 2004; Whalen et al., 
1998; Öhman & Soares, 1998) is signif icant. That the masked images can produce an effect 
on such an important variable for road safety as speed, suggests that the inf luence of implicit 
or unconscious emotions on driver behaviour should be fur ther studied. With this in mind, 
the results of this study are an interesting star ting point and could hopefully be used to help 
to guide future research.
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION
Some par ts of this chapter will be published as Lewis-Evans, B., de Waard, D., and Brookhuis, 
K.A. Contemporary theories of behavioural adaptation. In Jamson, S. and Rudin-Brown, C. 
(Eds) Behavioural adaptation: Theory, Evidence and Action. To be released in 2012.
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As stated throughout this thesis, traff ic psychology does not have any one unifying model or 
theory of driver behaviour. This could potentially reduce the impact and adoption of traff ic 
safety interventions due to mixed messages and conf licting paradigms. However, a point 
that has not yet been made is that this is not a problem that is limited to Traff ic Psychology. 
Rather, psychology as a wider science also lacks any unifying model or theory of human 
behaviour and is broken into many competing and even contradictory schools of thought. 
Since driving is ultimately just another form of human behaviour it is, therefore, no surprise 
that the lack of consensus in psychology as a whole is also ref lected in traff ic psychology. 
However, within traff ic psychology specif ically, one of the primary reasons given for the 
lack of consensus is that models of driver behaviour tend to lack testability and that even 
where testable models exist, the testing of them has not been common (Michon, 1985; Michon, 
1989; Ranney, 1994; Rothengatter, 2002). As such, the studies presented in this thesis were 
attempts to, at least a small way, explore this issue. This was primarily carried out by taking 
four models: TDH (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, 
McHugh et al., 2008), RAT (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011), RMM (Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 
2007; Vaa, 2011), and the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007), and 
testing some of their assumptions. 
These four models were selected because they all claim to be different from the models 
that preceded them in that they are clear about the pathways through which they function 
and, therefore, they produce testable hypotheses. Indeed, one distinction that seems to 
separate these theories is whether they suggest that a subjective variable, such as feeling of 
risk, is continuously felt, targeted and impacts on driver behaviour, or if such variables only 
affect driver behaviour when cer tain thresholds are crossed. In par ticular, the TDH (Fuller 
& Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008), RAT 
(Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011), RMM (Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) all take 
the f irst approach, with only the comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) 
advocating the second. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 were all aimed primarily at addressing this 
distinction and all seem to favour a threshold account for these variables. Chapter 6, on the 
other hand, addressed the issue of the inf luence of emotions, as unconscious body states, on 
driving behaviour. The main f indings of each of the chapters are discussed below. 
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7.1 Chapter 3 That is fast enough
The study described in this chapter is a variant of an earlier study by Fuller, McHugh and 
Pender (2008) (see section 2.1.3.3 in chapter 2 and section 3.1 in chapter 3 for detailed 
descriptions of this study). In this variant par ticipants were asked to provide ratings for two 
different roads which they drove, or observed being driven, at nine different f ixed speeds in 
a driving simulator. The different speeds were presented to the par ticipants in random order 
and after each drive par ticipants had to provide ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, effor t, 
comfor t, how typical the speed driven was, and the crash risk for themselves and a theoretical 
identical other. This differed from the original experiment in that par ticipants were actively 
driving, that more subjective measures were collected and that the speeds in the original 
study had been presented in increasing order (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). 
Rather than the systematically increasing trend in ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of 
risk which was repor ted in previous studies (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008), 
in this study a threshold effect was seen, where par ticipant’s ratings of task diff iculty and 
feeling of risk star ted low, or were absent, and stayed relatively stable until a cer tain speed 
was reached, and only then did these ratings begin to systematically increase. This occurred 
at around 50 km/h for the residential road and around 110 km/h for the dual carriageway. 
That there was no correlation between speed and ratings of risk and task diff iculty all the 
way up to 50 or 110km/h is a f inding that seems to be in sharp contrast to the claim made by 
some suppor ters of TDH that “…feelings of risk have been shown to be strongly correlated 
with speed, other than for relatively low speeds“(Broughton et al., 2009, pg 421). 
Similar threshold type trends were also found for ratings of comfor t and effor t, although 
in some cases these took on more of a U-shape. Ratings of how typical the speed driven was 
produced quite a strong U-shape, with ratings closer to the threshold point being rated as 
more typical and those fur ther away as less typical. Fur thermore threshold relationships were 
found for par ticipants ratings of crash risk. This is in line with the f indings of the earlier Fuller, 
McHugh et al. (2008) study. Although, it is wor th noting that when asked to provide crash 
risk ratings for a hypothetical, identical, other driver, the par ticipants rated the other driver 
as more likely to crash than themselves. This likely explains the differences in the variable of 
crash risk between two previous studies in this area, the f irst of which asked about personal 
crash risk (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008), and the second about the crash risk of a hypothetical, 
identical, other driver (Kinnear et al., 2008).
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One other similarity between previous studies (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008) 
and the study reported in chapter 3 was found. This was a relatively high correlation between 
ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and effort. This is unsurprising as from a naturalistic 
standpoint, task diff iculty, effort, and risk are all tightly connected. Indeed, the diff iculty of a task 
is part of its risk as diff iculty essentially indicates the chance of failure. However, as mentioned 
in section 2.1.4 of chapter 2 it is possible that this high correlation between these variables may 
be an artifact brought on by analytical thought prompted by simply asking for ratings from the 
participants (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007). In other words, it is possible that simply asking 
for ratings may have provoked the participants to analyze and introspect in a way that does 
not necessarily represent their true experiences while driving. 
One other aspect of the study repor ted in chapter 3 which is interesting, is that par ticipants 
were given a chance to drive once at a speed that was of their own choosing. This allowed 
ratings of the subjective variables to be arrayed around this preferred speed and revealed 
that the preferred speed tended to match the speed just before ratings of risk, task diff iculty, 
and effor t would increase. This indicates that people prefer to drive at a speed at which they 
don’t experience any subjective feelings of risk, task diff iculty, or effor t and that this speed 
seems to fall just before such feelings begin to be felt in a systematically increasing fashion. 
This f inding seems to lend fur ther suppor t to threshold theories such as the multiple comfor t 
zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007).
7.2 Chapter 4 That is close enough
The second experiment reported in chapter 4 reinforces the f indings of chapter 3, with similar 
threshold trends in ratings of subjective variables being observed during a car following task. 
This is important as models of driver behaviour need to be able to explain all facets of driver 
behaviour not just the, admittedly important, aspect of speed choice. Once again, as was found 
with speed in chapter 3, when given the chance, participants selected a following distance 
which corresponded to the point just before ratings of feeling of risk began to strongly increase. 
Although in this case, when scores were arrayed around the participants preferred following 
distance, no threshold effect was seen for ratings of effort or task diff iculty which stayed 
relatively stable. This is likely due to issues with some participants following quite close to the 
lead vehicle, which meant that there were often not three complete data points below this 
following distance that could be used in the analysis. However, it does seem to highlight that 
feeling of risk could be seen as a potentially more reactive variable. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that feeling of risk may merely be something that participants are more sensitive to 
reporting when explicitly asked, rather than a true ref lection of what was felt in the moment.
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Also, in chapter 4 the issue of driver experience was examined to see if there was any 
difference between inexperienced and experienced drivers. Since the accident involvement of 
these individuals differ, it is perhaps possible that their perception of the subjective variables 
assessed could also differ. However, the same threshold effect was found for both the 
inexperienced and experienced drivers. This seems to indicate that the triggers for these 
feelings, at least in the case of simple car following tasks, are created early on in the process 
of learning to drive. It would be illuminating to repeat the experiment with truly novice 
drivers .This may show much greater reactivity and perhaps even produce results more 
in line with a constant perception of feelings of risk and task diff iculty, since the experience 
is still new to them. It is also likely that at this very early point, when nearly constantly 
feeling risk and diff iculty, that the novice driver is relatively safe. However, learning to drive 
is learning not to fear and it is possible that the transition to only threshold perception of 
risk and diff iculty is relatively rapid as drivers gain experience. This may outpace a driver’s 
true skills in recognizing hazards on the road their own limitations and help create the typical 
overconf idence associated with drivers (McKenna et al., 1991; McKenna, 1993). 
This process of habituation could be related to the other aspect addressed in chapter 4, 
that of habit. Since driving is known to be a highly automatic learnt task, past behaviour and 
habit obviously play a large role in driver behaviour. It is in fact through disturbances to mostly 
automatic safety margins that the multiple comfor t zone model says that uncomfor table 
feelings, such as risk or effor t, will arise (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007). Also, in three of the 
studies repor ted in this thesis (chapters 3-5), par ticipants ratings of what was ‘typical’ for them 
in terms of speed or following distance, tended to be the most reactive in terms of indicating 
where the threshold point would be. That is to say, that this variable took on a U or V shape, 
with the bottom of the U/V tending to correspond to the speed or following distance just 
before the other ratings provided began to increase signif icantly. It was, therefore, thought 
that maybe a small change in what was usual would cause these thresholds to be crossed 
earlier. This was tested by having par ticipants drive on both the unfamiliar and familiar sides 
of the road while carrying out the car following task. However, no meaningful effect was 
found. This may be because the change was too small, or perhaps it was too obvious, and 
because it did not actually objectively increase the diff iculty of the task the par ticipants were 
able to rationalize away any effects that it may have otherwise had. 
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7.3 Chapter 5 Maintain that speed
The idea of habit and preferred speeds indicating a threshold point played a large role in the 
experiment repor ted in chapter 5. In this case, par ticipants’ own preferred speed was used 
as a set point, and then they were asked to drive at speeds higher or lower than this speed, 
while in some cases performing a secondary task to increase mental workload.
Again the results of this experiment point to threshold perceptions of the subjective 
variables examined. Fur thermore, when able to drive at a speed of their own choosing, the 
par ticipants consistently rated their subjective experiences of risk, task diff iculty, and effor t 
as low or absent. 
The addition of workload via a secondary task, moved the ratings for the subjective 
variables upwards, ref lecting the increased diff iculty of performing the secondary task, but 
interestingly the threshold effect in the data remained. From the perception of a threshold 
model like the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) this makes 
sense in that even when under secondary load, the automatic, learnt, safety margins are 
still operating and still the primary guide of driver behaviour. Then once they have been 
breached they create an additive effect on top of the feelings already being generated by the 
secondary task. It is less easy to address this f inding in terms of TDH (de Waard, 2002; Fuller, 
2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008), RAT (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 
2011), or RMM (Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011), however, as the addition of 
workload brought on by the secondary task would be expected to have made even clearer 
the systematically increasing and decreasing trends in the relevant variables, or variable, that 
each model claims are constantly monitored and targeted. 
The f indings in terms of the par ticipants’ objective speed of travel, during the experiment 
described in chapter 5, are also revealing. The fact that when under cognitive load, par ticipants 
who were driving slower than their usually preferred speed had a tendency to increase, and 
not decrease, their speed, also speaks to the automatic control of speed. As does the speed 
adaptation effect observed between the baseline and after speeds, where driving slower 
or faster during the experimental conditions had a clear effect on the speed par ticipants 
preferred to drive at the end of each trial. The f inding of an increase in speed when under 
load, appears to be diff icult for models such as TDH, RAT and RMM to address. As in this 
case, subjective task diff iculty and feeling of risk increased, as did the objective diff iculty of the 
task, therefore, these models should predict that action should be taken by the par ticipants to 
decrease these feelings back down to their preferred level. However, what they actually did 
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was to, likely unconsciously, increase their speed and thereby fur ther increase the objective 
diff iculty and demand of the task. This is probably because conscious control of maintaining 
the lower speed was being interfered with by the secondary task, which then allowed much 
more automatic performance based processes to take over. The result was a move towards 
cer tain learnt speeds. This occurred despite ratings of the diff iculty, risk, and effor t of the task 
being much higher than they usually would be if the par ticipants had been operating at their 
preferred speed. 
The f inding that par ticipants in this study who were under cognitive load increased their 
speed when attempting to maintain a speed which was lower than usually preferred, also has 
implications outside of the general discussion around models of driver behaviour. In par ticular, 
it indicates that at least some propor tion of speeding behaviour may be unintentional, caused 
more by attentional issues rather than intent. This is a par ticularly challenging idea for those 
in road safety who may wish to have a more black and white view, where every speeder is 
intentionally and purposefully violating the rules of the road. 
7.4 Chapter 6 Did you see that?
This chapter addresses the inf luence of emotions, represented as unconscious body states, on 
driver behaviour. Thanks in large to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 
2003), but also the earlier work of Taylor (Taylor, 1964), the idea that emotions can affect driver 
behaviour is referenced, at least in part, by all four of the main models of driver behaviour 
examined most closely in this thesis (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 
2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011; Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007; Vaa 
et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011). 
Provoking an emotional response in an individual without their consciously or explicitly feeling 
it is a challenge. However, in past experiments, masked emotional images have been shown to 
be able to produce emotional responses in individuals without their awareness (Carlsson et al., 
2004; Gläscher & Adolphs, 2003; Kimura et al., 2004; Whalen et al., 1998; Öhman & Soares, 1994; 
Öhman & Soares, 1998; Öhman, 2005), and as such they were also used in the study presented 
in chapter 6, with participants being exposed to both negative and neutral, masked emotional 
target images taken from the IAPS image set (Lang et al., 1999).
What was found is that the emotionally negative images seemed to have a suppressing 
or reducing effect on the usually found familiarity effects seen in within-subject designs. This is 
evident in a signif icant order and target image type interaction for the actual speed driven and 
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the physiological measurements of heart rate and high band heart rate variability. In terms of 
the results for speed, participants tended to increase speed from the f irst trial to the second, 
in line with a familiarity effect. However they did so less, if the negative target image trial was 
second. Similarly heart rate tended to decrease and high band heart rate variability increase, 
between the f irst and second trial. This is again what would be expected with familiarity and 
once again this effect was reduced if the negative image was second. 
Signif icantly these effects occurred without any meaningful impact of the images on subjective 
ratings of effort or risk. This could imply that the results were not because of any conscious or 
explicit feelings on behalf of the participants, at least not in terms of changes in feeling of risk 
or effort. 
It should be noted, however, that the majority of these f indings were found only in the 
female participants and not in the males. Indeed, if only the female sample is examined, then 
the emotionally negative target images had a signif icant main effect on reducing overall driving 
speed in addition to the interaction with order, mentioned above. In my opinion, this is most 
likely because of the much smaller male dataset, particularly given the signif icant order and 
target image interactions. However, it is also possible that the female participants were more 
sensitive to the types of images used, or may react to emotional signals in a way that differs 
from the male population (Bradley et al., 2001; Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2007; Lang et al., 1999; 
Lithari et al., 2010; Proverbio et al., 2008; Williams & Gordon, 2007). 
As far as I am aware, the experiment in chapter 6 represents the f irst attempt to use 
masked images in an applied setting like driving. Given that previous studies which have found 
an impact of emotional masked images have tended to be carried out in relatively simple 
experimental conditions (e.g. Carlsson et al., 2004; Gläscher & Adolphs, 2003; Kimura et al., 
2004; Whalen et al., 1998; Öhman & Soares, 1994; Öhman & Soares, 1998; Öhman, 2005), the 
fact that these images had any impact on driving at all is interesting. However, the study should 
be taken as a f irst step and unfortunately does not particularly aid in determining which of the 
four models examined in this thesis is more accurate, as they can all, to some extent, account for 
the effects that were observed. For example, the multiple comfort zone model (Summala, 2005; 
Summala, 2007), could state that the introduction of the negative images caused an emotional 
threshold to be crossed, leading to a reduction in speed. Whereas RAT (Fuller, 2011), could 
counter by saying that the participant’s constant awareness of feeling of risk was altered by the 
introduction of the images and they had reduced speed in reaction to this, therefore, returning 
to their preferred level of experienced risk. While this is perhaps frustrating for anyone aiming to 
prove one model over another, it does highlight that these four models are all similar in terms 




The f indings of the studies featured in chapters 3–6, and discussed above, lead to several 
conclusions. The f irst is that the speed drivers travel at is not solely a conscious or reasoned 
choice. Rather it appears to be handled, at least at some level, by automatic processes. 
The existence of these processes can be inferred when the cognitive capability of drivers is 
loaded, such as in the study described in chapter 5. In this case it appears these automatic 
processes can actually act to increase the objective diff iculty of a task when under cognitive 
load, rather than decrease it. The existence of unconscious processes in speed control can 
also be inferred by the inf luence of the negatively emotional masked images on driving speed, 
as described in chapter 6. 
It is also relatively clear that the f indings of the experiments described in chapters 3–5, 
suppor t a threshold account for the perception of subjective variables such as task diff iculty, 
effor t, comfor t, crash risk, and feeling of risk. This was not the case however for par ticipants’ 
ratings of how ‘typical’ the speed (in chapters 3 & 5) or following distance (in chapter 4) they 
experienced was. This variable tended to be the most reactive and took on a U or V shaped 
curve with the bottom of the curve tending to indicate par ticipants preferred speed or 
following distance. The fact that par ticipants were able to easily indicate awareness of what 
was typical, both with and without feedback from other subjectively experienced variables, 
indicates that these other variables may not be of primary impor tance when deciding what 
speed to travel at, or deciding what distance to follow a lead vehicle at. Rather, par ticipants 
appear to be able to directly use the information provided by their perceptual system and 
current task performance to guide their driving behaviour. 
The f indings of this thesis therefore more strongly suppor t models such as the multiple 
comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007). This is due to the reliance of this 
model on actual performance measures in driving, such as time to line crossing or time to 
collision, rather than on the constant awareness of, and monitoring of, any one par ticular 
feeling or group of feelings as the primary driving force behind driver decisions. 
However, there are several points that should be mentioned about the above conclusions. 
Firstly, in the case of the experiments described in chapters 3–5, it is apparent at times that 
there is a slight increasing trend with increasing speed (r = .03-.07) for par ticipants’ ratings 
of feelings of risk before what is described as the threshold point. This is not always present, 
and once the threshold has been crossed the trend becomes much more apparent. Even so, 
it could be taken as an indication of par ticipants having a constant perception of changes 
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in risk. However, as mentioned in the relevant chapters, this likely is an ar tifact from asking 
par ticipants to engage in after the fact analysis of their feelings and impressions. This after 
the fact analysis could have biased ratings towards the repor ting of these variables and may 
have resulted in the par ticipants not accurately repor ting on how they felt in the moment. 
In fact, given this likely heightened sensitivity to providing ratings, it makes the f inding that a 
threshold type account was generally seen, even stronger.
One additional argument that a suppor ter of RMM (Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 
2007; Vaa, 2011) could make in reply to the f indings of this thesis, is the model refers to a 
best ‘target feeling’, and that it is possible that the experiments described in chapters 3–5 
just did not collect data on the correct feeling. This is theoretically possible of course, but 
it should be noted that nearly all of the variables assessed in chapters 3–5 are included as 
possible ‘best feelings’ in RMM. This includes feeling of risk, a ‘best feeling’ that is given special 
prominence by the model, and is even featured in its name. Therefore, if this explanation that 
the correct ‘best feeling’ was not assessed is accepted, then it would not only run counter to 
the impor tance of risk in the Risk Monitor Model, but also bring the model dangerously close 
to being unfalsif iable, due to the broad nature of the potential ‘best feelings’ available.
A more serious and general concern that could be raised by suppor ters of TDH (Broughton 
et al., 2009; Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh 
et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008), RAT (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011), or RMM (Vaa et al., 2000; 
Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) is that the continuous monitoring versus threshold account 
distinction between the models examined in this thesis, is false, and that the TDH, RAT and 
RMM do not suggest that subjective variables are constantly perceived. Indeed, if the latest 
publication on TDH and RAT is examined then the following statement is found
“RAT proposes that driver control decisions are motivated by a desire to maintain feelings 
of risk (and its corollary task diff iculty) within an acceptable range, even though for much of 
the time these feelings may be below the level of conscious awareness.” (Fuller, 2011, pg 36)
What can be seen from this statement is that Fuller appears to be proposing that feeling 
of risk is kept within a cer tain range, constantly monitored, and maintained, but at the same 
time is mostly not felt by drivers. This statement is in contrast to previous def initions of feeling 
of risk provided by Fuller which stated that feeling of risk was the same as experienced risk 
(Fuller, 2005; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). For example: 
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“They [the par ticipants] were also asked to rate their experience of risk (i.e. feeling of risk) 
for each sequence” (Fuller, 2005, p 468) - in reference to the experiment repor ted in Fuller, 
McHugh & Pender (2008) which uses ratings of feeling of risk to equal experienced risk
“We can tentatively conclude from the above results that Taylor and Wilde were correct in 
exposing experienced risk (i.e. feelings of risk) as a critical determinant of driver behaviour…” 
(Fuller, 2005, p 470).
“Increases in task diff iculty may be experienced as increases in feelings of risk.” (Fuller et 
al., 2008, p80)
In a similar way, task diff iculty as par t of TDH, was also often referred to as ‘experienced’, 
thereby implying some level of conscious awareness, and that it would be systematically 
related to speed (Fuller, 2007; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). Fur thermore, the 
evidence obtained from the Fuller, McHugh et al (2008) experiment, in which ratings of feeling 
of risk and task diff iculty did clearly differ in conscious awareness across a range of speeds, 
was used several times to demonstrate the role of these variables within TDH (Fuller, 2005; 
Fuller, 2007; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). However, this asser tion of unconscious feelings has 
now been made and should be examined. 
The f irst point that can be raised is one of terminology and semantics. As covered in 
chapter 2 (see section 2.1.3.2) the authors of TDH, RAT, and RMM all appear to be aware 
of, and mention (e.g. Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2011; Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 
2011), Damasio’s (1994; 2003) the def inition of feelings as a conscious subjective experience of 
underlying emotional body states. Similar def initions are also provided in the APA dictionary 
of psychology (VandenBos, 2006) and the Penguin dictionary of psychology (Reber, 2009). 
These def initions also ref lect the common usage of the term ‘feeling’ where it is implied that 
the ‘feeling’ is ‘felt’ and therefore conscious. Indeed even the phrase ‘gut feeling’ which refers to 
making a decision based on a hunch rather than via reasoning still implies that a ‘gut feeling’ 
is present and able to be felt and acted upon. 
Still, strictly def initional issues aside, there is some philosophical argument over the 
possibility of unconscious feelings (see Lacewing (2007) for a summary), but at this moment 
no solid conclusions have been reached either way. As such, the possibility of unconscious 
feelings does exist, albeit in a fashion that is not widely accepted or proven. There is also 
another terminological issue can be raised with TDH and RAT in par ticular, in that they both 
refer to ‘perceived’ feeling of risk/task diff icultly’, ‘perceived’ capability and ‘perceived’ task 
demand (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3 respectively). Again the word ‘perceived’ carries with it the 
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connotation of conscious awareness of the variable in question. Indeed, within psychology, 
perception is generally treated as the end result of the processing of sensory information to 
create a conscious awareness of the environment (Reber, 2009; VandenBos, 2006). Everyday 
use of the term ‘perceived’ also carries the connation of conscious awareness. 
Even if one were to put aside the semantic and philosophical arguments over not feeling 
feelings and unperceived perceptions, it is still clear that these models posit the constant 
monitoring and presence of cer tain feelings, such as risk. Therefore, they can still be classif ied 
as constant monitor models rather than threshold ones. However, if the guiding feelings 
are truly unfelt ones, then it would appear that much of the work presented in this thesis 
cannot fully falsify these models. Indeed, given the diff iculty of accessing and measuring such 
a construct as an unconscious ‘feeling’, it becomes quite diff icult to falsify these models at all 
(Lacewing, 2007), although the experiment described in chapter 6 is a small, if inconclusive, 
attempt towards doing so. 
It also appears that the very structure of the Somatic Marker Hypothesis on which 
RAT, and also RMM, is par tly built, is against Fuller’s (2011) implication of the constant 
presence, monitoring, and targeting a feeling of risk. As stated in various par ts of this thesis, 
the Somatic Marker Hypothesis makes it clear that emotions, and, therefore, the feelings 
that can arise from emotions, only occur when triggered by previously learnt situations or 
stimuli (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). This is because, as mentioned in section 2.2.2 of 
chapter 2, our underlying biology, and indeed our chemistry, operates in a threshold manner. 
If our physiology operates in this way then our emotions and feelings must also follow, only 
occurring once chemical thresholds have been crossed within our bodies. The alternative, to 
be constantly having a feeling of risk that was above zero, unconscious or otherwise, would 
be a great drain on energy resources, especially seeing that in most cases there is no need to 
react, and there is no need to feel or have a physiological emotional response to risk. Rather, 
your body maintains its usual function and only reacts when cer tain learnt, or rarely innate, 
stimuli or situations are detected. In this way, RMM’s asser tion that the body is the monitor 
is a valuable one (Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011), this ensures that energy is spent when needed and 
reserved when it is not. The upshot of this is that nearly any emotion or feeling, of risk or 
otherwise, conscious or unconscious, only occurs in cer tain situations and it is only in these 
situations that it can impact on decision making. 
Fuller (1984, 2011) and Vaa (2001, 2003) have also argued that the threshold account of 
feeling of risk provided by models like zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 
1988) or the multiple comfor t zone (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) does not make sense 
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as, in Fullers words; “it is most impor tant to stress that the stimuli which trigger avoidance 
responses must retain their emotive characteristic” (Fuller, 2011, p 28). This is supposedly 
because if they do not retain their emotive characteristics then they become neutral stimuli 
and could not be used in decision making. Therefore, feelings of risk must be continually 
present and able to be monitored. I disagree with this line of reasoning. 
We are not born with innate emotive characteristics attached to everything. Rather 
as stated by Damasio (1994; 2003), we learn to associate emotions with stimuli, but more 
impor tantly I would add that this association tends to be with stimuli in cer tain set situations. 
If I am driving towards a brick wall at high speed then the stimulus of the wall is likely to 
possess very strong emotional characteristics. Does this mean that I am monitoring the 
position of every brick wall that I could possibly hit in my car and unconsciously ‘feeling’ the 
risk associated with them? No, the walls are in this case emotionally neutral and irrelevant 
stimuli. They mean nothing to me unless I am interacting with them in cer tain situations and 
it is in these situations that they play a role in my decision making. They do not have to be 
‘charged’ with emotional characteristics beforehand to do so. All they really need to maintain 
is their wall-like characteristics. This is, as already stated previously, the energy eff icient way 
for dealing with the world in which we have evolved. 
Indeed, one could perhaps look to phobic individuals to see what occurs when this 
threshold, situation dependent functioning fails. Ornithophobic individuals, for example, have 
an irrational fear of birds and this may even extend to objects associated with birds such as the 
feathers in a feather duster. Here the linkage between a threatening emotional stimulus and 
situation, a bird f lying at your head for example, has become decoupled from the situation in 
which it its appropriate. This causes it to be applied to the stimulus of ‘bird’, more generally. 
This is obviously maladaptive and a great waste of energy.
There are cer tain stimuli and situations that invoke ‘innate’ responses. For example, in 
the situation where anything looms suddenly in the visual f ield there is likely to be a star tle 
response and an accompanying feeling of a threat being apparent. This, amongst other 
things, leads to the childhood game of ‘made you f linch’. This occurs whether the suddenly 
looming stimulus is a playmates f ist, or a soft f luffy pillow. So again, it does not seem to 
depend necessarily on the emotional characteristic of the stimulus but rather the situation in 
which it is encountered. This ties in well with models such as the multiple comfor t zone model 
(Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) which would suggest that we have cer tain, rather general, 
safety margins which can be called into play when needed. In the case of the above example 
that would be a general rule or schema that says if something moves quickly within our visual 
f ield towards us, we should move away, and as a result of the physiological star tle reaction, 
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feel aversion towards that object. It does not, however, rely on the object being labelled with 
emotional characteristics but rather on it being perceived visually as an object looming in 
the visual f ield. Fur thermore if your playground friend continues to insist in waving her f ist 
in your face then via habituation you will very soon stop to experience any threat from the 
situation at all, and even this quite strong ‘innate’ response will disappear, not only from 
your behavioural reactions, but also from any indications of risk in your psychophysiology. 
Does this mean the risk is gone? No, it does not, but it does mean that risk is no longer 
being monitored as it has been shown to be irrelevant, a fact that your playmate may take 
advantage of by punching you in the face. The generally forgiving nature of the driving task 
could lead to similar habituation to the dangers that drivers, objectively speaking, constantly 
face (Fuller, 1984). 
Finally it is also worth noting that in order for Fuller (2011) to make the statement that 
feeling of risk or task diff iculty is not constantly experienced as a subjective conscious feeling, 
he must therefore be at least par tly discounting the f indings of his earlier study in which 
this was the case (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). While this has not been explicitly done, Fuller 
(2011) does reference the paper which makes up chapter 3 of this thesis (Lewis-Evans & 
Rothengatter, 2009), suggesting that the impression that risk is not impor tant in everyday 
decision making, is only because most of the time avoidance responses have been correctly 
made and therefore risk is not consciously experienced. While not stated by Fuller, one could 
perhaps assume then that task diff iculty is also not always consciously experienced for this 
same reason. This in itself is an interesting statement, however, especially when combined 
with the earlier statement from Fuller about stimuli ‘triggering’ avoidance responses. Again, 
from a semantic point of view the term ‘triggering’ implies a more threshold type reaction, 
with a reaction only occurring once a cer tain trigger also occurs. Fur thermore, if most of 
the time these triggers are correctly avoided then even if they do retain some emotional 
characteristic it must not often come into play and therefore will not be constantly monitored. 
In other words, if successful avoidance usually leads to feelings of risk not being consciously 
present, then why would it also not lead to risk being usually also absent at an unconscious 
level? One could easily theorize a learning process where an emotional stimulus is learnt to be 
avoided or escaped from, and then this learning itself becomes reinforcing due to the removal 
of the unpleasant stimulus without need to maintain constant monitoring of the potential 
emotion that may occur if avoidance fails. This type of avoidance or escape learning is known 
to be very strong and resistant to extinction (Skinner, 1953), and in fact the process described 
above is very similar to the idea of threat avoidance formerly put forward by Fuller in his 
earlier threat/risk avoidance theory. 
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The above discussion is not meant to imply that feelings and emotions are not an 
impor tant par t of human decision making. As repor ted by Damasio (1994, 2003), individuals 
with brain damage that inhibits or prevents emotional cues being used, tend to make poor 
decisions, although they are not completely incapable of decision making. Indeed if adults 
with these types of conditions are tested in formal situations where they have time to think, 
they often perform as well as brain ‘normal’ individuals. Therefore, they do appear to be able 
to make appropriate decisions despite the stimuli around them being effectively emotionally 
neutral. Since this ability to function is normally observed in adults who developed a non-
emotive state later in their life, it is likely because they are able to rely on past learning and 
rules in these situations, even if they do sometimes have diff iculty when dealing with the 
rapidly evolving nature of decision making in everyday life. It is also found that they appear 
to have problems learning to make favourable risk based judgments when the risk is initially 
ambiguous (Bechara et al., 1997). Although there is some discussion whether this is due to 
issues with emotion and somatic marking or other cognitive def icits such as problems with 
reversal learning (Fellows & Farah, 2005), working memory, or attention (Manes et al., 2002). 
The above f indings mostly highlight the learnt nature of behaviour, in par ticular the learnt 
associations of emotion and action, and suggest that threshold models, such as the multiple 
comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) provide a more parsimonious account 
for the role of emotions and feelings in driving, in that they maintain that what is monitored 
is the world around the driver and the performance of the driver within it. In this fashion, a 
driver can rely on generalized rules, for example about closeness of objects to their vehicle, 
in addition to any emotional cues, risk related or otherwise, that may arise. This means 
that risk, or any other feeling or emotion, is only perceived when cer tain learnt thresholds 
are crossed or cer tain learnt stimuli and situations are present and does not need to be 
constantly monitored.
Not that the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) is perfect. 
Rather, it is par ticularly vague in what exactly motivates individuals to establish these 
thresholds when they are f irst learning them. Also, what motivates drivers to ignore the 
feelings and emotions that signal that thresholds have been crossed? The model is also 
somewhat weak when it comes to detailing what role, if any, of social psychological 
attributes such as attitudes and personality, play in driving behaviour. Finally the model does 
not explicitly acknowledge the driver as par t of a system nor incorporate many advances 
made in cognitive or neuropsychology. These factors ultimately make it a model that is still 




Despite the arguments presented above, and throughout this thesis, there are some 
commonalities that exist amongst TDH (Fuller & Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller, 2007; Fuller 
et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008), RAT (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011), RMM (Vaa et al., 
2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011) and the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; 
Summala, 2007). The f irst is the recognition of the impor tant role that emotions and feelings 
play in decision making, alongside a move away from utility models in describing behaviour. 
This is a ref lection of a general trend in psychology (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003; Slovic 
et al., 2004), and may take on different forms depending on the driver behaviour model but 
as Fuller has already suggested, this does seem to represent a ‘hidden consensus’ between 
the models (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011). Fur thermore, in terms of their observed behavioural 
outcomes the models are quite similar and all four models agree that if experienced risk or 
task diff iculty becomes higher than a cer tain level then action will be taken to reduce the 
experience of these variables. 
Another similarity is that these models, and many of the other modern models mentioned 
in chapter 2, attempt to provide, at least some, clear, testable hypotheses. Although the 
actual testing of the models has currently been limited to only a few studies (e.g. Broughton 
et al., 2009; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008; Kinnear, 2009; Lewis-Evans & 
Charlton, 2006; Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans et al., 2010; Lewis-Evans, de 
Waard, & Brookhuis, 2011; Lewis-Evans, de Waard, Jolij, & Brookhuis, 2012; Rudin-Brown & 
Parker, 2004), and the models are still not perfectly clear. This is however a step forward 
from earlier models, and may lead to one model gaining prominence over the others.
The models examined in this thesis also share a move away from concentrating on 
accident risk. Although, in the case of RAT and RMM, they still do view risk, in the terms of 
a feeling, as a factor of central impor tance. I believe, like Michon (1985; 1989), Ranney (1994), 
and Rothengatter (2002) did, that it is time for traff ic psychology to move away from this 
concentration on risk; a move that many of the driver assistance technology orientated 
models covered in section 2.4 of chapter 2 have already made. Driver behaviour is just one 
form of human behaviour and any truly comprehensive model that seeks to explain it should 
be able to both illuminate why a young driver drives at 140 km/h down a country road but 
also why they give up on reading a textbook for school. Risk, feeling of or otherwise, is unlikely 
to play a role in the individual’s latter decision and, therefore, we must examine the possibility 
it does not play a major role in the young driver arriving at the former.
As stated in section 2.2.2 of chapter 2, from an evolutionary standpoint, risk is a poor 
candidate for a primary guiding force in animal and, therefore, human behaviour. Rather, 
the energy cost of an action is a much more readily available variable as it is immediately 
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accessible and does not need to rely on the discovery of, and remembered association with, the 
consequences for any one action. This distinction is especially important in the driving context 
which occurs in quite a forgiving environment where it is unlikely that most drivers will ever 
experience any seriously negative consequences of their objectively risky behaviour. As road 
safety professionals and researchers we can of course see the aggregate and individual risk 
of decisions made in the traff ic system but it does not mean that risk plays a major role in 
individual driver decision making on a day- to-day basis. To assume so, is in some ways acting 
on hindsight bias, in that we have all the information about how things turned out and, 
therefore, the risks seem to be obvious to us. But we must remember that, as put so well by 
Wagenaar (1992, p 279) “…people… run risks, but they do not take them”, a statement that 
could just as easily be restated as ‘people run risks, but they do not usually feel them.’
Here at the end of this thesis it is tempting for me to propose a new model of driver 
behaviour. If I were to do so, I believe it would somewhat resemble the Situation Control 
Framework (2011) described in section 2.4.18 of chapter 2. This model takes the multiple 
comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007), including the rejection of risk as a 
primary variable of interest and strengthens it with the idea of the driver as a component in 
a system. This systems approach has long been championed by Human Factors psychologists 
(Reason, 1990) and is represented in traff ic psychology in terms of initiatives such as Sweden’s 
Vision Zero (Tingvall, 1997). However, it still often seems that models of driver behaviour 
concentrate solely on the driver as a singular causal point of failure. In par ticular, statistics 
along the lines of ‘90% of all accidents are caused by human error’ are used far too often as 
excuses to blame the driver and institute what are often ineffective educational road safety 
effor ts (Christie, 2001). The Situational Control Framework also references the Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis in a way that I feel is suitable, given the f indings repor ted in chapter 6. 
More than this though, if I were to propose a model I believe it would also attempt to, as 
suggested by Ranney (1994), incorporate the ideas of Rasmussen (1987). Indeed, it seems that 
moving from skill to rule to knowledge levels of operation, would go well with a threshold 
account of feelings in driving tied to actual task performance, in that as drivers move between 
these levels, there is a corresponding change in the mental effor t required by the task. I 
also believe that the feelings that accompany underload and boredom could be included 
into existing threshold models. In par ticular, I hypothesize that the avoidance of boredom 
in par ticular is a strong motivating factor in driver behaviour due to the fact that it is likely 
to be more commonly encountered by drivers than any feelings of diff iculty or risk. As such, 
any model I proposed would likely be a par tly avoidance driven threshold learning model 
which predicts drivers learning not to fear, being driven by expectations and maintaining 
satisfactory, not optimal, performance levels. 
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Finally, any model that I did put forward would also aim to incorporate or explain Hedlund’s 
(2000) principles for behavioural adaptation3 and Elvik’s (2006) laws of accident causation. 
Hedlund’s (2000) principles for behavioural adaptation state that there are four principles 
to consider when designing a road safety intervention if you want to avoid behavioural 
adaptation: visibility, effect, motivation,, and control. In general, this means that if a driver 
doesn’t know a change has occurred, if the change doesn’t affect them, if they don’t have 
any change in their motivations and/or if they simply cannot change their behaviour because 
of constraining environmental factors then behavioural adaptation will not occur. Although, 
it should be noted that in light of the work of researchers such as Damasio (1994; 2003), 
and the results of the research presented in chapter 6, that the principle of effect must also 
accommodate the idea of unconscious effects via somatic markers or emotional physiological 
states. These do seem to be quite broad principles but I feel in the absence of any agreed 
upon model of driver behaviour, they could serve as useful guidelines for the design of road 
safety interventions. This is a role that I believe Elvik’s (2006) laws of accident causation 
can also play. These are the ‘universal law of learning’, the ‘law of rare events’, the ‘law of 
complexity’ and the ‘law of cognitive capability’. These ‘laws’ state that: as exposure increases 
then accident rate per unit of exposure will decrease due to the increased experience of the 
driver (universal law of learning), that rarely accounted risks will account for a larger increase 
in accident rate than commonly encountered risks (law of rare events), that the more drivers 
have to attend to in the environment the more per time unit then their error rate will increase 
(law of complexity) and f inally, that drivers have limited cognitive capability and that errors 
and accidents will increase as capability decreases or is pushed to its limits (law of cognitive 
capacity). Again, these are relatively basic assumptions but ones that I feel any model should 
be able to account for and that can serve as somewhat useful guidelines in the current 
absence of an agreed upon model of driver behaviour.
All this said, I will stop shor t of formally proposing a new model. I do so in par t because 
I do not wish to add to the considerable pile of models that exist. Mainly, this is because I 
also believe that I could not at the moment provide a model that is more predictively, rather 
than descriptively, useful than those that already exist. More work must be done f irst and 
more questions answered. It may be that one of the existing models already has the answer 
but due to a lack of testing has not been validated. I also believe that I and other traff ic 
psychologists must look more often outside of our discipline for answers on this issue. As 
stated above, driving is just another form of human behaviour, albeit one that contributes 
to large-scale loss of life around the world. Therefore, I feel that any model that can explain 
3 While these are referred to as principles of risk compensation in the original text,  
  I feel the neutral term of behavioural adaptation is more appropriate.
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driving should also, at the very least, be able to explain most other locomotion behaviours, 
and more likely, should also be able to account for a considerable amount of other non-
locomotion related behaviours. 
This then, is perhaps a disappointing way to end this thesis, par ticularly in light of my 
insistence that traff ic psychology must present a more united front to policy makers and road 
designers. However, it is an honest way to end and I hope that this thesis can contribute to 
model development even if that is ultimately through a model of my own devising at some 
later date. Science advances most often through small steps of testing and replication rather 
than through leaps and bounds. As such, I humbly offer this thesis as a series of such steps.

CHAPTER 8 DUTCH SUMMARY/NEDERLANDSE
  SAMENVATTING
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Geen enkel model van rijgedrag is het gelukt om algemeen geaccepteerd en gebruikt te 
worden in de Verkeerspsychologie. Echter, de motivationele modellen kunnen op zinvolle 
wijze in twee subgroepen ingedeeld worden en de verschillen hier tussen kunnen onderzocht 
worden. De ene subgroep stelt dat het zich richten op en constant monitoren van een 
bepaalde subjectieve variabele, vaak risico, de controlerende factor is in autorijden. De drie 
belangrijkste modellen die in dit proefschrift besproken worden die behoren tot deze subgroep 
zijn Task Diff iculty Homeostasis theory (Fuller, 2002; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, 
2005; Fuller, 2007), Risk Allostasis Theory (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011) en the Risk Monitor Model 
(Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007; Vaa, 2011). De andere subgroep stelt dat subjectieve 
variabelen als risico alleen relevant zijn als een bepaalde grenswaarde overschreden wordt. 
Het multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007) is het belangrijkste model 
uit deze subgroep dat hier in detail besproken wordt.
Het onderscheid tussen de twee subgroepen wordt behandeld in de hoofdstukken 3-5 
van dit proefschrift, en de belangrijkste resultaten worden hieronder samengevat. Ondanks 
genoemde verschillen, hechten alle vier de modellen veel waarde aan de rol van emoties en 
gevoelens van bestuurders bij het nemen van beslissingen. Allen verwijzen in het bijzonder 
naar het idee dat emoties, weergegeven als onbewuste lichamelijke toestanden, een invloed 
kunnen hebben op rijgedrag zonder dat dit leidt tot bewuste gewaarwording (Damasio, 
1994; Damasio, 2003). In het experiment dat in hoofdstuk 6 wordt behandeld is een poging 
ondernomen dit idee te toetsen, en ook hiervan is hieronder een samenvatting te vinden.
8.1 Hoofdstuk 3 Dat is snel genoeg
Zoals hierboven vermeld stelt Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT) dat bestuurders proberen een 
risicogevoel binnen geprefereerde marges te houden (Fuller, 2008; Fuller, 2011). Het model 
geeft ook aan dat oordelen over risicogevoelens en taakmoeilijkheid hoog gecorreleerd zijn 
en dat deze oordelen systematisch toe zullen nemen met toenemende rijsnelheid. RAT is de 
laatste versie van Task-Diff iculty Homeostasis theory, en is deels gebaseerd op resultaten van 
experimenten waarin aan deelnemers werd gevraagd om taakmoeilijkheid, risicogevoelens, 
en de botskans te beoordelen na het bekijken van digitaal bewerkte video clips (Fuller et al., 
2008).
Dit eerder uitgevoerde video experiment is ver taald naar een rijsimulator experiment. 
De rijsimulator geeft deelnemers de gelegenheid om het voer tuig te besturen in plaats van 
slechts als passieve observator te kijken. Bovendien kregen de deelnemers op deze manier 
extra informatie met betrekking tot hun rijsnelheid. De resultaten leveren ondersteuning 
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voor eerdere bevindingen dat oordelen over taakmoeilijkheid en risicogevoelens gerelateerd 
zijn en dat deze ook sterk gerelateerd zijn aan inspanningsoordelen en matig gerelateerd zijn 
aan oordelen met betrekking tot comfor t en gewoonte. Echter, de in het videoexperiment 
gevonden systematische toenemende trend voor taakmoeilijkheid en risicogevoelens 
werd niet gevonden in de simulator: de resultaten daarvan leveren ondersteuning voor 
een “drempel relatie” waarbij risicogevoelens (het gevoel en de kans op het verliezen van 
controle/het krijgen van een botsing), moeilijkheid, inspanning, en comfor t eerst een periode 
van stabiliteit doorlopen en pas gaan stijgen nadat een drempelwaarde overschreden is. 
Bestuurders geven er overigens de voorkeur aan om te verkeren in de periode van stabiliteit 
waarin de subjectieve ervaring van risico en taakmoeilijkheid laag of afwezig is.
Ook werd vastgesteld hoe kenmerkend men de snelheid vond waarmee men had gereden. 
Hieruit kwam een trend naar voren met een U-vormige relatie waarbij snelheden meer en 
meer als kenmerkend werden beoordeeld vóór de voorkeurssnelheid, en minder erna. Het 
lijkt erop dat dit aangeeft dat eerder gewoonte en het zich bewust zijn van de werkelijke 
rijsnelheid belangrijker zijn voor het kiezen van de rijsnelheid dan een andere variabele zoals 
risicogevoel.
8.2 Hoofdstuk 4 Dat is dichtbij genoeg
De bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 3 hierboven zijn in strijd met resultaten uit studies die zich 
richtten op de relatie risicogevoelens en taakmoeilijkheid met rijsnelheid (Fuller et al., 2008; 
Kinnear et al., 2008). Om die reden is de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 4 gericht op een 
ander aspect van rijgedrag, namelijk de keuze van de volgafstand ten opzichte van een 
voorligger en de relatie hiervan met eerder genoemde subjectieve variabelen.
Om dit te onderzoeken reden deelnemers met 50 km/uur in een simulator achter een 
ander voer tuig met een vaste volgtijd tussen 0.5 en 4.0 seconden. Na iedere rit werden 
een subjectieve beoordeling van taakmoeilijkheid, risico, comfor t, en inspanning gevraagd. 
Ook werd aan de deelnemers gevraagd om op een voorkeurs volgafstand te rijden. Om 
ver trouwdheid vast te stellen reden deelnemers zowel aan de linker als rechter kant van de 
weg. Tenslotte werd rijervaring als factor onderzocht, zowel relatief onervaren als ervaren 
bestuurders werden getest.
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De resultaten leverden verdere ondersteuning op voor een drempel-relatie van 
taakmoeilijkheid, risico, inspanning, en comfor t met volgtijd. Deelnemers scoorden laag op 
deze subjectieve variabelen, maar de beoordeling begon rond de 2.0 seconden volgtijd toe te 
nemen. Het gevoel van taakmoeilijkheid, risico, en effor t correleerden hoog met elkaar. Er zijn 
geen effecten gevonden van rijervaring of de kant van de weg waar gereden werd.
8.3 Hoofdstuk 5 Hou die snelheid vast
De studie in hoofdstuk 5 richt zich weer op de waarneming van subjectieve variabelen in 
relatie tot rijsnelheid. Ditmaal is zowel rijsnelheid als cognitieve belasting van de deelnemers 
gemanipuleerd. Aan deelnemers werd gevraagd om eerst gedurende één minuut op hun 
voorkeurssnelheid te rijden in een rijsimulator. Daarna werd hun snelheid automatisch 
verhoogd of verlaagd met 10, 20, of 30 km/uur, of bleef deze onveranderd. Hierna werd aan 
hen gevraagd om gedurende één minuut met een nieuwe snelheid te rijden. Na deze minuut 
werd de snelheid opnieuw aangepast en moest deze gedurende één minuut vastgehouden 
worden, maar ditmaal moesten ze ook een mentale reken dubbeltaak uitvoeren.
Tenslotte werd aan de deelnemers weer gevraagd om één minuut met hun 
voorkeurssnelheid te rijden. Deze procedure werd zeven keer herhaald, één keer voor iedere 
snelheidsmanipulatie; -30, -20, -10, +0, +10, +20 en +30 km/h. Na ieder interval van één 
minuut werd verbaal een oordeel gegeven over taakmoeilijkheid, inspanning, risicogevoelens, 
en hoe kenmerkend die snelheid voor hen was geweest.
De resultaten lieten een drempel effect zien in oordeel met betrekking tot taakmoeilijkheid, 
inspanning, en risicogevoel met snelheid, waarbij geen signif icant verschil werd gevonden 
tussen de oordelen gegeven gedurende de baseline periode en de experimenteel verlaagde 
snelheidsperioden tot het moment dat de voorkeurssnelheid werd overschreden.
Verder werd gevonden dat het drempel effect ook onder cognitieve belasting bleef 
bestaan, echter wel in afgezwakte vorm. Tenslotte lijkt het erop dat bestuurders die cognitief 
belast zijn moeite hebben een rijsnelheid aan te houden die lager is dan de snelheid waaraan 
ze normaal gesproken de voorkeur geven. Snelheden boven hun voorkeurssnelheid lijken 
makkelijker vol te houden, in ieder geval op de kor te termijn.
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8.4 Hoofdstuk 6 Heb je dat gezien?
Veel theorieën over rijgedrag stellen dat er een functionele rol is voor onbewuste of impliciete 
emoties die het rijgedrag bepalen. Om die reden is in deze studie het effect van gemaskeerde 
emotioneel geladen beelden op rijgedrag onderzocht met het doel inzicht te krijgen in de 
rol van dergelijke emoties. Terwijl deelnemers in de simulator reden, werden ze herhaaldelijk 
blootgesteld aan negatief of neutraal geladen verborgen beelden die “als een sandwich” 
gemaskeerd werden door emotioneel neutrale beelden. Deelnemers reden 3–4 minuten op 
een landelijke weg, en kwamen deze beelden gedurende twee ritten tegen.
Uit het experiment kwam een aantal volgorde effecten naar voren. Als de tweede rit 
verborgen negatieve beelden bevatte, was de afname in har tslagritme, de toename in hoge 
band har tslagvariabiliteit, en daadwerkelijke rijsnelheid geringer.
Afgezien van deze bevindingen waren er geen effecten van verborgen beelden op 
subjectieve inspanningsoordelen of risicogevoelens. Er was echter wel een effect van geslacht, 
waarbij het grootste deel van de gevonden effecten beperkt is tot de vrouwelijke deelnemers. 
Deze resultaten geven aan dat het heel goed mogelijk is dat onbewuste of impliciete stimuli 
rijgedrag kunnen beïnvloeden zonder dat dit leidt tot expliciete gewaarwording.
8.5 Discussie en conclusies
Uit de studies die gerappor teerd zijn in hoofdstuk 3–6, en die hierboven kor t besproken zijn, 
kan een aantal conclusies getrokken worden. De eerste conclusie is dat de snelheid waarmee 
bestuurders rijden niet alleen een bewuste en beredeneerde keuze is. Het lijkt er meer op dat 
deze keuze, in ieder geval tot op zekere hoogte, bepaald wordt door automatische processen. 
Dat deze processen bestaan kan afgeleid worden uit het gedrag van cognitief belaste 
bestuurders, zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 5. In dit geval blijken deze automatische processen 
wanneer iemand cognitief belast is de objectieve moeilijkheid van een taak te verhogen in 
plaats van te verlagen. Dat onbewuste processen een rol spelen bij snelheidsgedrag kan 
ook afgeleid worden uit de resultaten van de negatief geladen verborgen beelden studie uit 
hoofdstuk 6.
De bevindingen van de experimenten beschreven in hoofdstuk 3–5 geven ondersteuning 
voor de drempel relatie tussen de perceptie van subjectieve variabelen als taakmoeilijkheid, 
inspanning, comfor t, botsrisico, risicogevoelens, en rijgedrag. Dit was echter niet het geval 
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voor hoe kenmerkend men snelheden (hoofdstuk 3 en 5) of volgafstand (hoofdstuk 5) had 
ervaren. Deze variabelen hadden de neiging het meest reactief te zijn, en namen een U of 
V-vorm aan met de neiging dat de bodem van de curve de geprefereerde snelheid of volgtijd 
weergaf.
Het feit dat deelnemers goed in staat waren aan te geven wat kenmerkend was met 
en zonder feedback van andere subjectieve ervaringsvariabelen geeft aan dat deze andere 
variabelen wellicht niet het belangrijkst zijn voor het beslissen met welke rijsnelheid gereden 
wordt, of op welke afstand gevolgd wordt. Het is eerder zo dat deelnemers direct de informatie 
uit hun perceptuele systeem gebruiken en zich baseren op de huidige taakuitvoering.
Daarom geven de bevindingen in dit proefschrift ondersteuning voor modellen zoals 
the multiple comfor t zone model (Summala, 2005; Summala, 2007). Dit is vooral te danken 
aan het feit dat dat model berust op daadwerkelijke rijgedragsparameters, zoals time-to-
line crossing, en niet op het constant bewust zijn en monitoren van een bepaald gevoel of 
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